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FOREWORD 
The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the 
United Nations, was established in December 1981. In celebration of its 30th 
anniversary, an International Seminar was organized in Helsinki on 20 October 
2011. 
When the seminar was being planned, there was considerable discussion on 
what the theme should be. Instead of celebrating past achievements, HEUNI 
decided to place the focus on the present and the future, and look at “New 
Types of Crime”.  
This publication brings together the contributions of acknowledged 
international experts on crime issues. The articles deal in particular with 
trafficking in persons, corruption, economic crime, and the collection of crime 
data. 
The staff of HEUNI would like to warmly thank all the experts and the 
participants for their excellent contribution. 
The International Seminar also marked the retirement of HEUNI’s long-
serving director, Mr Kauko Aromaa. In many ways, the discussions at the 
International Seminar reflect his wide-ranging interests and influence on solid 
international criminological research.  
Helsinki, 8 May 2012  
Matti Joutsen 
Director, HEUNI 
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OPENING REMARKS 
Fredrik Wersäll 
President, Svea Court of Appeal, Sweden 
Chairperson, HEUNI Advisory Board 
Welcome to this seminar, which is being held to recognise and celebrate the 30 
year anniversary of HEUNI. I would also like to recognise that the Director of 
HEUNI, Kauko Aromaa, shall soon retire from his position. 
The seminar is about HEUNI´s current profile, or essential parts of it. We, as 
members of the Advisory Board, have enjoyed the privilege of seeing it 
develop over time, and are excited about this opportunity to see the kind of 
fruits that the work has produced. 
The small size of the institute has often raised doubts as to the feasibility of 
having it try to tackle such large and demanding issues. Experience has, 
however, demonstrated that such fears have been unfounded. It seems that 
HEUNI’s small size has eventually become an asset, since it has not allowed 
dwelling too much on past successes. Of course, the price has been the need to 
downgrade some possibly worthwhile types of activity. 
The European working environment has simultaneously undergone a radical 
change, and for instance some of the previous HEUNI activities have been 
gradually taken over by massive, powerfully organised new kinds of European 
cooperation forms, which a small institute can scarcely beat or with which it 
can not successfully and meaningfully compete. 
In this situation, the strategy has been to join and in a way infiltrate the larger 
competitor. It is not, however, excluded that also complementary functions can 
be taken over by a small and flexible institute that has the advantage of being 
able to move more quickly than the massive platforms of cooperation and 
exchange, and of being able to pick up also topics that are not core mainstream 
ones, and thus possibly anticipate what is one day going to become 
mainstream. 
HEUNI is a small but professional organisation. It has been able to fulfil the 
needs for research in the criminal policy area in Europe, by fruitful cooperation 
with UNODC, UNECE, Eurostat and other bodies on different issues such as 
crime-related statistics, including European standards for victim surveys and 
surveys of violence against women. The topics of research are often on the 
political agenda. Examples are trafficking, transnational crime and corruption. 
The work of HEUNI is well reflected on the agenda for this meeting. We look 
forward to a very interesting seminar, with contributions from distinguished 
researchers and lively discussions. 
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Tiina Astola 
Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Justice of Finland 
Forty years ago, Finland began a total overhaul of criminal law. Two of the key 
goals were to review what behaviour should be punishable, and to ensure that 
the level of punishment allotted to each type of crime was appropriate for a 
modern society. For the next thirty years, countless meetings were held, 
proposals were discussed and reports were written. The result was a major 
package of reforms of both the general and the special part of the criminal law.  
An observer could be forgiven for thinking that, once all of this work was out 
of the way, our legislators could relax, and – barring some minor cosmetic 
changes here and there – Finland’s criminal law would remain more or less 
untouched for at least a few years.  
That didn’t happen. Each year, the Law Drafting Department of our Ministry of 
Justice continues to produce several proposals for amendment of our criminal 
law, for the consideration of Parliament. Although most of these amendments 
concern details – important details, but details nevertheless – some of them do 
introduce entirely new offences to Finnish criminal law, such as participation 
in the activity of a criminal organization, promotion of the activity of a terrorist 
group, interference in a computer system, arrangement of illegal immigration, 
abuse of genetic technology offence, unauthorized use of foreign labour, and 
insider trading. We are under constant pressure to consider more, currently for 
example trading in influence, and identity theft. 
Where does this pressure come from? It would be too simplistic to answer, for 
example, that it comes from the European Union. We in Finland are heavily 
involved in the work in Brussels on the drafting of new decisions and we know 
quite well that calls for entirely new criminalizations do not simply come out 
of the blue at European Union meetings. 
The pressure in fact comes from two directions: from the real (and rapid) 
technological, demographic, sociological and economic changes in our society, 
and from individuals who identify these changes and argue that they pose a 
threat that should perhaps be countered through criminal law. 
These changes are often difficult to see, and the individuals who point them out 
provide us with a valuable service. It is often difficult to identify something as 
a problem in society, especially if the victims are not aware that they are being 
victimized (as is often the case with computer crime), the victims may not be 
aware of their rights (as is often the case with human trafficking for the 
purpose of forced labour), or the impact may be diffused throughout society (as 
is often the case with corruption and economic crime). For this reason, there is 
good reason to discuss not only individual offence categories, but also 
information gathering, measurement, conceptualization and analysis. 
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Different countries have different perspectives and interests, and in a 
globalizing world it is important that we have a forum for discussing these 
interests. We must be prepared to intervene when “old” offences are being 
committed in new ways, and when completely new forms of harmful behaviour 
begin to appear. At the same time we should be cautious of overreacting. It is 
possible that some elements in our society urge us to outlaw behaviour simply 
on the grounds that it is new and different from what people are used to. If, 
after careful analysis, we do conclude that new forms of behaviour are harmful 
enough to require a response from society, we must be prepared to consider 
approaches other than criminal law. And if, reluctantly, we decide that the 
“ultima ratio” of criminalization should be invoked, we should take care to 
ensure that the behaviour is clearly defined, and the threat of punishment will 
indeed have the desired preventive impact. Ultimately, modern society changes 
quickly, but criminal law does not; this is as it should be. 
We at the Ministry of Justice are grateful to HEUNI for organizing this 
international seminar on new forms of crime. It is important to us to increase 
our awareness of the impact that different changes have on our societies, 
around Europe and indeed around the world. 
And one more thing. I would like to take the opportunity, here in the seminar 
very briefly, to thank Director Kauko Aromaa for his valuable work as the head 
of the now 30 year old HEUNI. As the Institute’s third Director, he has guided 
it since the beginning of the millennium and, since he will retire very soon, this 
seminar will be his last in this capacity. So thank you very much, Kauko. I 
believe that at the small reception later on this evening we will have time to 
look back and remember old times. However, the focus in the seminar is very 
much in the present and also in the future. I wish you all an interesting day and 
hope to see you at the reception in the evening.  
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John Sandage 
Director, Division of Treaty Affairs 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, friends and colleagues, it gives me 
great pleasure to be present at this HEUNI 30 year seminar.  
As many of you well know, the European Institute for Crime Prevention and 
Control, HEUNI, was established originally through agreement between the 
United Nations and the Government of Finland, signed on 23 December 1981. 
On consulting the original agreement, I realized finally, after a number of 
years, where the “H” in HEUNI comes from – as the agreement actually refers 
to the establishment of the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 
affiliated with the United Nations. The agreement is clear though that the 
institute was always intended to be the European establishment in a network of 
regional institutes. This network was created by a resolution of the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council in 1971 that requested the Secretary-
General to develop and extend regional institutes for training and research in 
the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders.  
The network, which is today known as the United Nations Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Programme Network comprises some seventeen 
programme network institutes, including regional sisters of HEUNI in Asia and 
the Far East (UNAFEI), Latin America (ILANUD), and Africa (UNAFRI), as 
well as a number of both national and international centres of research and 
excellence in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice.  
HEUNI has consistently been a leading light amongst the programme network 
institutes. Indeed, when I look at the main functions of the Institute, as 
expressed in its founding document – in particular para 4, which refers to 
conducting, within the limits of its resources, research serving the objectives of 
the Institute – I am moved to say that HEUNI has far surpassed its founding 
objectives, and continues to do so. Even a most cursory review of the activities 
that HEUNI has carried out in cooperation with UNODC over the last years 
suggests that HEUNI has never seen the reference to ‘resources’ in this clause 
as a particular limitation. For a comparatively small institution, the number and 
range of outputs that it has produced over the last years is impressive and 
inspiring. Allow me, if you will, to mention just some of the highlights: 
 During the twelfth United Nations Congress in Brazil 2010, HEUNI 
was responsible for the organisation of a workshop on best practices in 
the treatment of prisoners in the criminal justice system. The outcomes 
of that workshop have been key to informing work on the revision of 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners. 
 In 2008 and 2009 HEUNI acted as the UNODC partner for data 
collection and analysis on trafficking in persons for the whole of 
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Europe for the UNODC/UN.GIFT Global Report on Trafficking in 
Persons. More recently, HEUNI have also participated in the 
development of a Needs Assessment Toolkit on the Criminal Justice 
Response to Human Trafficking.  
 In the area of anti-corruption, HEUNI recently organized a training 
workshop, together with the Academy of Law of the Ministry of Justice 
of the Russian Federation for officials involved directly in a range of 
aspects of anti-corruption work within the country. 
 Finally, in the important area of data and research, in addition to 
contributing to numerous UNODC expert working groups in this area, 
HEUNI has supported UNODC in the identification of international and 
European standards for the collection of crime and criminal justice 
statistics, in the context of an EU-funded project in the Western 
Balkans. HEUNI also has a long history of producing analytical and 
statistical reports in cooperation with UNODC, including in 2010, the 
report “International Statistics on Crime and Justice” and, in 2008 and 
2003, detailed studies on results from the United Nations Survey of 
Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems for Europe 
and North America. 
In short, it is probably easier to list those areas of UNODC work in which 
HEUNI has not had some involvement in the past years, rather than to list 
those areas to which it has contributed. UNODC is extremely grateful for the 
significant achievements of HEUNI over the past three decades and for our 
productive cooperation and joint work which continues to this day. HEUNI, 
together with the other programme network institutes, brings a wealth of 
experience and knowledge that can be brought to bear on the challenge of 
better understanding crime and in elaborating the most effective response. The 
unique position of the institutes – being affiliated with the United Nations but 
maintaining a certain academic freedom – offers new perspectives that 
complement and enhance the core mandates given to UNODC by Member 
states. 
As we consider the timely topic of “new crime types” at this 30 years seminar, 
I would like to offer one view on the link between international and national 
action in this area. A high level segment of a meeting of the Conference of 
Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime last year also took “new and emerging” crimes as a priority for its 
debate. During this debate, speakers emphasized that criminal groups had 
expanded their activities to include cybercrime, trafficking in cultural property, 
piracy, trafficking in natural resources, trafficking in counterfeit medicines, 
and trafficking in organs. The Conference recognized that in addition to 
developing adequate legislative and operational responses in order to combat 
emerging, and re-emerging, forms of crime, comprehensive crime prevention 
policies to address the root causes of crime are also necessary. Indeed, as we 
work at the international level to strengthen mechanisms for forms of 
international cooperation such as mutual legal assistance, extradition, law 
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enforcement cooperation, and agreement on criminalization in national law, we 
must not forget that almost all “new crime types” have a direct impact on 
individual victims, whether the person who loses their credit card details to 
cybercriminals, the victim of human trafficking who loses their freedom, or the 
victim who loses their life in the unlicensed medical procedures associated 
with trafficking in human organs. All transnational crime, and many new 
forms, rely on networks of individuals willing to take risks and for whom there 
appear to be benefits in doing so. Those living in impoverished and 
disadvantaged communities may feel they have little option but to become 
involved, and organized crime often preys upon families and young people in 
such communities, giving them little opportunity to refuse to become involved. 
Effective responses to new forms of crime must take account of this 
perspective, as they link action at the international level with national crime 
prevention diagnoses and strategies. In the area of cybercrime, for instance, in 
addition to work at the international level on a comprehensive study on the 
nature of and response to cybercrime, UNODC is developing a package of 
technical support for use at country level with all relevant actors, including law 
enforcement, ministries of justice, telecommunications, and the private sector. 
This includes not only assessment and capacity building in the areas of 
legislation, law enforcement investigations, and institutional structures, but 
also key prevention activities, such as raising public awareness of cybercrime 
victimization. 
It is only through concerted partnerships at international and national level 
between the United Nations, governments, institutions such as HEUNI and the 
crime prevention and criminal justice programme network, as well as with the 
private and non-governmental sectors, that we can begin to address the 
challenges of new forms and manifestations of crime.  
I would like to thank HEUNI for being part of the United Nations programme 
network and for playing a key role in meeting such challenges. I warmly 
congratulate Director Aromaa on his admirable leadership and numerous 
achievements over the last decade. HEUNI and UNODC both owe a debt of 
gratitude to the knowledge and wisdom he has brought and the focus he has 
placed on research, data and evidence-based programmes. We will miss his 
leadership but look forward with confidence to the future, remaining secure in 
the knowledge that HEUNI will continue to play a vital role in the work of the 
United Nations and the crime prevention and criminal justice community at 
large. 
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SESSION 1: TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 
ADDRESSING HUMAN TRAFFICKING AS A 
FORCED LABOUR CONCERN: THE POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
Roger Plant 
Former Head of the ILO Special Action Programme  
to Combat Forced Labour 
It is a pleasure to be here in Helsinki and Finland for the first time in my life, 
after several near misses. It is of course an equal pleasure to celebrate 
HEUNI’s 30 year anniversary. This is less than half my own age, but in these 
uncertain days institutions often have far shorter life spans than individuals. So 
hearty congratulations. 
I’d also like to thank HEUNI for its creative research on labour trafficking and 
exploitation. I remember meeting Kauko Aroma some years ago in Stockholm 
at a meeting hosted by the Swedish Ministers of Justice and Labour, one of the 
first efforts to place the labour dimensions of human trafficking on Nordic 
policy agendas. Kauko took the issue up in earnest, and said he would launch a 
serious study on the issue in Finland and neighbouring countries. I left the ILO 
before we could work out a way to collaborate on this research. But he kept his 
promise, and just a few weeks ago I was able to see the impressive results. 
I’d like to start by saying a few things about the Finnish study, before others 
perhaps say more about it. 
The HEUNI report covers trafficking for forced labour in the three countries of 
Estonia, Finland and Poland, and confirms the difficulties in identifying 
situations of exploitation. The research uncovers what are seen as situations of 
labour exploitation in a wide range of sectors, from agriculture through to 
shipyards and construction, service sectors, commerce, seasonal jobs and 
domestic work. It is a familiar pattern of low or no salaries, constant 
supervision and control, removal or passports, long working hours, limited 
freedom of movement, and contracts in a language the workers do not 
understand. In Finland, we are told that stereotypical thinking and lack of 
awareness hinder the identification of trafficking cases, in that they are dealt 
with as “extortionate work discrimination instead of trafficking”. In Poland, 
only serious cases are identified as trafficking for forced labour, and the 
victims have problems getting help. In Estonia, awareness of trafficking for 
forced labour is low among not only the authorities but also the general public. 
Overall, the study concludes that “the cases that come to the attention of the 
authorities represent merely the tip of the iceberg”.  
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Several years ago, I felt that the ILO programme against forced labour was 
almost out there alone, in insisting that labour trafficking in Europe and 
elsewhere was as serious a matter as sex trafficking. Gradually the awareness 
grew. Countries started training their labour as well as criminal justice agents 
in how to look out for labour trafficking. The OSCE, under the able leadership 
of Eva Biaudet and also her predecessor, held important conferences on the 
subject. Countries like the UK began to collect data on labour trafficking cases 
through their National Referral Mechanisms. UK figures, for the first two years 
of its NRM up to March this year, were 331 cases of trafficking for labour 
exploitation and 506 for sexual exploitation. And as Europol observed last 
month, in its annual review of human trafficking ands action against it in the 
European region, “The investigation of labour exploitation is now firmly on the 
agenda of many countries to recognise, adapt to and combat new forms of 
trafficking”. 
All well and good. But this is a meeting about “new crimes”. And if we look at 
labour trafficking through the lens of criminal law enforcement, one thing 
stands out a mile. It is very rarely prosecuted. And it is very hard to get 
convictions. 
Every year, the US Government comes up with global law enforcement data 
against human trafficking, in its Trafficking in Persons Report. For the past 
few years it has provided figures for prosecutions and convictions, for sex and 
labour trafficking respectively. The 2011 report, if the figures are accurate, 
shows how little effective law enforcement there has been on the latter. And in 
Europe, where there has been so much recent attention to the problem of labour 
exploitation, there were only 47 prosecutions and 38 convictions for labour 
trafficking in the entire continent for 2010. These are all tiny figures, compared 
with the ILO’s global estimates of over 12 million people subjected to forced 
labour around the world at any given time. 
So the available law enforcement data calls for some serious reflection. Are 
there actually very few cases of labour exploitation, which are serious enough 
to amount to the criminal offences of forced labour or human trafficking? Or 
are existing methods of police and criminal investigation failing to capture 
these cases? Are better indicators needed, to guide the efforts of prosecutors 
and law enforcement? Is the burden of proof too rigorous to secure convictions 
for the offence? And if it is difficult to prosecute labour trafficking and 
exploitation as criminal offences, should we not look at other ways of dealing 
with these abuses? What is the role of labour justice, labour inspectors, and 
labour courts where they exist? And what other remedies can be available, 
either for law enforcement, or for the protection and compensation of victims? 
How can NGOs become more involved, in partnership with government 
agencies? And what can be the role of employers’ organizations or trade 
unions? 
I’ll try to focus your minds today on three main issues. First, the conceptual 
challenges in getting the right kinds of law on the statute, so that police and 
prosecutors can know what they are talking about, and judges and juries can 
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know when and what to convict. Second, a broad glimpse of the patterns of 
labour exploitation today, mainly in Europe. And finally, some ideas about 
how different agencies and types of law enforcement can complement each 
other, sometimes in cooperation with business and labour and other civil 
society groups. 
Conceptual and policy challenges 
All of Europe and much of the world now covers, in some way, forced labour, 
slavery-like practices, labour trafficking or labour exploitation in its national 
laws. It can be in specific anti-trafficking laws, in criminal codes, or in 
migration and labour law. The surge of interest, provoked by the Palermo 
Trafficking Protocol has brought much needed attention to various forms of 
worker exploitation on modern labour markets, particularly the exploitation of 
vulnerable women, men and also children recruited for employment overseas. 
Yet there is little consensus as to the appropriate response, or as to which 
agencies of government are responsible. The issues tend to fall into the cracks 
between criminal justice, the enforcement of employment and labour law, 
migration policies, and visa arrangements. 
Because human trafficking is generally seen as a serious crime, needing a 
strong criminal law enforcement response, the lead agencies in action against it 
tend to be the police, criminal investigation and prosecution, and criminal 
justice. They want to find hard crimes, and they don’t want to dabble in grey 
areas and subtle forms of deception. They probably feel that this is best left to 
academics and diligent researchers. 
But there is a fundamental issue at stake, which legislators have never quite 
come to grips with. Does trafficking require coercion, or at least the intent to 
coerce? Or is it a matter of moving people into sub-standard living and 
working conditions, even if there is a strong element of “self-exploitation”, and 
the so-called victims would rather put up with these than return to their places 
of origin? Should the anti-trafficking paradigm limit itself to clamping down 
on force, violence and deception? Or should it be used more widely and 
creatively, to tackle the employment practices which seem to be propagating 
“two tier” labour markets in European countries, and gradually whittling down 
the labour protections that have been carefully constructed in social market 
economies? 
Forced labour has been dealt broadly by the ILO, in a Convention dating back 
to 1930 but still considered valid today, as a situation in which people enter 
work or service against their freedom of choice and cannot get out of it without 
punishment or the threat of punishment. Out of almost 190 international labour 
Conventions adopted by the ILO over a 90 year period, forced labour is the 
only issue in ILO standards that deals directly with a matter of criminal justice. 
Article 25 of the 1930 forced labour Convention provides clearly that “the 
illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour shall be punishable as a penal 
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offence, and it shall be an obligation on any Member ratifying this Convention 
to ensure that the penalties imposed by law are really adequate and are strictly 
enforced”. 
The concept of exploitation is an important component of the Palermo 
Trafficking Protocol. It requires legislative attention to the criminal offence of 
trafficking for exploitation, for which there is little precedent in international 
law, let alone court decisions. Only Karl Marx seems to have spent a lifetime 
grappling with the concept. But several countries have now legislated against 
living and working conditions considered incompatible with human dignity, 
providing for appropriate penalties. Both Belgium and France have provisions 
in their criminal legislation which consider the offence of human trafficking to 
involve the imposition of living and working conditions considered “contrary 
to human dignity”. Under Germany’s Penal Code as amended in 2005, the new 
offence of trafficking for labour exploitation, applicable only to foreigners, 
includes the concepts of slavery-like conditions and debt bondage. One 
criterion for this offence is the payment of wages markedly less than those paid 
to German nationals. Brazil’s Criminal Code provides for penalties against 
“slave labour”, which can involve both coercion and debt bondage, and also 
extremely sub-standard living and working conditions. 
There has also been much discussion about the degree or severity of 
exploitation. It is a very subjective term, which has not generally been covered 
in labour standards, let alone in criminal law. Common sense suggests that 
people are exploited when others derive unfair advantage, or make unfair 
profits, at their expense, by subjecting them to arduous and morally 
unacceptable conditions of work. But there are obvious gradations of this. No 
legislature or judiciary will find it easy to determine which practices should be 
dealt with through long prison sentences, which through fines, or which 
through the closure of enterprises. 
The US anti-trafficking law has been gradually refined to capture the different 
forms of deception and coercive exploitation. A 2008 amendment created a 
new criminal statute prohibiting fraud in foreign labour contracting. It imposes 
criminal liability on persons who, knowingly and with intent to defraud, recruit 
workers from outside for employment within the United States by means of 
materially false or fraudulent representations. Israel’s 2006 anti-trafficking law 
is conceptually based on the notion of different crimes of increasing degrees of 
gravity or “gradations in exploitation”. It begins with exploitation rather 
generally defined as the lesser offence, forced labour in the middle; and 
trafficking for a wide array of offences including slavery and forced labour, 
which carried the highest penalties. 
To address these conceptual challenges, the ILO cooperated with the European 
Union, developing indicators to cover all the often subtle elements of 
deception, coercion and exploitation involved. Following the definition of 
human trafficking in the Palermo Protocol, experts were asked to provide a list 
of indicators (or typical elements) of coercion deception, exploitation and 
vulnerability which they know are relevant in modern cases of trafficking in 
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Europe. Experts eventually agreed on a list of 67 indicators, respectively 
covering deceptive recruitment; coercive recruitment; recruitment by abuse of 
vulnerability; exploitative conditions of work; forms of coercion at destination; 
and abuse of vulnerability at destination. 
The various combinations can help understand the variety and complexity of 
modern human trafficking. The method involves a proactive approach, digging 
in to a hidden problem that may eventually merit criminal investigation and 
prosecution, rather than relying on the available criminal statistics (which are 
highly likely to under-represent the reality of the problems). And while these 
indicators were originally developed for purposes of data collection and 
analysis, a number of countries are now seeking to adapt them to the needs of 
law enforcement, and integrated approaches to prevention and protection. 
Many analysts, including the ILO in its global estimates of forced labour and 
trafficking, have distinguished between the different offences of forced labour, 
slavery and slavery-like practices, and human trafficking. Not everyone likes 
these distinctions. With the current impetus to legislate against human 
trafficking, some governments insist that forced labour and trafficking are one 
and the same thing. The ILO estimate assumes that trafficking is a process, 
which requires a recruiting agent, movement away from the place of origin, 
and coercive exploitation at the place of destination. Others have argued that 
movement is irrelevant. These can be largely semantic concerns. What really 
matters is that the laws and law enforcement mechanisms be in place, to 
identify and punish the most serious forms of abuse. 
Global trends 
I don’t need to say much on this point. I think most people in the room today 
have a good idea of the forms of modern labour exploitation.  
Last month, Europol issued its annual assessment of human trafficking trends 
in the European region. It found that, since the most recent expansion of the 
European Union, situations amounting to forced labour had increased. The 
main economic sectors involved were agriculture and farming; the construction 
industry; the service sector, including hotels and restaurants and cafeterias; the 
manufacturing sector; and domestic service. Child trafficking was also on the 
increase, for begging, street crime, drugs, and also welfare benefit fraud. The 
latter was a growing concern, because of the large profits that could be made 
by each of the criminal gangs involved. 
The trafficking methods were seen to vary. Many persons are lured with bogus 
offers of legitimate employment: others agree on the type of work they are 
expected to perform, but are deceived as to the actual circumstances in a 
destination country. Meanwhile, some victims do not realize they are being 
exploited, particularly those who have worked in exploitative conditions such 
as agriculture or textile manufacture in their countries of origin. 
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Much of this is related to what in bureaucratic language are rather gratuitously 
called “atypical” employment practices. In fact they are becoming more and 
more typical and widespread. They involve posted worker or temporary work 
schemes, officially bringing in migrants to work in a particular sector of the 
economy, where wages are normally low, work conditions are arduous, and 
nationals are generally unwilling to do the work. A common feature is the use 
of labour brokers, or complex forms of subcontracting, so that farmers or 
supermarkets can more or less wash their hands of responsibility for 
employment contracts. 
There is growing concern that unscrupulous recruitment practices – by small-
scale labour brokers through to larger and registered agencies – are driving 
vulnerable migrants into situations of debt bondage and forced labour. The 
cocktail is a mix of excessive charges and transaction costs for visas, travel and 
placement expenses in the country of origin; and confiscation of papers, threats 
of denunciation and sometimes physical coercion in the country of destination.  
In last month’s report Europol talked about “hubs of crime” for trafficking 
networks in Europe, including Bulgarians, Roma, Nigerians and Chinese. The 
Nigerians and Chinese were singled out as particularly dangerous, the former 
more involved in sex trafficking, the latter more often in labour exploitation. In 
its words, Chinese organised crime groups operate throughout the EU in a less 
conspicuous manner, and the number of exploited Chinese nationals is 
unknown. Successive phases of trafficking are carried out by fluid and diverse 
structures. Traditional environments for labour exploitation include Asian 
restaurants, textile workshops and tanneries, together with an emerging pattern 
of prostitution both within and outside the Chinese community. A lack of 
awareness on the part of the victims and high levels of seclusion mean that the 
trafficking often goes unreported. 
The ILO’s forced labour programme spent years researching this Chinese 
labour exploitation in Europe, using Chinese and other Mandarin speaking 
researchers to penetrate these so-called “hidden communities”. I strongly 
recommend the book published last year – Concealed Chains: Labour 
Exploitation and Chinese Migrants in Europe – for anyone who wants to 
understand better the complexities of this labour exploitation. 
The book traces the original recruitment methods in China, the relationship 
with traffickers and smugglers, and the living and working experience in the 
destination countries. But there was a vibrant debate among researchers as to 
whether this was coercion and forced labour, or rather a voluntary “self-
exploitation” in which the Chinese workers deliberately put up with dreadful 
living and working conditions to build up savings for the future. Recruitment 
was rarely if ever involuntary. Migrants knew of the hardship that could come 
from clandestine entry into Europe, and of the duress that can result from this. 
Huge fees were paid to smugglers, but there was rarely a direct link between 
the person to whom the migrants were indebted and the employer who 
exploited them. And as the employer did not use the debt as a direct instrument 
to gain control over the migrants, this could hardly be qualified as debt 
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bondage in the legal sense. Rather, employers were taking advantage of 
vulnerable workers. While free consent and forced labour were at opposite 
ends of the spectrum, a broad range of exploitative employer practices lay in 
the middle of the spectrum. And in both China and destination countries, the 
report highlighted the need for special attention to the regulation and 
monitoring of labour brokers and intermediaries. 
So the boundaries between legality and illegality are obscure. Some of the 
schemes are official, but can become ridden with abuse. For example, the US 
State Department has long been equating with labour trafficking the 
sponsorship systems in the Middle East, in which migrant workers from 
African or Asian countries are tied to one person, who can trade the visa in an 
informal market for a profit. But you can find similar schemes in Australia, 
Canada, Ireland and the United States, which are now being scrutinized by 
human rights NGOs. At the root of the problem lies the use of labour brokers, 
who may charge a single worker more than US$ 10,000 in a country of origin. 
So to conclude on trends, there is a handful of prosecutions, some of which are 
successful. The Netherlands has tried hard to crack down on labour trafficking, 
investigating cases and training its police and labour authorities. But judges 
generally acquitted until the Supreme Court dealt with a so-called “Chinese 
case” in October 2009. Since then there have been more convictions, with 
courts looking at objective criteria of exploitation rather than struggling to 
prove “intent to exploit”. In the UK by contrast, earlier this year a jury 
acquitted defendants in what seemed a watertight case, when Lithuanian and 
Polish workers had been recruited through adverts, had to pay back advances 
with interest, had passports removed and in some cases suffered violence. The 
workers had been lawfully in the UK, and were harvesting produce believed to 
be destined for large supermarkets. 
So what can de done? 
First, you need a clear legal framework, covering abusive recruitment, and also 
coming to grips with this problem of excessive fee charging. Business and 
labour have to be at the table, ensuring that the problems are transparent and 
realistic. But you also need a monitoring agency, which does not necessarily go 
down the route of criminal enforcement, but has the power to do so in the most 
serious cases. 
I often like to cite an example from my own country. For years there were 
concerns about informal agencies in the UK called “gangmasters”, the labour 
brokers who provided cheap labour for seasonal work in agriculture, 
construction, packaging and processing, and other activities. They were 
unlicensed and unregistered, they often employed irregular migrant labour, and 
they escaped monitoring and control by the authorities. It was a serious 
loophole in employment law. But then a terrible tragedy in early 2004, when 
over 20 Chinese migrants recruited by these gangmasters died in a shell-fishing 
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accident in northern England, motivated public opinion to do something about 
it. Business, labour and government came together to discuss the response. A 
private members bill was introduced to parliament. The Gangmasters 
(Licensing) Act, 2004, creates the offence of acting as a gangmaster without 
the authority of a license. The following year a Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority (GLA) was set up to protect workers in the sectors of agriculture, 
shellfish gathering, food processing and packaging. Its main task has been to 
license the labour providers, though it also has the powers to bring 
prosecutions in serious cases. It revoked almost 60 such licenses in the first 
three years of its operations. In 2008, it launched a programme of targeted 
enforcement through surprise raids throughout the UK. It has also brought its 
first criminal prosecutions, and launched consultations with major supermarket 
chains on means to combat labour exploitation in the UK. 
Second, indicators are essential. I explained the purpose of the Delphi 
indicators on exploitation, as developed by the ILO. These need to be further 
refined, and adapted to national contexts on the basis of real cases. Law 
enforcement will have a better idea as to when to prosecute, and what other 
remedies are available. 
Third, labour inspectors need to be involved. Some European countries target 
their awareness raising and training programmes at labour inspectors. It may 
seem obvious that labour inspectors should be at the forefront of anti-
trafficking activities. They can be the best early warning system, and are 
usually able to enter workplaces without a warrant. But there can be many 
problems, over mandate, or over sharing of information with other law 
enforcement authorities. The normal mandate of labour inspectors is to monitor 
work conditions and apply national labour legislation. Health and labour 
inspection can be an integral part of criminal law enforcement. In other cases 
labour justice is separate from criminal justice, and applies penalties or fines 
provided for by labour law, even including the closure of enterprises. 
Conversely, there are countries where labour offences are specifically covered 
in penal law. Spain’s Criminal Code has a special section covering crimes 
against the rights of workers, addressing such issues as exploitation by other 
human beings, with specific penalties. 
But labour inspectorates sometimes have a limited mandate, with regard to the 
kind of premise that they can inspect. And the involvement of labour inspectors 
in action against clandestine or “undeclared” labour has its own risks, as far as 
victim protection is concerned. The ILO has warned against measures that 
compel labour inspectors to conduct immigration enforcement activity as part 
of their workplace inspection agenda. This intimidates migrant workers from 
exposing or resisting abusive conditions. It also imposes law enforcement 
responsibilities for which labour inspectors are neither competent nor trained, 
and can ultimately drive an important portion of immigrant labour further into 
non-regulated and clandestine employment conditions. 
A basic code of practice for labour inspectors, illustrated by country examples, 
could be a good start. This could be taken up by a body such as the 
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International Association of Labour Inspection (IALI), which has adopted an 
action plan against forced labour and trafficking. 
Fourth, there is a need for greater awareness among the public at large, and 
better coordination of anti-trafficking efforts. Public opinion needs to accept 
that abusive practices of labour exploitation can amount to crimes, and should 
be punished as such. This requires major media efforts, well researched and 
balanced documentaries, and a commitment to responsible journalism. 
Judges will always have some discretion in a democracy. It helps if the 
definition of an offence is not left too vague or abstruse. It certainly helps if the 
criminal and other legislation can capture the fraudulent practices that can 
make up the offence of labour trafficking, or at least contribute to it. But when 
labour exploitation is a “continuum”, from lesser to more serious forms of 
abuse, there are different ways of dealing with them.  
It is wrong to draw overly rigid distinctions between criminal, labour and other 
forms of administrative justice. They can work together, sharing information 
and evidence, and jointly deciding on the appropriate response. There have 
been cases where special investigative and prosecution units have incorporated 
both police and labour inspection. In other cases, as in Austria, labour 
inspectors are obliged to share information on likely trafficking cases with 
criminal justice authorities. 
The profits from labour trafficking, as from sex trafficking, can be very large. 
The instruments of customs or tax enforcement can be used to clamp down on 
unfair or undeclared profits. This is also important for compensation. The main 
concern of persons subjected to labour exploitation is usually to get back the 
wages out of which they have been unfairly cheated. Creative litigation and 
law enforcement is needed, to find the mechanisms through which the 
offenders are adequately fined, and the victims have some chance to receive 
due compensation even when (either voluntarily or not) they have returned to 
their countries of origin. 
In conclusion, criminal law enforcement is an important and necessary part of 
the response to labour trafficking. But the anti-trafficking movement and 
partnerships should help open eyes to the wider problems of labour markets 
and migration and address the creeping forms of exploitation which, if not 
seriously tackled, can indeed become a source of profit for petty criminals and 
in the worst cases organized crime. 
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Introduction 
It was in 1995 that I had my introduction to working with colleagues in HEUNI 
and I have always found those professional relationships to be illuminating, 
challenging, stimulating and truly collegiate and many of those colleagues I 
now count as my friends. So, it is an honour to be asked to make a contribution 
to the thirtieth anniversary celebrations of HEUNI and to this volume of 
collected essays. 
The scholarly work undertaken by HEUNI over the past thirty years has largely 
been pushing at the boundaries of applied criminology. For example in the 
early 1990s HEUNI was concerned with the establishment of policing and 
criminal justice systems in the post-Soviet societies that were in close 
proximity to Europe and in providing an understanding of how the process of 
‘assistance’ was given and received (Hebenton and Spencer 2001). Applied 
criminological research was conducted by Aromaa and Lehti (1996) on the 
experiences of new businesses in post-Soviet countries, once again 
demonstrating HEUNI’s commitment to applying criminological research to 
inform the making of policy. The HEUNI approach was not simplistic or 
determined by governments but one that critically applied criminological 
theory and perspectives based on rigorous research to the real problems 
encountered by citizens and governments.  
Over the recent years one of the points of focus for the work of HEUNI has 
been in attempting to bring a criminological rigour to the question of human 
trafficking. Recent work published by HEUNI (Jokinen et al 2011 and Spencer 
et al 2011) point towards the importance of taking a critical criminological 
approach to the issue of human trafficking. Importantly both of these 
publications move away from a concentration on human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation and take the broader perspective of trafficking for labour 
exploitation.  
There are a number of areas in which criminology can make a contribution to 
the wider understanding of human trafficking, for example the structure of 
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networks that move people across borders or how the market is organised for 
trafficked labour. However, the one which this essay focuses on is that of 
policy making in the area of human trafficking and the implementation of 
policy. Within the policymaking literature there is a debate about how policy is 
actually made, and without rehearsing the debate here, I follow the line of 
argument detailed by Turnbull (2006) that we should understand the 
policymaking process as one that is about answering questions rather than a 
rational exercise in problem solving.  
Criminology and criminal justice policy making 
The presentation of labour exploitation as a problem, for example the United 
Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) which is a part of the UK’s 
Serious Organised Crime Agency, defines trafficking in a formalised manner, 
drawing on UK law and the Palermo Protocol and categorizes trafficking into 
four types; sexual exploitation, forced labour, domestic servitude and organ 
harvesting. Such an approach to human trafficking, one that problematises and 
categorizes, begs a series of question not least that it has no sense of the 
interconnectedness between the ‘victims’ and the traffickers. There is no 
analysis of how migration is an essential element of the trafficking process and 
how the decision to migrate is one that is balanced against the risks of 
remaining and the risks of migrating. The UKHTC account appears to present 
victims and traffickers as one dimensional and therefore lacks a framework 
within which to ask more searching questions about the process of trafficking.  
Labour exploitation raises many questions; moral questions about the practices 
of producers and consumers and their engagement with markets that drive 
prices downward with the inevitable consequence of exploitation of the labour 
of the vulnerable and poor. Questions that concern economic relationships 
between consumers, producers and those that labour in our own countries and 
in those that are far away. There are questions about what is the most effective 
way to police such infringements on human dignity. There are also questions of 
policy formulation and implementation; how the problem is understood has a 
significant effect on how policy is constructed and formulated. Criminology 
needs to engage with these policy making processes to understand how the 
questions in the policy making process are framed and how these questions are 
answered in the delivery of policy. It is on this issue that the remainder of this 
essay will focus.  
There are a plethora of policies and laws that address directly or tangentially 
the issue of human trafficking. These policies and laws are the outcome of a 
series of negotiated answers by a coalition of interests. The UK provides a 
good example of how international criminal justice organisations, for example 
the United Nations, provide a direct influence on the framing of the policy 
questions. In the UK the Human Trafficking Protocol of the Palermo 
Convention (see for example UNODC 2004) has been incorporated into the 
2003 Sexual Offences Act, specifically paragraphs 57-60. The Protocol also 
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provides a structure to the approach taken by law enforcement in addressing 
the issues of human trafficking in the UK. However, this also creates a series of 
blind-spots (see Dorn 2010) that result in particular perspectives being 
discounted or remaining ‘unseen’. There are no detailed qualitative research 
accounts of interviews with traffickers, there are few research accounts of 
interviews with those who do not define themselves as victims and only partial 
accounts of those who are defined as victims. The research appears to be biased 
towards providing affirming accounts of the official view of human trafficking 
and a significant element of this official view is a process of criminalisation.  
One outcome of the above is that law enforcement agencies within the UK 
have taken a sexual exploitation approach to human trafficking (Spencer and 
Broad 2010), and this is not surprising because as Doezema (2005) has argued 
the Palermo Protocol places the emphasis on human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation and UK policy questions have been framed around the Palermo 
Protocol. However, it is not just policy making that has taken a narrow view of 
human trafficking and making a link to sexual exploitation1 but criminology 
has also taken this view with much of the criminological literature being 
focused on sexual exploitation. However, as Agustin notes there is a process 
whereby what is the appropriate topic of investigation in one discipline, in this 
case migration studies, finds that the focus of investigation moves out of the 
field of vision and into another discipline’s view when there is a shift in 
circumstances: 
“In recent years, the field of migration studies has opened up to diverse 
theories; … it is strange that a whole category of migration should be 
discursively shunted’ or perhaps tidied away’ into another domain. I refer 
to women who leave their countries and later are found selling sex in 
someone else’s, at which point they disappear from migration studies 
(where they would be migrants) and reappear in criminological or feminist 
theorising (where they are called victims).” (Agustin 2006:29) 
This separation of academic investigation results in a compartmentalisation of 
trafficking and the criminological concern is one relatively small aspect of the 
trafficking activity, that of sexual exploitation. The problem with such an 
approach is that it creates many blind-spots, one of which is labour 
exploitation. A consequence of this is that policy becomes formulated around 
questions that are concerned with sexual exploitation rather than questions that 
are concerned with different forms of ‘unfree’ labour (Skeldon 2011). The 
formulation of policy questions and answers that focus almost exclusively on 
sexual exploitation from a law enforcement perspective results in a form of 
understanding that creates categories of victims and pays little attention to the 
perpetrator, the circumstances around migration or the experiences of migrants 
in general. All of these approaches would allow for a more sophisticated 
theorisation of the issue of trafficking and the many different facets to the 
                                                 
1 There are many reasons why there has been a concentration on sexual exploitation – See 
Spencer and Broad 2010 for a more detailed account. 
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activity would become more transparent. Following from this policy making 
would be broader and better informed and so more relevant to the issues faced 
by migrants whether in the sex industry or exploitation in other licit and illicit 
activities. What is critical is how the discipline of criminology engages with 
the key theoretical debates and other social science disciplines.  
David Downes famously said that criminology is a ‘rendezvous subject’, that is 
a discipline that connects with others in a dynamic manner to bring about new 
understandings of ‘old’ problems. Translating these new perspectives into 
policy formulations is not easy, as Garland and Sparks (2000) note there is a 
problem with ensuring that a criminological perspective has a place in 
government decision making; governments operate within a ‘context of 
instrumental rationality’ and one that is influenced by emotions, political 
imperatives and perceived demands of the electorate (Garland and Sparks:19). 
Therefore there are occasions when criminological insights are not conducive 
to the policies that government perceives as being required to tackle a 
particular problem.  
Developing a criminological approach to human 
trafficking 
Human trafficking is neither a new phenomenon nor one that has not, 
previously, been subject to forms of moral indignation (Spencer and Broad 
forthcoming) and the creation of a problem based on relatively little evidence 
(see for example Weitzer 2007). However, we can approach the problem of 
human trafficking by taking account of the work in migration studies that 
begins to provide some answers to the question why people migrate. There is a 
debate as to how best understand the data on migration and to give meaning to 
the reasons respondents give as to why they migrate. Much political debate 
understands the decision to migrate as a relatively straightforward one; people 
migrate because they want to avail themselves of a better life in a different 
country. This rather simplistic approach takes little account of the global 
processes that stimulate migratory flows. Boswell et al (2011) argue that: 
“Political debate frequently seems to revolve around different empirical 
assertions about the causes, effects and consequences of migration. Such 
assertions may involve claims about the numbers of immigrants entering 
or leaving a particular country, how long they are staying, what kind of 
work they undertake, their impact on the welfare system or the ability of 
migrants to ‘integrate’ into the societies in which they live.” (Bosworth et 
al 2011:1). 
These different empirical assertions are an important of the policy making 
‘narrative’ as Bosworth et al define it, that is a narrative that defines the terms 
of the policy problem and establishes the solution. These policy narratives are 
influenced by the global explanations of the human trafficking problem and the 
international solutions proposed.  
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There are a number of narratives in the policy making process. For example the 
UKHTC has a particular story to tell in relation to trafficking and they claim 
the ‘specialist’ or ‘expert’ knowledge and because of this they are in the 
position to best inform the way forward. For others engaged in the policy 
debate the knowledge is not perceived to be so irrefutable but rather more 
contentious because of the problems embedded in the narrative. As Goodey 
(2008) argues the responses in policy terms to trafficking at the international, 
EU and national levels have been constructed using very sketchy data and this 
has located the issue in the ‘migration-crime-security’ nexus (Goodey 
2008:438). Using Turnbull’s arguments that policy is usually a set of answers 
to one, or a series, of questions, this suggests that the thorny questions of 
migration policy have found some answers within a law enforcement 
framework and this approach to the policy narrative creates a number of bind 
spots.  
There will always be blind spots in policy making by the very nature of the 
enterprise, but it is important to identify them if possible because they are not 
always blind spots. What is important is to identify those issues that are not 
being talked about: 
“If 'everybody knows' how things 'really' work, why do the [policy 
analysis] models persist in leaving out such knowledge, and why do such 
inaccurate models persist? It would seem that tacit knowledge plays a key 
role in maintaining supporting silences in public discourse.” (Yanow 
1995:111) 
The areas that are not discussed in many cases are those areas where there is 
knowledge but it is ‘knowledge denied’ (van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009). 
This denial of what is known is in the view of van Duyne and Vander Beken 
(2009) a problem of attempting to make policy from what we know. This is a 
problematic strategy when what we know does not easily sit within the 
narrative structure; at this point to accommodate the narrative the difficult 
elements are denied, forgotten or simply ignored. For example, the difficulty of 
obtaining accurate data on the prevalence of trafficking. As Goodey (2008) 
argues it is difficult to get accurate data for the number of people trafficked in 
accordance with the definition of the Palermo Protocol. The difficulties in 
collecting accurate data are known (see for example Kelly and Regan 2000) but 
in spite of all the difficulties in assessing the number of victims there are very 
many official estimates of the number of victims and the scale of the problem, 
which is often inflated to epidemic proportions. This fits with the official law 
enforcement narrative of human trafficking being a large and significant 
problem that requires additional law enforcement expertise and of course 
increased resources to support the experts. The ‘problem’ of trafficking is 
further refined to focus on sexual exploitation and so the potentially more 
significant issue of labour exploitation becomes ignored and its lack of 
recognition is one of those ‘supported silences’ (Yanow 1995). 
The challenge for a criminological approach is twofold; first, to introduce into 
the discussion of human trafficking some intellectual rigour and second, to 
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counter the dominant narrative by not supporting the silences. The first 
challenge relies on researchers to engage with a range of other disciplines when 
investigating human trafficking. The first question for criminologists is simply, 
‘Is the study of human trafficking a relevant field of investigation?’ There are 
two approaches to this question. It is a relevant area for investigation because 
trafficking is a criminal offence and criminology is concerned with the study of 
crime and criminals. However, a critical approach is required to the problem of 
human trafficking so that the process of criminalisation is understood and that 
the ‘official’ narrative is subjected to scrutiny. A consequence of this is that the 
research agenda needs to have a wider perspective; the focus on the victims of 
human trafficking for sexual exploitation should be widened to include 
research that engages with labour exploitation, an understanding of how the 
markets function in different forms of exploitative and ‘unfree’ labour, 
including the sex industry. This approach would challenge the current 
orthodoxy by locating sexual exploitation within the framework of labour 
exploitation and not as something different to it and thus worthy of specific 
individualised narrow research. This approach would also ensure that there was 
criminological research into the traffickers, who in all the noise about sexual 
exploitation have been ignored. Their ‘story’ is one that requires a telling 
because they provide an insight into how markets and networks operate and 
what motivations lay behind their actions. In many cases, in the UK for 
example, the convicted traffickers are themselves migrants and so have a story 
tell of their migration experiences and their route into trafficking. 
A wider research view of trafficking addresses the second challenge, that of 
addressing the dominant narrative. A challenge to the law enforcement 
narrative is important because it will develop new lines of information into the 
policy making process; more subtle and detailed data will assist in making 
policy at the international, EU and national level that does not simply 
criminalise but takes account of the contribution from migration studies, 
economics and political studies in understanding the nature of and risks of 
migration (Jaeger et al 2007), the economics of trafficking (Wheatsone et al 
2101) and the relationship between trafficking and the political economy 
(Phillips 2009). The contribution of these social science disciplines to the 
criminological understanding of human trafficking is important because they 
provide a wider context in which to understand who are victimised, 
criminalised and engage in trafficking as a means of criminal enterprise.  
Conclusion 
In this essay I have argued that it is important to widen the criminological lens 
through which human trafficking is viewed and to challenge the ‘official’ 
narrative. In doing so it will ensure that victims are better provided for, 
traffickers are not demonised but their offending understood within the broader 
terms of migration and the exploitation of criminal opportunities that instability 
and economic hardship can cause. An applied criminological approach will 
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ensure that there is an analysis of the experiences of migrants (mainly men) 
who become involved in certain types of crime in destination countries. An 
analysis that considered how those who purchase from the traffickers, whether 
it be for forms of debt bondage or labour exploitation, would provide a more 
detailed understanding of how such networks are constructed. Are the 
trafficking networks based on ethnicity, geography or family? It would also 
provide a greater understanding of how markets function and how they can be 
more effectively disrupted. An understanding of the networks would improve 
the attempts to counter enforced migration in the source countries and so 
protect victims. Such an analysis would provide the opportunity to investigate 
in more detail the decision to migrate and begin to provide a perspective that 
does not view all migrant experiences as being the same. The experiences of 
women are different to those of men, the experiences of Roma migrants will be 
different to migrants from Iran. The decision to migrate internally within the 
EU is a different decision to one that requires making a hazardous journey in a 
boat from the North African coast to Lampadusa as an undocumented migrant. 
True to form HEUNI has been investigating such issues and working to 
broaden the criminological agenda in relation to human trafficking and labour 
exploitation. Work by Lehti and Aromaa in 2002 was engaging in the problem 
of how to assess the size of the ‘trafficked population’, but this is not the only 
publication on this topic. Others followed and in 2006 Aromaa and Lehti 
argued that the figures for international human trafficking overestimated the 
figures for adult prostitution but underestimated the trafficking in minors 
(Aromaa and Lehti 2006). Recent work from HEUNI by Jokinen et al engages 
with the issues of labour exploitation and forced labour. This body of work 
provides an example of how the official narrative can be challenged and a more 
sophisticated and detailed analysis brought to bear. It is the task of 
criminologists to widen and take forward the agenda established by HEUNI in 
its 30 years of work. 
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BERRY PICKERS –  
VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING? 
Anniina Jokinen 
Researcher, HEUNI 
Every year Finnish forests fill with wild berries and mushrooms that can be 
freely picked by anyone. The possible income from selling the berries is 
considered to be tax free. In the last 10 years, more and more wild berry 
pickers from Asia and Eastern Europe have been recruited to pick wild berries 
in the forests of Northern Finland. They work extremely long hours in the 
forest picking berries up to 15 or 16 hours a day and are accommodated in very 
poor conditions. They sell the berries usually to the same companies that have 
organised their trip to Finland.  
In order to travel to Finland, most people have had to borrow money in their 
home country and they are thus in debt when they arrive here. No one knows 
what promises they are made about the possible income and conditions when 
they are recruited. 
Depending on the year, there might be a plenty of berries in the forest – or not. 
If it is a bad year, it is completely possible that the income from selling the 
berries does not even cover the plane tickets and the expenses they have to pay 
in Finland for accommodation, food and transportation. Many of these features 
can also be seen as indicators of trafficking in persons for the purpose forced 
labour as we have pointed out in a recent HEUNI report on trafficking for 
forced labour. This issue has been raised also by the Finnish Ombudsman for 
Minorities who is also the National Rapporteur on trafficking in persons. 
Now, they can do all this with a simple tourist visa, since wild berry picking is 
not considered to be a job by the Finnish authorities. The wild berry pickers are 
in fact considered to be independent entrepreneurs, self-employed and thus 
their working conditions and terms of employment are not monitored by the 
Finnish labour inspectors. For the same reasons, also employment and labour 
offences covered in the Finnish Criminal Code do not concern these people 
because they are not employed. This seems problematic. 
This view has been challenged by many who argue that organised wild berry 
picking could and should be considered to be a job. The workers get tools and 
instructions from Finnish recruitment and berry companies, to whom they sell 
the berries and pay for their accommodation etc. If they were considered to be 
employed by these firms, labour offences and labour law could be applied to 
their situation and their terms of employment could be monitored by the labour 
inspectorates. 
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In 2010, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a guideline according 
to which people applying for a visa for wild berry picking should present an 
invitation and contract of purchase from a Finnish berry company. The inviting 
company has to be able to cover the expenses of the person’s trip, 
accommodation and tools in case it is a bad year, so that the person coming to 
Finland does not run into debt and can cover their expenses. What are the 
impacts of this policy, we don’t know as of yet. 
Finally, it should be noted that according to the ILO, work or service does not 
need to be defined as work by the national law for it to be defined as forced 
labour. If we look at the situation of these berry pickers in its totality, you 
could argue that at least some of the features of trafficking are present. If the 
berry pickers are in debt when they come to Finland, they are very dependent 
on the berry company to guarantee their livelihood. If on top of this they have 
to pay excessive fees for accommodation, food, tools and transportation, are in 
debt, and they have been made false or misleading promises about the income, 
nature of the work and its circumstances, one could argue that maybe they are 
in fact victims of trafficking and not just self-employed entrepreneurs. 
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MONITORING EFFORTS AGAINST HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 
Eva Biaudet 
Ombudsman for Minorities, Finnish National Rapporteur 
It is with great pleasure that I am here at HEUNIs 30th Anniversary 
Conference, speaking on the final report on monitoring human trafficking 
security. For those of us who have had the opportunity to participate, it has 
meant a continuation on a lifelong work against exploitation of persons, now in 
its’ most serious form. Modern day slavery, human trafficking, is a difficult 
theme because it brings upon us both guilt and shame – witnessing violations 
against other human beings in our own societies - and not having all the means 
and efforts to stop it. I would like to thank you for keeping this issue on the 
agenda of HEUNI. I am certain that we all will be able to see the fruits of our 
work both nationally and internationally. To continue on a positive note, 
certainly Roger Plant and others who have worked against this crime for more 
than two decades, have seen big changes to the better. I have witnessed plenty 
of changes and direct impact on the work of authorities, in only a few years. 
There are lots of things to do and we already have learned about what kind of 
mechanisms are necessary to bring about more effective combating of this 
crime against human rights. Still, it takes many efforts and true multi-
stakeholder responsibility, as well as cooperation, in order to achieve success 
over time. 
Today I am here in my capacity as the Finnish Ombudsman for Minorities and 
National Rapporteur on Human Trafficking and Related Phenomena. It was 
some two years ago that changed my perspective from that of an international 
diplomatic organisation to that of a national monitor – evaluating the 
implementation of international regulations, national legislations and practises 
of authorities as well as NGOs. Adding to my previous work as an MP, I have 
now looked at our efforts in combating this crime, protecting and assisting the 
victims of it and the perhaps still very humble efforts to prevent this modern 
day slavery from three perspectives: the political, the international and the 
implementation and grass roots level. And it has been a healthy exercise. 
Having returned to Finland from the OSCE at the end of 2009, my strongest 
sensation was that trafficking in human beings really does look the same 
everywhere. That the modus operandi of the criminals was the same, the 
psychology of how the victim is controlled was the same, how the victims lack 
self-esteem and ignorance of her rights was the same, how the stigma and 
prejudice with authorities such as the police, judges and even social workers 
was the same. This depressed me of course, having lived in the false belief that 
the strong social infrastructure, the egalitarian values and the uncorrupted 
authorities would protect us from this modern day slavery. And indeed they do 
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provide us with a better platform for fighting against all kinds of exploitation, 
but there is the added blindfold that prevents us from seeing the reality and too 
many times from believing the victim. The “culture of disbelief” that I learned 
about from studies with social workers in the UK was indeed also very true 
among my own mostly very competent authorities.  
In June last year, the Finnish National Rapporteur’s first report to Parliament 
was published. In this report I evaluated the anti-trafficking measures that had 
been adopted. Indeed during the past years many significant improvements had 
taken place. The Finnish Criminal Code was completed with sections that 
enable victims of trafficking to be issued a reflection period and residence 
permit and a proper victims’ assistance system has been established in order to 
protect and assist presumed victims. 
In my first report we examined how the rights of trafficked persons are being 
implemented and what type of obstacles the Finnish system may entail. The 
most important observation of this report was that human trafficking and 
related serious exploitation are more common than we often realise, because 
victims are not identified adequately. They are not identified at all - we are of 
course discussing a clandestine crime - but more often victims are not 
identified as victims of trafficking or of serious exploitation. The authorities 
may fail to recognize the fact that the person is a victim - particularly in 
prostitution. As a consequence victims are denied their statutory rights, such as 
services of the system of victim’s assistance or they lose their status as party in 
the subsequent trial. 
As the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human beings (adopted in 2005 by the Committee of 
Ministers) states, a failure to correctly identify a trafficking victim probably 
means that the victim will continue to be denied his or her fundamental rights. 
Hence the prosecution also might lose a necessary witness to gain a conviction 
of the perpetrator. 
Many persons, including minors, who are in the victims’ assistance system, 
have been victimized already in a country other than Finland. However, not all 
suspected victims of human trafficking have received proper assistance, 
because the case has not been seen to fulfil the statutory definition in our 
Criminal Code. This has raised my grave concerns when clear indicators of 
sexual exploitation or labour exploitation existed. Use of threats, restricting the 
victim’s freedom of movement and different types of debt bondage occurred in 
those cases we examined. In the process the authorities had attached undue 
significance to the fact that the persons had been victimised abroad and that the 
law enforcement authorities had not been able to detect the perpetrators. 
Accordingly the victims were returned to the country of victimisation. The fact 
that the person in question was a minor, a child, had not changed this 
procedure. The decision by our authorities was taken on the basis of the Dublin 
Regulation which determines the EU State that is responsible for examining an 
asylum application. This regulation which is designed to share the 
responsibility for asylum procedures and to avoid duplication makes it indeed 
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possible to refuse entry to asylum seekers and return them to file a similar 
procedure in the country of first entry. Unfortunately, presumed victims of 
trafficking may, if not adequately identified and assisted in the state of 
identification, be returned to the traffickers they try to flee from and hence 
become re-victimised. 
My office analysed all the so-called Dublin decisions issued between January 
and August 2009 where the applicants had been returned to Italy and Greece. 
Although the number of analysed cases was limited we found results that gave 
cause for this concern. Several of the applicants had reported sexual 
exploitation, violence or political persecution in their home countries. Because 
of the harsh conditions they had decided to leave for Europe aided by a 
smuggler. The conditions of smuggling were often inhumane and the persons 
were not able to describe their journeys. Some reported that the smugglers had 
taken their travel documents. They also mentioned that they owed money. In 
nearly all cases we examined the applicants had also been subjected to physical 
or sexual violence. Many reported violence from authorities. The documents 
clearly indicated that human trafficking had already taken place in more than 
half of the cases, the exploitation had taken place in prostitution or work in a 
bakery or on a farm, or they had been forced to carry drugs. 
What seems to have emerged as a challenge in the cases analysed is that the 
Dublin procedure does not enable an identification of possible human 
trafficking. In many cases the documentation showed that authorities took no 
measures concerning ambiguities in the applicants travel arrangements, 
becoming victims of sexual violence or other violence, abductions, or 
deception as to the nature of the promised work. The decision was mostly 
concerned with reception conditions for asylum seekers in Greece and Italy and 
the need to investigate the crime where it had been committed. It is important 
to note, however, that although the Dublin Regulation makes it possible to also 
return minors to another EU country, it does not eliminate the requirements in 
international obligations and national legislation to assess the best interest of 
the child in all action taken by the administrative authorities. 
What I have learned - following grass roots implementation of the combat 
against human trafficking – is that it is absolutely necessary to create a system 
for the protection of and assistance to victims, based on particular legislation 
and procedures, that is not dependent on whether the traffickers can be 
identified, prosecuted or convicted. Each State should offer support to a victim 
in their territory independently of the criminal procedure. Indicators of human 
trafficking should be sufficient reason to provide assistance. The identification 
process is time-consuming and complex but due to the serious nature of the 
crime and to our continued failure to protect men, women and children - often 
foreigners and with little understanding of their rights - it is necessary to 
become better at recognising indicators and act upon them. We already have 
enough international evidence on this to learn! 
Child protection measures must also be included. The target level should be the 
level of the domestic child protection measures. Children should be treated as 
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if they were our own. Many victims also have children who are in need of child 
protection measures. Measures addressing domestic trafficking are important 
and particular attention should be given to the risks for young girls and boys. 
Many countries have put different anti- trafficking mechanisms in place. Many 
countries already have National Action Plans and have appointed National 
Coordinators and even National Rapporteurs. They all have distinct features 
that complement one another and there is evidence that action against 
trafficking and related exploitation can benefit and become more targeted and 
efficient by using these mechanisms. I would myself once more like to 
emphasize the impact that we have, as an independent and transparent National 
Rapporteur. We not only gather data, but we also analyse existing data and 
information, and evaluate anti-trafficking policies and actions taken. We have 
not been very keen on supporting efforts of cross- border technical data 
gathering without adequate analysing of the figures, that tell us so little of 
reality. Comparing such analysis could on the other hand give us plenty of 
information. But let’s first establish National Rapporteurs in all EU countries, 
as indeed we all have committed to do. In Finland this work, following our first 
report to Parliament, the serious examination of this report by Parliament, and 
the thorough recommendations to authorities from Parliament, has clearly 
pushed us forward to a more efficient and evidence-based anti-trafficking 
work.  
It is necessary not to lie back and be satisfied when legislation is set up, but to 
also follow the implementation and coordination between actors. It is on the 
contrary essential that also other actors, such as Parliamentarians, NGOs and 
the media (which we should not forget) continue to ask the tough questions, 
make authorities accountable for their deficiencies in identifying and protecting 
victims and put priorities in place when it comes to resources. Trafficking is a 
serious crime against humans, against our human dignity and equality. 
Trafficking erodes these basic values. Every failure to protect a victim - be it a 
man, woman or a child - is a failure of society. The victims cannot be blamed 
for this crime. Many times too often they still are. 
Much improvement has indeed happened even if the challenges grow at an 
even faster pace. The enemy is carrying on a business with profits that are hard 
to overestimate, only because we allow this market of commercial sexual 
exploitation and inhuman labour conditions to exist. So far, Europe has not 
been very successful on curbing the demand. However, it is positive that the 
strong labour market actors in Finland have taken on this challenge to fight and 
recognise also the most serious exploitation of foreigners in our labour market, 
here in Finland. Again it needs to be said that secluded workplaces in homes or 
in remote areas are particularly difficult to detect, and more attention should be 
given to low threshold services that provide legal advice and information about 
other services in particular for persons in an irregular situation. Discussions on 
how to break the evil circle of exploitation for seriously exploited persons in 
irregular situations, and ensure their empowerment and social mobility, is still 
not an issue with Finnish politicians. The protection of undocumented persons 
  37  
who live and work in Europe has not become a political issue here as of yet, 
although the Ombudsman for Minorities has called for access to education for 
children. A global clinic provides very basic health care services for 
undocumented persons in Helsinki today. 
The report on trafficking in human beings for the purpose of forced labour in 
Finland, Estonia and Poland, published by HEUNI earlier this year, shows 
some important facts. It confirms many of the findings that my office has 
made. The study shows that many of the cases of exploitation of migrant labour 
in Finland, in fact, have included traits of trafficking. The workers have been 
threatened, they have worked extremely long hours, for little or no pay, the 
workers have been indebted already before coming to Finland and they live in 
very poor conditions. However, it seems that authorities and others fail to see 
this as indicators of trafficking and only treat it as violations of labour rights or 
as work discrimination. The HEUNI study argues that there is a need to see the 
totality of the situation of the exploited workers - not just the separate 
indications of salary violations or long working hours. There is a need to see 
also the more subtle forms of control of movement that make it impossible for 
the worker to leave the abusive workplace. Trafficking for forced labour, 
therefore, does not mean only situations where there is extreme force or 
violence. 
My second National Report is a kind of midterm report with a more narrow 
perspective than the first, that was directed to Parliament and that contain 
recommendations that are being implemented a few years ahead. This year I 
particularly draw attention to the failures in identification and protection of 
victims of sexual exploitation, victimized in prostitution in Finland. We are 
currently also supporting the police in their efforts to create more adequate 
operative guidelines, and how to pay better attention to indicators of presumed 
trafficking. In this effort, continuous training of law-enforcement authorities, 
the police and the prosecutors, is of greatest importance As monitor, we do 
have access to all information, and we are making particular efforts to detect at 
what point decisions are taken not to further investigate cases as human 
trafficking. And we do all know - what is not investigated is not found. Instead, 
lesser crimes are investigated, such as pimping, where unfortunately the rights 
of victims are weak in law. We have found that, contrary to international 
experience, only a very small part of the victim assistance is directed to victims 
of sexual exploitation. Less than 10 persons have come from exploitation in 
prostitution in Finland. 
As national Rapporteur I am very pleased, however, that our recommendations 
from the previous report were accepted to a large extent and new legislation 
improving protection, and hopefully also hence identification of victims is 
being prepared as well as changes in criminal law. It is a most worrying 
situation when foreigners, in particular exploited women, do not receive 
adequate protection in our country even when it comes to such serious crimes 
as trafficking. However, I am an optimist also on this account. Our work in 
raising awareness among the public and among decision-makers has been quite 
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successful and Finland is finally in practice preparing for ratification of the 
important Council of Europe Convention on Human Trafficking. The 
Convention must bring about stronger efforts in victim protection, improving 
victim protection in the Dublin process among other things. 
I want to congratulate HEUNI on its 30th anniversary. It is a great pleasure to 
co-operate with you and I personally would like to thank Kauko Aromaa, for 
his important work for many years. All the more, I appreciate your important 
work fighting human trafficking and related exploitation! HEUNI has been key 
in keeping trafficking high on the political agenda - please continue to do so! 
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HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF ORGAN REMOVAL: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 
Florence Hol, LLB 
The Netherlands 
Introduction 
This paper is the outcome of research into recent developments in the 
Netherlands and developments in the field of international regulations 
concerning human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal and organ 
trade.  
This research has been conducted at the Bureau of the Dutch Rapporteur on 
Trafficking in Human Beings, commissioned by the Dutch National 
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, Mrs. C.E. Dettmeijer-Vermeulen. 
There has been a National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings in the 
Netherlands since 1 April 2000 and the Rapporteur’s main task is to report on 
the nature and extent of human trafficking in the Netherlands, and on the 
effects of the anti-trafficking policy being pursued. The Dutch Rapporteur 
works independently and reports to the Dutch government.1 
The Dutch National Rapporteur has published two reports, one in 2007 and one 
in 2009 in which human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal is 
discussed.2 It was evident from these reports that there is very little information 
available on the actual occurrence of human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal and on organ trade. There was evidence that transplant tourism 
and human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal do occur in the 
Netherlands and that people are prepared to accept payment for donating a 
kidney. The need to be vigilant was emphasized. 
The current research builds further on these two reports and charts the present 
situation in the Netherlands regarding human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal and organ trading. 
                                                 
1 The website of Dutch Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings is http://english.bnrm.nl/.  
2 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2007), Chapter 9 and Dutch National Rapporteur on 
THB (2009), Chapter 13.  
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First of all in section 2.1 there is a brief outline of the legislation concerning 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal and organ trading. Then 
the recent developments in national legislation concerning human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal and organ trading will be described. Special 
attention is given to the amendment of the Health Insurance Act. 
Reimbursement for transplants in countries outside of the European Union and 
the European Economic Area are no longer possible as a result of this 
amendment, unless the donor is a spouse, registered partner or relative of the 
insured person. Further the Subsidy Regulation for live transplants, which 
compensates the donor for costs incurred as a result of the donation, will be 
discussed. 
Section 2.2 deals with the occurrence of trafficking of human beings for the 
purpose of organ removal in the Netherlands, as well as the possible 
involvement of Dutch people. The Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking 
in Human Beings has received one signal, in recent times, of a possible 
instance of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. The signals 
and indications of the existence of organ trafficking and transplant tourism are 
really increasing. These signals will be handled in section 2.3. 
The shortage of donors is the root cause of human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal and organ trading.3 Therefore it is important to outline the 
government’s approach to the shortage of donors. The recent developments in 
this approach will be handled in section 2.4. 
The dominant idea in the Netherlands is that altruism should be the motivation 
for donating an organ. However, there are more and more calls from all sides to 
encourage organ donation by offering financial incentives. This will be looked 
into in section 2.5. 
Attention is given to commercial surrogacy in section 2.6 and whether this 
phenomenon could fall under Article 273f of the Dutch Criminal Code on 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. 
Finally, section 3 examines the most recent developments in international 
regulations and other international documents that are of importance to human 
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. 
Developments in the Netherlands 
National regulations 
Human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal as well as organ trading 
are criminal offences in the Netherlands.4 In this section I will begin with a 
                                                 
3 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2007), § 13.2.2, p. 545 and § 13.3.2, p. 550. 
4 See article 273f of the Dutch Criminal Code and article 32 of the Organ Donation Act (Wet 
op de orgaandonatie). 
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brief outline of the legislation concerning human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal and organ trade. For an extended discussion on the legislation in 
question I can recommend the Fifth Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur.5 
The recent developments in national legislation concerning human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal and organ trade will also be covered. 
Brief outline of national regulations  
Human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal is, according to Article 
273f of the Dutch Criminal Code, a criminal offence in the Netherlands since 1 
January 2005. It is a criminal offence according to Article 273f part 1 
subparagraph 1 of the Penal Code to recruit, transport, move, accommodate or 
shelter anyone by coercive means (using violence, threats of violence, 
extortion, deception etc.) for the purpose of removing their organs. To commit 
such an offence, the actual exploitation or the removal of an organ is not 
necessary.6 Sub-paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9 of paragraph 1 also have to do with 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. A Dutch person abroad 
who is guilty of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal is also 
liable to punishment under Article 273f when this is considered an offence in 
the country concerned.  
The supply of organs is regulated by the Organ Donation Act.7 The most 
important condition in this Act for organ donation is the explicit prior 
permission of the donor8 and “provision of the organ free of charge”.9  
Deliberate removal of an organ during life or after death without prior 
permission being given is a criminal offence under Article 32 of the Organ 
Donation Act. Also intentionally bringing about or encouraging another person 
to grant permission to a third party to allow the removal of an organ during life 
for a fee in excess of the costs is a criminal offence. Furthermore it is a 
criminal offence for those who openly offer a commercial fee for the receipt of 
an organ and also those who openly offer themselves as donor or as 
“negotiator” for a commercial fee. 
Health insurance 
The Seventh Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur discussed a case of 
transplant tourism where a Dutch kidney patient had undergone an organ 
                                                 
5 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2007), pp. 193-194, 197-198. 
6 Cleiren & Verpalen 2010, (T&C Sr), art. 273f Sr, aant. 9 (Commentary H. van Maurik). 
7 Wet van 24 mei 1996, houdende regelen omtrent het ter beschikking stellen van organen (Wet 
op de orgaandonatie). 
8 Article 8 Organ Donation Act. 
9 Article 2 Organ Donation Act. Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2007), § 9.2.1, p. 193. 
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transplant in Pakistan.10 This transplant was covered by a Dutch health 
insurance company. The Health Insurance Act stipulated that the health 
insurance company had to pay the costs of the transplant regardless of whether 
the organ was paid for or not.11 That conflicted with the ethical and legal norms 
in the Netherlands where an organ should be provided for free.12 That is why 
the Minister for Health, Welfare and Sport, in a letter to Parliament on 3 
November 2008, announced the intention to “supplement the regulations in 
such a way that the health insurance company would have to refuse 
compensation in cases where there is serious doubt about the ethical 
acceptability of a transplant.”13 Pursuant to this intention the Health Insurance 
Act, Article 2.4, first paragraph, part c, came into effect on 1 January 2010.14 
This article now states that transplants outside the European Union countries 
and countries that are party to the Agreement of the European Economic Area 
are not reimbursed, unless it is a donation from a spouse, registered partner or 
relative of the person insured.15 The rationale is that in these cases there will be 
no question of extra financial compensation.16 The threshold has been raised 
for Dutch people to undergo transplants abroad against payment as a result of 
this change. The payment of compensation for transplants by the health 
insurance company is now more in line with the criminal status of organ 
trading.17 For organ transplants within the European Union countries and 
countries that are party to the Agreement of the European Economic Area there 
is no provision for the health insurance company to refuse a reimbursement in 
case of serious doubt about the ethical acceptability of a transplant. In these 
cases the reimbursement for the transplant is dependent on the policy 
conditions of the health insurance company. 
 
                                                 
10 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.3.1. See the broadcast of the television 
programme Netwerk of 21 January 2008. 
11 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.3.1, p. 548. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 
2007/08, nr. 1741. 
12 Besluit van 31 augustus 2009, houdende wijziging van het besluit zorgverzekeringen in 
verband met aanpassingen in de te verzekeren prestaties en in de regels voor het eigen risico 
per 1 januari 2010, Stb. 2009, 381. 
13 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 28 140, nr. 62. 
14 Stb. 2009, 381, op. cit., 12.  
15 Artikel 2.4, eerste lid, onderdeel c, van het Besluit zorgverzekering: transplantaties van 
weefsels en organen slechts tot de zorg behoren indien de transplantatie is verricht in een 
lidstaat van de Europese Unie, in een staat die partij is bij de Overeenkomst betreffende de 
Europese Economische Ruimte of in een andere staat indien de donor woonachtig is in die staat 
en de echtgenoot, de geregistreerde partner of een bloedverwant in de eerste, tweede of derde 
graad van de verzekerde is. 
16 Stb. 2009, 381, op. cit., 12.  
17 Article 32 Wet op de orgaandonatie. 
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Reimbursement of the costs resulting from the donation 
The Subsidy Regulation for living donation that came into effect on 1 June 
2009 is also worth mentioning.18 This regulation is to meet the costs that are 
incurred as a direct result of the donation, as far as there is no other 
reimbursement for these costs.19 The compensation to donors for expenses 
incurred has a more structured basis with this regulation and firmer ground in 
public law.20 In this way a barrier has been lifted for living donation.21  
Incidents of human trafficking for the purpose of organ 
removal 
Although human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal has been made a 
criminal offence since 1 January 2005 under Article 273f of the Dutch 
Criminal Code, the question remains whether this form of human trafficking 
actually occurs in the Netherlands or whether it involves Dutch people.  
The Bureau of the Dutch Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings has 
received some signals that in 2006 and 2007 there were possible cases of 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal.22 Since these cases the 
Bureau of VieJa23 and CoMensha24 have received information on one possible 
case in 2010 of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. This 
involved an Iranian political refugee who had been smuggled into the 
Netherlands via Istanbul. He was locked up in a room in the Netherlands and 
threatened with organ removal. The man managed to escape and told his story 
to the police. After this he was allotted a place to stay and an asylum 
application procedure was started. 
                                                 
18 Regeling van de Minister van Volksgezondheid, welzijn en Sport van 12 mei 2009, nr. 
GMT/IB/2929135, houdende tegemoetkoming in kosten voor het ter beschikking stellen van 
een orgaan bij leven (Subsidieregeling donatie bij leven), Stcrt. 2009, 97. 
19 See for examples of compensations for which the donor is eligible: Kamerstukken II 
2010/11, 28 140, nr. 77, p. 9. 
20 Stcrt. 2009, 97, op. cit., 18, p. 4. 
21 Stcrt. 2009, 97, op. cit., 18, p. 4.  
22 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.3.3. Two signals came from the police in 
2006 and 2007 concerning the possible involvement of human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal and another case was registered by CoMensha in 2007.  
23 Vieja Utrecht is an organisation concerned with what is involved in an effective response to 
domestic violence, such as advising, prevention, indication and registration, care and guidance 
and developing expertise. See: http://www.vieja-utrecht.nl/. 
24 CoMensha is the Dutch coordination centre on human trafficking and functions as a national 
contact point for the central application, placement and registration of victims of human 
trafficking. See http://www.comensha.nl/. 
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There are no new (possible) cases of human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal known to the police25 and according to the public prosecution 
office they have never launched prosecution procedures for human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal.26 
In Belgium two cases of illegally removing organs27 came to the attention of 
the public prosecutor, but according to the Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism no legal proceedings have materialized.28  
Incidents of organ trade and transplant tourism 
Risk of human trafficking 
From the above it appears that there are hardly any signs that human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal does occur in the Netherlands or involves 
Dutch people. Yet it is important to remain vigilant regarding human 
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. It is therefore important to 
monitor practices that carry risks for human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal.  
This section will consider whether there are signs that organ trade and 
transplant tourism occur in the Netherlands or involve Dutch people. Organ 
trade is not the same as human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal, 
but in practice they can overlap in the same set of facts.29 The risk with organ 
trading is that the commercialization of organs can compromise the voluntary 
nature of the donation.30 Where there is organ trade there is thus also the risk of 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. That is why it is important 
to consider signals of organ trading. 
An outline of evidence of organ trade in the Netherlands or involving Dutch 
people, at the time of writing this report, will be given below. 
Organ trade and transplant tourism in the Netherlands and involving 
Dutch people 
Although there is not yet a clear picture on the extent of organ trade and 
transplant tourism in the Netherlands or involving Dutch people, more and 
                                                 
25 According to the expertise centre human trafficking and frontier-running of the National 
Police Services Agency (KLPD). 
26 According to the press officer of the national office of the public prosecutor, Wim de Bruin. 
27 Human trafficking –illegal removal of organs, art. 433 quinquies § 1,5º SW. 
28 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding, Jaarverslag Mensenhandel 
en - smokkel 2009, In schijn van wettelijkheid, Brussel: oktober 2010, p. 47. 
29 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2007), § 9.9.2.  
30 See Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.2.2 and § 2.5 (financial incentives) of 
this paper.  
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more light is being cast on the subject. Organs appear to be offered and sought 
after in public more frequently, doctors seem to find it easier to talk about 
possible cases of transplant tourism that they come across during their work, 
and there is more and more research done on the extent of organ trade and 
transplant tourism.31 
More and more people advertise their kidney for sale via the internet and 
sometimes in the newspapers as well.32 In early 2011 a major Dutch newspaper 
reported that recently 24 people had definitely advertised their kidney for sale 
by placing ads on websites such as Marktplaats and Speurders (Dutch eBay 
sites).33 In the advertisements financial compensation is requested and 
sometimes a definite amount was mentioned, e.g. 40,000 or 60,000 Euro.34 The 
advertisements are usually removed from the sites after a while. Sometimes 
there are also advertisements placed by kidney patients looking for an organ.35 
Early in 2011 there was an uproar over transplant tourism by Dutch people in 
Belgium. In 2010 28 Dutch people, who were on the waiting list in Belgium, 
received a Belgian organ transplant.36 Member of Parliament Dijkstra (D66) 
questioned the Minister for Health, Welfare and Sport about this.37 However, 
this case was not about paying for organs.  
                                                 
31 For research concerning organ trade see for instance: I. Geesink, C. Steegers (2011) and F. 
Ambagtsheer (2007). Michael Bos of the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council) has also done 
research on the worldwide organ economy.  
32 See for instance the advertisement ‘Nier aangeboden, prijs: nader overeen te komen’ of 13 
April 2011 on Tweedehands.net, http://diensten.tweedehands.net/overige-welzijn/nier-
aangeboden.html (Last consulted on 10 May 2011), the advertisement on Speurders.nl, 
www.nujij.nl/nier-te-koop-nier-aangeboden-gezond-nier.10684265.lynkx (Last consulted on 
10 May 2011), the newspaper article ‘Nier te koop uit geldnood’, Telegraaf, 18 March 2010, 
and the newspaper article ‘Nier verkopen enige uitweg voor Roos Lee’, Algemeen Dagblad, 8 
January 2011. 
33 ‘Nederlanders zetten hun nier te koop op internet’, Algemeen dagblad, 8 January 2011 en 
‘Nier verkopen enige uitweg voor Roos Lee’, Algemeen Dagblad, 8 January 2011. 
34 See the advertisement ‘Nier aangeboden, prijs: nader overeen te komen’ of 13 April 2011 on 
Tweedehands.net, http://diensten.tweedehands.net/overige-welzijn/nier-aangeboden. html (Last 
consulted on 10 May 2011), the advertisement on Speurders.nl, www.nujij.nl/nier-te-koop-
nier-aangeboden-gezond-nier.10684265.lynkx (Last consulted on 10 May 2011), the 
newspaper article ‘Nier te koop uit geldnood’, Telegraaf, 18 March 2010, and the newspaper 
article ‘Nier verkopen enige uitweg voor Roos Lee’, Algemeen Dagblad, 8 January 2011. 
35 See for example the article ‘Gezocht: donornier, bloed O-positief’, dé Weekkrant, 10 June 
2009.  
36 See ‘Nederlanders kapen Belgische organen weg’, De Volkskrant 17 January 2011. 
37 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, nr. 1376. 
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Addressing the shortage of donors 
The Netherlands still has a major shortage of donors.38 This shortage is the root 
problem of organ trading and human trafficking for the purpose of organ 
removal.39 It is thus important to form a picture of the government’s approach 
to the donor shortage, to understand the consequences for human trafficking for 
the purpose of organ removal. 
The Master Plan for Organ Donation was drawn up in 2008 by the Organ 
Donation Coordination Group. 40 The Coordination Group examined options 
for financial incentives for living donations. The Coordination Group 
concluded that this had to be rejected because there was insufficient support 
among the people and also for ethical and legal reasons.41 According to the 
Minister for Health, Welfare and Sport Schippers, some progress has been 
made in other areas as a result of the Organ Donation Master Plan, such as 
approach taken in hospitals, supplying information to the general public on 
living donation.42 This approach, however, has not yet solved the shortage of 
donors. In response to this Members of Parliament have met with Minister 
Schippers.43 During this meeting Member of Parliament Dijkstra announced 
that the Democratic Party D66 would come with a bill to introduce an active 
donor registration system.44 In this system you may freely choose whether or 
not to become a donor or not, but it is compulsory to register that choice. The 
Organ Donation Coordination Group had advised in the Organ Donation 
Master Plan that the Netherlands should adopt this system.45 However Minister 
Schippers has stated that she finds the assumption that a person wants to be a 
donor if he or she doesn’t lodge an objection a violation of the right of self-
determination and could only be justified if the violation led to an undeniable 
and significant increase in the number of donors. According to her the 
                                                 
38 According to the preliminary annual report 2010 of the Dutch Transplant Foundation there 
were 1300 patients on the transplant waiting list for an organ on 31 December 2010. See 
www.transplantatiestichting.nl/cms/mediaobject.php?file=VoorlopigjaarverslagNTS2010.pdf 
(Consulted on 26 April 2011). According to the Dutch Kidney Foundation there are currently 
926 people waiting for a kidney transplanta, and the annual death rate among the dialysis 
patients is 20 %. See www.nierstichting.nl/nieren/onzenieren/feiten-en-cijfers (Consulted on 26 
April 2011). 
39 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.2.2., p. 545, § 13.3.2, p. 550.. 
40 Coördinatiegroep Orgaandonatie, Masterplan Orgaandonatie, De vrijblijvendheid voorbij, 
11 juni 2008. See Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.3.2. 
41 Coördinatiegroep Orgaandonatie, Masterplan Orgaandonatie, De vrijblijvendheid voorbij, 
11 juni 2008. 
42 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 28 140, nr. 77, p. 5-9. 
43 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 28 140, nr. 78. 
44 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 28 140, nr. 78. At the moment the Netherlands has a passive donor 
registration system.  
45 Coördinatiegroep Orgaandonatie, Masterplan Orgaandonatie, De vrijblijvendheid voorbij, 11 
juni 2008. 
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uncertainties about the effects of a system change are too large to warrant 
doing so.46 
Financial incentives? 
Principle of non-commercialization 
Dutch law and regulations take a definite stance against commercial fees for 
organ donation.47 In international treaties and regulations altruism is also seen 
as the prime factor that should lead to organ donation.48 Donation must be 
voluntary and for free. There are various arguments for the non-
commercialization principle. One of those is that by paying, body material 
becomes marketable, and that is an infringement of human dignity.49 Another 
argument is that donors will withhold information on illnesses because of the 
payment, whereby the safety and quality of the donation becomes risky.50 What 
is of greatest importance with regard to human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal is that commercialization can compromise the voluntary nature 
of donations. In the Seventh Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur it was 
postulated that “social determinants of the organ donor – poverty, debts, a 
vulnerable social position or illiteracy – are a reflection of the social inequality 
between donor and recipient and compel the donor to sell organs.”51 In this 
way the organ giver would have no autonomy or choice and there would be 
coercion and exploitation involved.52 There is a risk of human trafficking for 
the purpose of organ removal if there is commercial organ donation. 
Call for organ donation with financial incentives 
The Netherlands still has a major shortage of donors.53 There is an increasing 
call from different sides to end the ban on compensation for organ donation. 
In early March 2011, the book “Nier te koop – Baarmoeder te huur” (Kidney 
for sale – Womb to rent) by Ingrid Geesink & Chantal Steegers was published. 
Gesseink and Steegers are researchers at the Rathenau Institute, an independent 
                                                 
46 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 28 140, nr. 77, p. 1-2. 
47 See Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2007), pp. 193-194, 197-198 and Dutch National 
Rapporteur on THB (2009), pp. 539, 547-550. 
48 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.4 and § 3 (international regulations) of this 
paper.  
49 I. Geesink, C. Steegers (2011), p. 21.  
50 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
51 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), p. 545. See D.A. Budiani-Saberi, K.A. Karim 
(2009).  
52 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), p. 545. 
53 See §2.4 (adressing the shortage of donors) of this paper.  
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research institute advising the government.54 The book explores the global 
market in body tissue. It shows that parts of our bodies can and do earn money 
and that Dutch people travel abroad to pay for body tissue. According to the 
authors we are being forced to adjust our ideas on paying and donating because 
of this. They suggest alternative forms of donation and possible financial 
incentives in their book. A possible compensation for organ donators that they 
mention is lifelong exemption from health insurance premiums.55 The Council 
for Health and Care (RVZ) had already proposed this exemption as a suitable 
form of remuneration in 2007.56 The authors of the article “Wet tegen 
orgaanhandel is dode letter” (The law against organ trade is idle words) also 
suggest this form of reward.57 According to them doctors are being confronted 
with patients suspected of paying for kidney transplants performed abroad. 
These potential cases of transplant tourism are not reported and registered and 
therefore also not penalized. Because of this, the illegal organ trade can 
continue. The authors argue therefore that the government should consider 
regulating the organ market instead of prohibiting it. According to them there 
does not have to be a conflict of interests between compensation and 
voluntariness. Good screening and compensation that is not paid in one go, and 
also not given in cash, such as a lifelong exemption from health insurance 
premiums. would prevent involuntariness. Research shows that exemption 
from the payment of health insurance premiums is seen by the population as 
the most acceptable form of compensation.58 
There have also been debates in Parliament as a result of the book “Nier te 
koop – Baarmoeder te huur” (Kidney for sale – Womb to rent).59 
Other forms of human trafficking? 
In the preceding sections we assumed that the standard “conventional organs” 
for organ trade and human trafficking for the purpose of organ were kidneys, 
heart, lungs and liver. Due to the severe shortage of these organs, patients seem 
                                                 
54 I. Geesink, C. Steegers (2011). 
55 See I. Geesink, C. Steegers (2011), p. 56, and the newspaper article of C. Houtekamer, ‘Het 
lichaam is geld waard, maar niet bij ons; Daarom wijken sommige kopers voor een nier, bot of 
een eicel uit naar het buitenland’, NRC Handelsblad, 4 March 2011. 
56 Raad voor de Volksgezondheid & Zorg. Financiële stimulering van orgaandonatie. Een 
ethische verkenning. Signalering ethiek en gezondheid 2007/3. Den Haag: Centrum voor ethiek 
en gezondheid, 2007.  
57 G. van Dijk, F. Ambagtsheer, W. Weimar (2011), pp. 778-781. 
58 See L. Kranenburg (2007), and M. C. Van Buren, et alia (2010), pp. 2488–2492. 
59 On the 22th of March 2011 Members of Parliament discussed with the Rathenau Institute the 
trade in human materials. During the parliamentary debate on organ donation on the 24th of 
March 2011 Members of Parliament have asked the Minister to comment on the book ‘Kidney 
for sale - Womb for rent’ of the Rathenau Institute 
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prepared to pay for them. Besides the trade in these “conventional organs” 
there is an increasing market for other parts of the body.60 
One of these markets is for wombs. Commercial surrogacy is on the increase 
thanks to developments such as the internet, the globalization of society and 
improved reproductive techniques.61 Dutch policy is focused on preventing 
commercial surrogacy62 and the promotion of it is also a criminal offence.63 
Some Dutch prospective parents therefore use surrogate mothers from 
countries such as India, Greece, Ukraine and the United States.64 In many cases 
it is poor women who are surrogate mothers. The question is to what extent 
these women have made a voluntary choice. As with organ trafficking, the 
social determinants of the woman, such as poverty, debts, a vulnerable social 
position and illiteracy, can force them to become surrogate mothers. 
Furthermore Indian women usually come under great pressure from their 
husbands and family.65 Moreover it seems that it is particularly in the poorer 
countries that the rights of the surrogate mothers are not always well 
regulated66 and most of the money goes to the mediators and the doctors.67 
There is thus a risk, with commercial surrogacy, that women are forced to 
become surrogate mothers and can be further exploited therein. Dr. Roel 
Schats, medical chief of the IVF Centre at the VU University Medical Centre, 
even said “that it is a form of modern slavery to use Indian women as breeding 
machines without any form of care included.”68 
This raises the question whether forced surrogacy falls, or should fall, within 
the scope of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal in Article 273f 
of the Dutch Criminal Code. A number of points deserve attention in 
considering this question. The promotion of surrogacy is a criminal offence 
under Articles 151b and 151c of the Dutch Criminal Code. According to the 
                                                 
60 See I. Geesink, C. Steegers (2011). 
61 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, nr. 30, en Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 500 VI, nr. 
83. 
62 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, nr. 30. 
63 Articles 151b and 151c of the Dutch Criminal Code. 
64 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 500 VI, nr. 83, and K. Boele-Woelki, et alia (2011). 
See the following documentaries about commercial surrogacy: BNN-documentary, Baby te 
koop, Ned 3, 10 March 2011 (9 pm) and Zippa Brand Frank, Google Baby, Israël 2009. 
65 According to Jyotsna Gupta, senior lecturer gender and diversity at the University of Utrecht 
in ‘te huur’, Nederlands Dagblad, 24 December 2010. 
66 When for instance the surrogate mother has a miscarriage she will not get more than the 
monthly compensation until that moment. See the article ‘te huur’, Nederlands Dagblad, 24 
December 2010.  
67 I. Geesink, C. Steegers (2011), p. 63. According to the article ‘te huur’, Nederlands 
Dagblad, 24 December 2010 doctors exploit surrogate mothers.  
68 ‘Commercieel draagmoederschap is vorm van slavernij’, Nederlands dagblad, 15 March 
2011. 
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Minister for Justice, the aim of these Articles is to prevent “surrogate mothers 
and prospective parents from finding each other by making mediation a crime 
and also includes publicizing the availability of a surrogate mother and demand 
for a surrogate mother.”69 These Articles, however, are not applicable to Dutch 
people who are guilty of promoting surrogacy outside of the Netherlands.70 
This shortcoming could be solved by letting forced surrogacy fall under the 
human trafficking criminal offence, but surrogacy is not mentioned in the 
Explanatory Text and not in any section of Article 273f. As already stated 
above there is a risk of women being forced into surrogacy and therein being 
exploited as surrogate mothers. That would be a serious violation of physical 
integrity. The scope of Article 273f seems to be interpreted more and more 
broadly by judges.71 If it were chosen to include forced surrogacy in the scope 
of human trafficking, then there are questions that would have to be thought 
about. The first is whether forced surrogacy can fall under human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal, as there is no organ removed. Surrogacy 
could also fall under labour or services in Article 273f. A second question that 
could be asked is who exactly are the exploiters of surrogacy. Are they the 
doctors, the potential parents, the man who “forces” his wife to be a surrogate 
mother or the mediators? It is important to take the scope of Article 273f into 
consideration and which practices should fall under it. 
Secretary of State Teeven for Security and Justice organized a meeting of 
experts on 31 March 2011 to discuss the question whether, and if so, in which 
way (international) surrogacy should be more regulated or differently 
organized than it is at the moment. During the meeting experts in different 
fields and from different organizations brought forward ideas on how to solve 
the problems that occur by potential parents going abroad and to how to 
prevent and solve this.  
International regulations 
A complete handling of the international legal framework on human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal and organ trade goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. For an overview of this I refer you to a study completed in 2009 by the 
United Nations and the Council of Europe on “Trafficking in organs, tissues 
and cells and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of 
organs”.72 This study will be briefly mentioned here. 
                                                 
69 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, nr. 30. 
70 See article 5 Dutch Criminal Code.  
71 See L. van Krimpen (2011). 
72 Council of Europe, Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in human beings 
for the purpose of the removal of organs, Joint Council of Europe/United nations study, 2009. 
This study is also mentioned the Seventh Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur on THB. 
Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.4, p.553. 
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According to the Bureau of the Dutch Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human 
Beings the common theme that emerges from the European and international 
framework is the call to governments to take measures on the shortage of 
available organs and to solve the waiting lists for patients and to fight against 
human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal.73 
The following will describe recent developments in international regulations 
and other international documents that are relevant to organ trade and human 
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal.74 
United Nations 
In 2009 a joint study by the United Nations and the Council of Europe 
appeared under the title Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking 
in human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs.75 This study 
discusses the present situation, the international standards and the 
consequences of trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in 
human beings for the purpose of organ removal. The study presents a number 
of conclusions and recommendations that can be summarized as follows:76 
 the need to distinguish clearly between ‘trafficking in OTC77’ and 
‘trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs’; 
 the principle of the prohibition of making financial gains with the 
human body or its parts should be the paramount consideration in 
relation to organ transplantation; 
 the need to promote organ donation and establish organisational 
measures to increase organ availability; 
 the need to collect reliable data on trafficking in OTC and on trafficking 
in human beings for the purpose of organ removal; 
 the need for an internationally agreed definition of “Trafficking in 
organs, tissues and cells”.  
 
                                                 
73 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.4, p.553. 
74 This research builds on the Reports of the Dutch National Rapporteur on THB. Here only the 
developments since the Seventh report are discussed. For a discussion of the international 
regulations before these developments see: Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.4. 
(The Dutch Report discusses more). 
75 Council of Europe, Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in human beings 
for the purpose of the removal of organs, Joint Council of Europe/United nations study, 2009. 
76 See Ibid., pp. 7-8 and 93-98. 
77 ‘OTC’: organs, tissues and cells. 
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World Health Organization 
Due to a lack of universally recognized terms and definitions the Global 
Glossary of Terms and Definitions on Donation and Transplantation was 
created in November 2009.78 In this Global Glossary existing and newly coined 
terms and definitions concerning donation and transplantation of cells, tissues 
and organs were defined.79 
On 21 May 2010 the Sixty-third World Health Assembly adopted resolution 
WHA63.22 and so the revised version of the WHO Guiding Principles on 
Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation was accepted.80 In short the 
resolution also calls upon member states to implement the Guiding Principles, 
to promote altruistic donations, to combat the practice of seeking financial gain 
from organ trade and transplant tourism, to promote a fair and transparent 
system for allocating organs and tissues, to improve the safety and efficacy of 
donating and transplanting, to strengthen national and multinational organising 
and coordinating authorities and to promote the collection of data.81  
Council of Europe 
As already mentioned above the Council of Europe published in cooperation 
with the United Nations, in 2009, the study Trafficking in organs, tissues and 
cells and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of 
organs.82 
In April 1997 the Netherlands signed the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.83 In 
2008 the Dutch Minister for Health, Welfare and Sport indicated that this 
convention would be ratified in the near future.84 This convention has, 
however, not yet been ratified.85 
                                                 
78 World Health Organization, Global Glossary of Terms and Definitions on Donation and 
Transplantation, Geneva, November 2009. 
79 Ibid., p. 3. 
80 World Health Organization, WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ 
Transplantation, endorsed by resolution WHA63.22, 21 May 2010. 
81 WHA63.22, p. 2. 
82 Council of Europe, op. cit., 75.  
83 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, Oviedo, 4.IV.1997.  
84 See Nationaal Rapporteur Mensenhandel (2009), p. 592. Beleidsbrief Ethiek van 7 
september 2008, Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 30 800 XVI, nr. 183, pp. 19-20. 
85 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=8&DF= 
11/10/2011&CL=ENG (Last consulted on 11/10/2011). 
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Also the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin86, 
signed by the Netherlands in 2002, has not yet been ratified.87 
The Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings from 200588 
was ratified by the Netherlands in April 2010 and came into force in August 
2010.89 
European Union 
The Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on standards of 
quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation of 7 July 
201090 is primarily focused on the quality and safety of organs. It was pointed 
out in the Directive that unacceptable practices in organ donation and 
transplantation like organ trade and human trafficking for the purpose of organ 
removal should be prevented. According to the European Parliament and the 
Council these practices are a serious violation of fundamental rights, human 
dignity and physical integrity. According to them the Directive will indirectly 
contribute “to combating organ trafficking through the establishment of 
competent authorities, the authorisation of transplantation centres, the 
establishment of conditions of procurement and systems of traceability”.91 The 
Member States must comply with the Directive by 27 August 2012.92 
In the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 2011, 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its 
victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA93, there is a 
broader concept formulated on what human trafficking must include in 
comparison to what is in the Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. The 
definition also covers human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal, 
                                                 
86 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, Strasbourg, 
24.I.2002. 
87 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=186&CM=8&DF 
=11/10/2011&CL=ENG (Last consulted on 11/10/2011). 
88 Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Warsaw, 
16.V.2005. 
89 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=197&CM=8&DF 
=01/05/2011&CL=ENG (Last consulted on 01/05/2011). 
90 The European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2010/45/EU on standards of quality and 
safety of human organs intended for transplantation, Strasbourg, 7 July 2010.  
91 Ibid., consideration 7.  
92 Ibid., art. 31.  
93 The European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, Strasbourg, 5 April 2011. 
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what according to the European Parliament and the Council, “constitutes a 
serious violation of human dignity and physical integrity”.94 
In April 2010 an EU financed project for living donation of organs (EULOD) 
was started.95 The general objectives of this project are to make an inventory of 
the living donation practices in the Member States, to investigate and promote 
living donation as a way of increasing the availability of organs and to develop 
tools that improve the quality and safety of living organ donations in Europe. 
Items of interest and problems  
In this paper the recent developments in the Netherlands and the developments 
of international regulations regarding human trafficking for the purpose of 
organ removal were described. In conclusion, the problems connected with this 
topic and the topics that deserve special attention are given below. 
 Cases of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal in the 
Netherlands or by Dutch people are virtually unknown. Vigilance is 
still necessary. Firstly, because little information is available on this 
form of human trafficking and organ trade. Secondly, partly because 
of the globalization of society and internet a market for organs seems 
to exist.  
 It is important that organ trade and transplant tourism are tracked in a 
better way. Commercialization of organs can endanger the 
voluntariness of donation. Where these practices occur there is a risk 
of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal.  
 In order to track organ trade and transplant tourism in a better way, as 
also noted in the Seventh Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, 
the help and close attention of facilitating, supporting and 
implementation agencies are needed in connection with organ 
donations, such as medical personnel and health insurance agencies.96 
In order to improve the task of reporting and registering possible 
cases of organ trade an appropriate body could be chartered to take 
this task upon themselves. 
 In addition to trade in the “conventional organs”, such as kidneys, 
heart, lungs and liver, there are increasing markets for more and more 
parts of the body. One example of this is commercial surrogacy. It is 
important to monitor these markets and to investigate if these parts of 
the body should also fall under Article 273f of the Dutch Criminal 
                                                 
94 Ibid., consideration 11. 
95 See http://www.eulod.org/.  
96 Dutch National Rapporteur on THB (2009), § 13.5. 
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Code. In this way the Article can keep up with the times and 
undesirable practices can be prevented. 
 The call to stimulate organ donation financially is increasing from 
many sides. There are some items here that deserve to be taken into 
account. The financial stimulation of organ donation could reduce the 
shortage of organs and thus reduce the chance of human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ donation. Financial stimulation of organ 
donation means that organ donation would be commercial and there 
would be a market for organs. Such a market carries the risk of 
stimulating human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal. 
These risks could be mitigated by granting donors exemption from 
health insurance premiums instead of compensation in cash. 
 The Secretary of State for Health, Welfare and Sport indicated in 
September 2008 the intention to ratify the Council of Europe’s 
Biomedicine Convention. To date this Convention and also the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human 
Origin have not been ratified.  
Human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal and organ trading are not 
phenomena that only occur within the borders of the Netherlands but are 
worldwide phenomena. The points of interest mentioned above could therefore 
also be of importance to other states. It is important that states realize that these 
phenomena are transnational. It is important that states try to come to new 
solutions with each other and where possible to synchronize their policies and 
approach with regard to organ donation, organ trading and human trafficking 
for the purpose of organ removal.  
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SESSION 2: ABUSE OF POWER OR CORRUPTION 
AND ECONOMIC CRIME 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION: 
THE TWO LARGEST PROBLEMS IN THE 
WORLD? 
Jay S. Albanese, Ph.D. 
Professor and Criminologist,  
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Richmond, Virginia, USA 
Is what we do really important in comparison to other issues? Should we be 
focusing on other problems because they are of greater significance? Organized 
crime and corruption have dominated the world (and the United Nations) 
agenda for more than a decade. These issues have been central to the work of 
policymakers and researchers globally. The question that arises is whether 
these two topics were actually the right way to spend our time. Are there other 
subjects and issues that are more pressing, more serious, and more deserving of 
attention? 
The field of criminology and criminal justice is comparatively new, and there 
is more that is unknown than is known about crime causation, effective 
treatment of offenders, and crime prevention. Therefore, it is imperative that 
we devote our time to the most important issues in the field. Our choices of 
what to investigate determine in large part what we will learn, or what we will 
not learn. So have we made the appropriate choice in focusing so heavily on 
organized crime and corruption? 
It is important to be specific about the subject of our intention, and so we must 
define carefully what constitutes organized crime, and what constitutes 
corruption. Without precision in definition, we cannot determine effectively 
their true nature and scope and, of course, definition is a fundamental step in 
the scientific method. 
Definitions of organized crime and corruption vary by country, individual 
research study, and UN Convention. So there is no universally accepted 
definition of the problems to which we are devoting our professional lives! 
Organized crime has been defined through a consensus of scholars as a 
continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit 
activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is 
maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the 
corruption of public officials (Albanese, 2011). Corruption is defined as use of 
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public office for private gain. The specific offences imbedded in this notion 
include embezzlement, fraud, nepotism, bribery, extortion, and influence 
peddling. It is therefore possible to be precise in defining these ideas, even if 
we are not consistent across studies or policies. 
As Aristotle pointed out 25 centuries ago, it is one thing to know that different 
locations have different levels of crime and corruption, but it is quite a different 
matter to know why.  
Knowledge of the former type is descriptive; knowledge of the latter type is 
explanatory.  
It is explanatory knowledge that provides scientific understanding of the world 
(Salmon, 2006). As the Scottish philosopher David Hume wrote in 1739, 
there's also a big difference between descriptive statements describing what is 
and prescriptive statements describing what ought to be (Hume, 2000). When 
reviewing research studies and policy development in the areas of organized 
crime and corruption, it can be seen that we often recklessly move from 
describing a situation to recommending what should be done about it, when we 
really have only facts and no information whatsoever about what we ought to 
do about. 
In the modern age, ideology often trumps evidence. That is to say, people 
increasingly hold views despite the evidence, which is the definition of 
ideology. When individuals come up against evidence contrary to their views, 
opposing arguments are exaggerated and the bar for proof is raised to levels 
that can never be met. We see this in contemporary debates over climate 
change, environment impact, economic crisis, levels of corruption, and the 
influence of organized crime. Therefore, it is important to be objective, 
empirically driven, and to move carefully from descriptive to explanatory 
knowledge. 
The world’s largest problems 
Several organizations have attempted define and quantify what the world's 
largest problems are. The Arlington Institute (2012) identified the five greatest 
world problems as: 
 Economic collapse: will a fragile current global economy tip the world 
into a depression? 
 Peak oil: petroleum has powered the world for 100 years. Have we 
reached a peak in oil production? 
 The global water crisis: over the last 50 years the world population has 
tripled, but pollution, poor agriculture practices, and poor civic 
planning have decreased the water supply.  
 Species extinction: certain species that we depend upon for food are 
going extinct, impacting our own survivability.  
62 
 Rapid climate change: global warming is an empirical fact. Will people 
from different cultures work together or suffer from it? 
In a similar way, the Copenhagen Consensus Centre identified 10 challenges 
that it viewed as the most serious facing the world today. These challenges 
include: 
 Air pollution 
 Conflicts 
 Diseases 
 Education 
 Global warming 
 Malnutrition and hunger 
 Sanitation and water 
 Subsidies and trade barriers 
 Terrorism 
 Women and development 
In a similar fashion, the UN Millennium Development goals identified the 
serious problems demanding our attention as including: the ending of poverty 
and hunger, universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, 
combating HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability, and global partnership. 
When you consider each of these greatest problems in the world, several things 
become apparent. First, they all either are entirely man-made or have been 
pushed to a crisis point by decisions of humans. In addition, these decisions 
appear to be the result of some combination of ignorance, selfishness, 
criminality or corruption. Can it be said, therefore, that every one of the world's 
largest problems exists due to choices and decisions made worse by organized 
crime and corruption? 
The greatest world problems range from health to environment to social 
instability to civil conflict – all of which are either created or made worse by 
organized crime and corruption. Therefore, more effective control of organized 
crime and corruption would reduce (or eliminate) every other world problem! 
Making a difference in the world’s largest problems? 
It therefore appears that we have devoted ourselves to problems worthy of our 
attention, but our concepts need work, our data are weak, and the impact of our 
work on law and policy is deficient. When one looks at all peer-reviewed 
published articles on corruption and organized crime over the last decade (see 
Table 1), we can note that the number of articles published on corruption for 
example has risen and totals 4,231 for the decade. In organized crime there has 
been less research, and many fewer articles, although the number has grown to 
824.  
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Table 1: Peer-Reviewed Published Articles in Professional Journals 
Chronology  Corruption  Organized Crime  
2000-2005  1,533  380  
2006-2010  2,698  444  
2000-2010  4,231  824  
 
It should be noted that our efforts to engage in basic research to assess the 
nature and scope of the problem are very recent. The Corruption Perceptions 
Index, based on annual surveys, began to appear only 15 years ago 
(Transparency International, 2011). The even more recent Bribe Payers Index 
assesses the likelihood that businesses from industrialized countries will pay 
bribes abroad (Transparency International, 2008). The Global Corruption 
Barometer captures the experiences and views of more than 90,000 people in 
86 countries and territories, and is the only global public opinion survey on 
corruption (Transparency International, 2010). The International Crime 
Victimisation Survey has been administered irregularly to a group of countries 
and cities since 1989 (Van Dijk, van Kesteren and Smit, 2007). Each of these 
measurement efforts have found huge variations in the nature and extent of 
corruption around the world. The corruption is sometimes small (local police 
bribes), and sometimes threatening to a nation (major bribery and extortion by 
government officials at the highest levels). 
The costs and consequences of corruption are significant. The World Bank 
provides low-interest loans, interest-free credits and grants to developing 
countries for a wide array of purposes that include investments in education, 
health, public administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector 
development, agriculture and environmental and natural resource management. 
The World Bank, established in 1944, has found that focusing on global 
investment (the underlying issue) is simply not enough! A simultaneous focus 
on corruption is needed to insure the investment is used properly, and not 
misdirected or wasted. The World Bank, an essentially financial institution, has 
come to recognize that lending money to reduce inequality and encourage 
investment does not solve the underlying problems – unless you also pay 
attention to corruption.  
Corruption deters investment, hinders growth, and fosters inequality. It erodes 
the impact of development assistance and increases exploitation of natural 
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resources. Corruption reduces the effectiveness of public administration and 
subverts the rule of law and confidence in government and business. In short, 
corruption increases wealth of the few at the expense of society at large (World 
Bank, 2000). 
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT, is the 
United Nations agency for human settlements, which is mandated “to promote 
socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of 
providing adequate shelter for all.” In 1950, one-third of the world's people 
lived in cities. By the year 2000, this rose to one-half and will continue to grow 
to two-thirds, or 6 billion people, by 2050. Cities are now home to half of 
humankind. In many cities, especially in developing countries, slum dwellers 
number more than 50 per cent of the population and have little or no access to 
shelter, water, and sanitation, education or health services. It is recognized that 
the growth of organized crime has a direct impact on sustainable towns and 
cities. This is because organized crime has been seen to destabilize the political 
order, and magnify the impact of economic crises through housing market 
speculation, for example. Organized crime also has been found by UN Habitat 
to draw in youth as a source of cheap labour (UNODC, 2011; UN Habitat, 
2011). Therefore sustainable cities are impossible without the control of 
organized crime and corruption. 
Conclusions 
Development agencies now see organized crime and corruption as central to 
their efforts. Development assistance is not enough. Anti-corruption and anti-
organized crime efforts are also needed, if training, technical assistance support 
are to be invested wisely. Problems do not disappear with adequate resources 
and good intentions – there is a need to focus on organized crime and 
corruption which underlie all the world’s greatest problems. 
Research also needs to better follow its own methods. When reviewing the 
studies on organized crime and corruption, scientific method is often breached 
or short-circuited by expedience (often attributed to funding limitations). Far 
too often, researchers and evaluators are involved in situations where scientific 
method is compromised (when sample size or scope of the project should be 
changed, rather than the underlying methods employed). Research, training, 
and technical assistance investments which lack comparison groups, impact 
analysis, follow-up over time, or a dedicated push for policy changes based on 
empirical facts, leaves us unable the answer the most important question of all: 
Are we making any difference? And without an assessment of impact, both 
money and interest eventually run dry, as institutions move on to other 
problems, because progress, change, or impact could not be demonstrated. 
Therein lies the greatest challenge for our work in the future, now that we have 
identified organized crime and corruption as two of the greatest problems in the 
world! 
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NEW PENAL PROVISIONS IN SWEDEN ON 
BRIBERY: SUMMARY, SOU 2010:38 
Bo Svensson, Sweden 
Coordinated provisions 
The current provisions in the Penal Code on bribery are contained in three 
sections in separate chapters of the Penal Code. These provisions have been 
justifiably criticised as being hard to understand.  
The Inquiry is now making proposals for changes according to which the 
provisions on bribery will be arranged in five sections, which will all be 
contained in a single chapter of the Penal Code, viz. Chapter 10 with the 
proposed title of “On Embezzlement, Other Breaches of Trust and Bribery”. 
Section 5 of the Chapter deals with breach of trust, section 5a with active 
bribery, section 5b with passive bribery, section 5c with gross active and 
passive bribery and section 5d with negligent financing of a bribe. 
Furthermore, the report contains proposals on a Swedish code on gifts, rewards 
and other benefits in the business sector. The code is part of self-regulation in 
the business sector.  
These proposals aim to achieve modern efficient and easily accessible 
regulations on bribery with clearer definitions of what is a punishable offence.  
The proposed coordinated provisions in the Penal Code, together with the 
proposed code, will provide businesses and individuals with clearer guidance 
as to what constitutes permissible and impermissible influence on the exercise 
of public authority and public procurement. The code will also provide 
businesses with guidelines as to what is acceptable and unacceptable as regards 
benefits provided by businesses with a view to promoting their commercial 
activities.  
The penal provisions are to be complemented by a business law code. 
It is not possible in a legal text to give detailed and concrete guidelines as to 
when a benefit is a bribe. The legal text on bribery must instead, as at present, 
be restricted to short provisions of a general nature on the prerequisites that 
must be met for criminal liability.  
The code on benefits produced by the Inquiry, together with representatives of 
the business community, will be an important ”source of law” for the courts 
and others who are to apply the new provisions (see below).  
The new provisions on bribery are formulated as follows.  
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Category of persons 
The current Chapter 20, section 2, of the Penal Code lists those who can be 
punished for passive bribery (taking a bribe). The same category of persons can 
be punished, under Chapter 17, section 7, for active bribery (giving a bribe). 
This technique of listing, together with the fact that the provisions on bribery 
are contained in three different chapters, makes the current legal texts difficult 
to read with numerous cross-references. 
The explicitly defined category of persons for passive and active bribery leads 
to problems of differentiation. Changes in society also mean that the list has to 
be regularly adjusted to take into account new categories of persons. People 
who should reasonably be subject to the legislation on bribery are currently not 
included in the list.  
According to the current arrangements, for instance, a self-employed person 
with independent contracts is not included in the above-mentioned list. It is 
thus not an offence for a freelance journalist to accept money from the business 
sector or from a political organisation to write or not to write a news article 
about a mismanaged company or about who is providing funds to a political 
party.  
The Inquiry proposes that the current special list be removed. Consequently, all 
employees and contractors will be covered by the penal provisions of the 
legislation on bribery. Instead, there will be some restriction of the category of 
persons through the requirement that an action shall have an improper 
influence on the way that the employee or contractor has carried out his or her 
work or contract.  
Improper influence 
Chapter 17, Section 7, and Chapter 20, Section 2, of the Penal Code refer to “a 
bribe or other improper reward”. The wording of the law makes it appear as if 
it is the reward, i.e. money or other benefits, which is per se improper. 
However, the provision should not be interpreted in this way. The impropriety 
relates to the transaction as a whole.  
The Inquiry proposes that the penal provisions be clarified in such a way that it 
is evident from the wording of the law that a prerequisite for the offence of 
bribery is that the action influences the exercise of public authority or a public 
procurement or the recipient’s way of performing his or her duties or 
commission. It should also be clear that this influence must appear in an overall 
assessment as being improper.  
In the assessment of whether an action was intended to improperly influence 
the work or commission of the recipient, the following factors are of primary 
importance: 
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 the nature and value of the benefit 
 the connection between the benefit and the recipient’s work or 
commission 
 the recipient’s position in relation to the provider of the benefit and to 
the recipient’s employer or client. 
 the way in which the benefit was given, for example, if this took place 
openly or clandestinely, if the benefit was given to only one employee 
or to many employees and if the benefit was provided at the initiative of 
the recipient 
 general custom and usage in the industry as regards benefits. 
Breach of trust - Chapter 10, Section 5, of the Penal Code 
The new criminal provisions are targeted on various typical cases. The first 
typical case concerns bribes given or received by employees in various 
companies and organisations with a view to benefiting the donor or some other 
party to the detriment of the company or organisation. In other words, it 
involves an agreement where the donor, the recipient or someone else benefits 
at the expense of a third party.  
An example of this is a sales manager who accepts a bribe to sell the 
company’s products at an excessively low price. Conduct of this kind is 
currently covered by the criminal provision in Chapter 10, Section 5, on breach 
of trust.  
The Inquiry proposes that the wording of this provision be clarified to make it 
clear that it refers to passive bribery. In these cases, the recipient is sentenced 
as the perpetrator and the donor as the accessory. The provision is mainly 
intended to protect the interests of the principal and does not normally entail 
any problems of differentiation. 
Bribes in the exercise of public authority and public 
procurement – Chapter 10, Section 5 a (1), of the Penal Code 
The second typical case consists of bribes given with the intention of 
influencing the exercise of public authority or a public procurement. An 
example of this would be a judge who accepts money to pronounce a judgment 
in favour of the donor in conflict with current legislation.  
The Inquiry proposes a new provision targeted on this typical case. The 
provision is primarily intended to protect trust in important public functions. 
Neither of these typical cases lead to any real problems of differentiation. 
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Unfair competition and related matters – Chapter 10, Section 
5a, (2) of the Penal Code 
The third typical case consists of bribes given to be able to buy or sell goods or 
services, which in this way eliminates free competition. The Inquiry has not 
been tasked with proposing any new rules on violation of competition but 
deems that it is almost unavoidable, in the absence of any such rules, that 
certain conduct with elements of unfair competition, be covered by criminal 
liability for the offence of bribery. 
The fourth typical case concerns benefits given in connection with 
anniversaries, or as a component in business relationships or marketing. The 
donor hopes that the recipient will reciprocate by the donor receiving beneficial 
treatment from the recipient’s company, and that the recipient understands this. 
In some contexts, it is completely legitimate to provide benefits of this kind, 
while in other cases it must be regarded as sufficiently reprehensible to be 
criminal.  
To cover these typical cases, the Inquiry proposes criminal liability for actions 
intended to improperly influence an employee’s or contractor’s way of 
performing his or her duties or commission.  
Bribes in competitions – Chapter 10, Section 5 a (3), of the 
Penal Code 
It has emerged in cases abroad which have attracted a lot of attention that 
participants in competitions have accepted bribes not to do their best, which 
has benefited the provider of the bribe who has bet on the outcome of the 
competition. It is not improbable that bribes of this kind have already occurred 
in Sweden, even though to a limited extent. In the light of trends in the gaming 
market and the large amounts involved, the Inquiry considers that there is a risk 
of crime of this kind becoming a common occurrence in Sweden too.  
Participants in competitions are sometimes employees of associations, for 
example, football or hockey players. In such cases, liability for bribery may 
come into question under the current legislation for an employee who accepts a 
bribe and for the briber. However, sometimes there is no employment nor any 
actual contractual relationship and the procedure is then not punishable as 
bribery.  
The sanctions available within the sports movement to take measures against 
bribery, for example, suspension, cannot be considered as being sufficiently 
far-reaching to protect the gaming market or sports movement against 
organised crime which engages in betting on the outcome of fixed matches.  
The Inquiry is therefore proposing a special provision targeted on benefits 
provided to influence the outcome of competitions, on which commercial 
betting takes place.  
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Negligent financing of bribery – Chapter 10, Section 5 d  
Under Chapter 23, Section 4, a person who furthers an act by advice or deed 
can be punished for being an accessory to the crime. Accordingly, a person 
who has provided money or other assets to be used as a bribe can be sentenced 
for being an accessory to bribery, if he or she is not sentenced as the 
perpetrator. However, a prerequisite is that the accessory intentionally 
furthered the act.  
The Inquiry considers that gross negligence in being an accessory to bribery 
should also be a criminal offence and is therefore proposing a special penal 
provision on negligent financing of bribery. It shall be possible to sentence a 
representative of a company for this crime if he or she, on behalf of the 
company, offers, promises or provides money or other assets to a person who, 
due to their position or by contract, represents the company in a particular 
matter and thereby furthers active bribery or gross active bribery in the matter 
through gross negligence.  
A prerequisite for criminal liability is that the assets are given to a person who, 
due to his or her position or by contract, represents the company in a particular 
matter. This might, for example, be an employee of a company within the same 
group or an associated company or a person who, due to a contract for services, 
represents the company in the matter. The concepts “group” and “associated 
company” are used by the Inquiry in the same meaning as in Chapter 1, 
sections 4 and section 5, respectively of the Annual Accounts Act (1995:1554).  
This provision is intended to apply together with, inter alia, the proposed code 
on gifts and other benefits in the business sector. The code proposes measures 
that companies should undertake to prevent bribery and improper influence. A 
company which has complied with the code in these respects cannot be 
considered as having acted in a grossly negligent way, even if it should be 
shown that the company has commissioned an agent, who, despite all 
precautionary measures taken by the company, has resorted to bribes when 
selling the company’s products.  
Bribery may have been committed abroad as well as in Sweden. If the financier 
has transferred money from Sweden or if a Swedish company is the financier, 
there is as a rule a Swedish connection of such a kind that means that there is 
no requirement for dual criminality under Chapter 2, section 3, of the Penal 
Code. However, the financing must concern active bribery under section 5a or 
gross active bribery under section 5c. It is sufficient for criminal liability for 
the prosecutor to show that such a crime has been committed even if it may be 
unclear by whom. If the bribery has taken place abroad, local customs may be 
taken into account when considering whether the proceeding has been intended 
as improper influence. 
The punishment for negligent financing of bribery is the same as for other 
bribery offences, a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. 
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Certain other penal law matters 
The punishment for active bribery and passive bribery, breach of trust and 
misuse of office is currently a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. In 
gross cases, a sentence of imprisonment for at least six months and at most six 
years is imposed. The Inquiry has not been tasked with making any general 
overview of the scales of penalties for different forms of bribery offences. 
Nothing has emerged in the course of the Inquiry to indicate that a change in 
the scales of penalties is needed. It is therefore proposed that the existing scales 
of penalties be unchanged.  
A special penal provision is proposed in Chapter 10, Section 5c, of the Penal 
Code for gross active and passive bribery. The Inquiry proposes that some 
circumstances are specified in the text of the law which the court shall 
particularly take into consideration in the assessment of whether the offence is 
gross. This should be the case if the deed concerned a substantial value, was 
part of crime that was engaged in systematically or otherwise was of a 
particularly dangerous kind.  
The prosecutor has, at present, certain restrictions on the duty to prosecute. A 
prosecution may only be initiated if the employer or client has reported the 
crime for prosecution or if prosecution is called for from the point of view of 
the public interest. The Inquiry proposes that the rule that prosecution may 
only be initiated if the crime has been reported for prosecution by the employer 
or client be abolished. Instead, a global provision should be introduced which 
restricts the duty to prosecute to cases where prosecution is called for from the 
point of view of the public interest. Prosecution is as a rule called for in the 
case of bribes that influence public authority or public procurement.  
Penal provisions on bribery do not only apply to offences committed in 
Sweden but also for those committed abroad. However, there is currently a 
requirement in the Penal Code for dual criminality which means that Swedish 
courts cannot normally impose sentences for bribes given abroad if there are no 
corresponding provisions in the country where the crime was committed. If the 
Inquiry’s proposal for a new penal provision on negligent financing is adopted, 
the effects of the requirement for dual criminality will be limited to some 
extent. In such cases, the crime has often been committed in Sweden or has in 
some other way a link to Sweden of such a kind that a Swedish court is 
competent to judge the case.  
It happens that Swedish companies abroad pay money or give other benefits to 
foreign public employees to safeguard the companies’ rights, for example, to 
obtain customs clearance of goods within a reasonable time. There are no 
reasons to have special rules for payments of this kind, “facilitation payments”. 
To the extent that the prerequisites for criminal liability, including the 
requirement for double jeopardy are met, a Swedish court can therefore impose 
a sentence for bribery.  
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Trading in influence 
Article 12 of The Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption obliges states to make trading with influence a criminal offence. It 
shall be a punishable offence, inter alia, to “promise, give or offer, directly or 
indirectly, any advantage to exert an improper influence” over the decision-
making of certain persons, such as an employed decision-maker in the public 
sector, members of parliament or ministers. There is a similar recommendation 
in the United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
Trading in influence is targeted on the interaction between three players. It is 
centred on a person who exercises power and who is a decision-maker (A) – 
who is to make a decision on a particular matter. Circling around the decision-
maker is an individual or an organisation (B) with a great interest in the 
outcome of an issue, which wishes to influence this outcome and commissions 
C to this end. What A does and realises is unimportant for the matter of 
whether B and C should be punished for trading in influence. It is also 
irrelevant whether the intermediary C is actually able to influence the decision-
maker A. 
The Inquiry considers that there is no reason to introduce criminal provisions 
on trading in influence targeted on contributions to political parties, nor is there 
any reason to introduce legislation to restrict the ability of an individual, a 
company or an interest organisation to employ a consultant or another agent to 
influence members of political bodies.  
However, there are some distinctive situations where, in the view of the 
Inquiry, it would be directly objectionable if it was not possible to demand 
criminal liability. This might be the case if one party in an administrative 
proceeding secretly made a payment to the spouse of a decision-maker in order 
to get the spouse to convince his wife/the decision-maker to reach a decision in 
favour of the party.  
The Inquiry therefore proposes that the provisions on bribery be worded in 
such a way that a person has criminal liability if this person offers, promises or 
grants a benefit to another person in order to influence the exercise of public 
authority or public procurement in an improper way. The same applies to the 
person who requests, accepts a promise or receives such a payment.  
This provision would make it easier to punish cases where benefits are given to 
another person who is close to the decision-maker with a view to influencing 
the decision-maker’s exercise of public authority although it cannot be proven 
that the public employee was aware that a benefit had been given for such a 
purpose.  
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A code on benefits in the business sector 
The Inquiry Chair and a working group with representatives from the business 
sector in Sweden have produced a proposal for a Swedish Code on Gifts, 
Rewards and Benefits in the Business Sector.  
This code is to be part of the business sector’s self-regulation. The Anti-
Corruption Institute has declared that it is willing, after this report has been 
circulated for comment, to adopt and administer the code. 
The code is intended to provide guidance to companies on matters relating to 
how benefits in the business sector may be used to promote the company’s 
business activities. It is intended to complement the penal law provisions. 
According to these penal law provisions on bribery, criminal liability may be 
incurred if benefits are intended to improperly influence the work or 
commission of an employee or contractor.  
If a representative of a company has complied with the code, the action cannot 
be considered to be intended to improperly influence the work or commission 
of the recipient. This is not to say that a representative who has breached the 
code is automatically guilty of a crime. The code is intended to make higher 
demands that those ensuing from the provisions of the Penal Code on bribery. 
It is therefore not necessarily the case that a person who has given a benefit in 
breach of the code is therefore also guilty of improper influence in the sense of 
the penal provisions.  
A general code for the business sector cannot possibility include detailed rules 
on improper influence. More detailed and specific industry or market systems 
can be produced through special agreements between trade organisations and 
companies in the same industry.  
Consideration has been taken in the work with the code to the regulatory 
frameworks previously produced by various organisations, for example, 
OECD, ICC, Transparency International and the Anti-Corruption Institute.  
The code will apply to all companies with a statutory duty to keep accounts 
under the Accounting Act or the Foreign Branches Act. If a company is 
covered by the code, this may be important in a court assessment of whether 
the company’s representatives are guilty of bribery or not. The code will also 
serve as a tool for the companies’ owners, business partners, and other 
stakeholders.  
The code contains guidelines on when it is permissible or impermissible for a 
company to offer, promise or provide a benefit to employees or contractors in 
another company or public body. The code also contains guidelines to 
companies on when their employees and contractors should accept benefits 
from another party. The code also provides guidelines to companies on 
preventive measures and partners.  
The full text of the code can be found directly following the proposed 
legislation. 
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Introduction  
The concept of corruption has been widely used both in the scientific works 
and in the media. Corruption is defined in many ways. It depends on the 
generally accepted functional, moral and legal norms of a society what kind of 
actions are considered to be corrupt ones and whether or not they should 
initiate a reaction on the part of society. In several societies corruption is an 
organic part of the socio-cultural traditions, and in many cases it is retained 
even though the social-economic system changes. In such a situation, giving a 
gift to the clerk for a service is not regarded as a bribe but as an expression of 
respect, and paying an official for an administrative act is regarded as a very 
natural thing. The rejection of the gift on the part of the clerk may even be 
regarded as an insult, and doing a favour to a relative is also plausible.  
In many cases corruption is payment for services or material which, under law, 
are not due the recipient. This is called bribery, or, e.g. in the Middle East, 
baksheesh. On the other hand, in several cases the recipient is entitled to the 
service in question, and the money or other gifts merely ‘accelerate’ the office 
work. However, generally it is advantageous to the person who pays and of 
course, to the person who accept the bribe, and disadvantageous to all other 
persons who wait for their business to be arranged. 
It follows that it is difficult to give a general definition of corruption. The 
approach may be legal, sociological or economic.  
The original meaning of corruption comes from the Latin verb “corrumpo” 
which means to deprave or to deface. The word ‘corrosion’ originated from 
this expression describing the process in which a metal item is covered with 
rust or is entirely transformed by it, but in general it means that something 
loses its good flavour / feature. Corruption is the corrosion of a society. 
                                                 
1 The Project is supported by the European Union and co-financed by the European Social 
Fund (grant agreement no. TAMOP 4.2.1./B-09/1/KMR-2010-0003).  
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Corruption is a well-known concept in Hungary, although there is no uniform 
definition of the term. It is generally understood as including a variety of 
behaviour ranging from the acceptance of gratuities and tips to bribery and 
influence.  
Nevertheless, there are some official definitions of corruption in international 
conventions. The United Nations Convention against Corruption specifies the 
following offences as corruption offences: active and passive bribery of 
national public officials, active and passive bribery of foreign public officials 
and officials of public international organizations, embezzlement, 
misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, trading in 
influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, active and passive bribery in 
the private sector, embezzlement of property in the private sector, laundering 
of proceeds of crime, concealment, and obstruction of justice.  
The Criminal Law Convention of the Council of Europe on Corruption 
stipulates active and passive bribery of domestic public officials, bribery of 
members of domestic public assemblies, bribery of foreign public officials, 
bribery of members of foreign public assemblies, active and passive bribery in 
the private sector, bribery of officials of international organisations, bribery of 
members of international parliamentary assemblies, bribery of judges and 
officials of international courts, trading in influence, the laundering of the 
proceeds from corruption offences, and accounting offences.  
Also researchers have tried to define the term corruption. Professor Petrus C. 
van Duyne (see Duyne, 1999) defines corruption as follow:  
“Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in 
which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) 
consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should 
rule his or her decision-making, in exchange for a reward or for the 
promise or expectation of a reward, while these motives influencing his or 
her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the decision.” 
According to Mariann Kránitz (see Kránitz, 1988) “Corruption is – level of the 
society as a whole – secondary income redistributive system which depends on 
the firstly redistributive system.” I absolutely agree with this statement of 
Kránitz. Finnish society completely confirmed this statement. In Finland the 
first redistributive system is proper, which is one of the reasons why Finland 
has a low corruption rate. (This is supported by the Finnish example, where the 
primary income is properly distributed, so there is practically no small-scale 
corruption in Finland.)  
The definition of corruption used by Transparency International is “abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”.  
According to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
“corruption is defined in general terms as the exploitation of a position of 
influence for private benefit. This definition encompasses both direct and 
indirect corruption, and both petty and grand corruption. It also includes 
the exploitation of people’s positions within private enterprise and the 
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abuse of public offices by the private sector, for example in the form of 
bribery.”  
The legal approach to corruption according to the criminal law in force in 
Hungary involves the offence of bribery and trading in influence2.  
How can the extent of corruption be recognized in a country?  
One of the main problems is that the latency of corruption is very high. The 
volume of corruption in Hungary could be explored if we combine three 
different sources, namely the Unified Criminal Statistics of the Police and 
Prosecution Services, research based on the citizens’ perception of corruption 
(e.g. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index) and empirical 
research dealing with experiences with corruption.  
According to the Unified Criminal Statistics of the Police and Prosecution 
Services in Hungary, over the last eight years the number of reported 
corruption cases was between 500 and 1000 (see Table 1 below). The real 
extent of bribery is not revealed by the statistical data. This data could show 
the minimum number of corruption cases in Hungary.  
Table 1: Data of corruption offences in Criminal Statistics in Hungary 
Year 2003  2004 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 2010 
Number of 
all reported 
crimes  
413’343  418’883 436’522  425’941  426’914  408’407  394’034 447’186 
Bribery  707  545 821  363  313  396  915 376 
Trading in 
influence  
75  50 137  117  37  144  47 106 
 
Studies that focus on the hidden part of corruption mostly deal with public 
perception3.  
It is evident that the results of the research dealing with the subjective 
perception of corruption and with objective experiences, respectively, differ 
from each other substantially. For example, according to the Gallup-UNICRI 
study (see Gallup, 2003) in 2003 only 9 % of the respondents said yes to the 
following question: “has anyone (private person or public official) asked you 
or expected you to pay bribe in the last 12 months?” The same study contained 
                                                 
2 According to Act IV of 1978 on the Hungarian Criminal Code (hereinafter HCC) from 
Section 250. to Section 258/F.  
3 The summary of the results of research on corruption in Hungary emphasises that most of the 
studies measured the subjective belief and not the real experience of corruption. See Nagy et 
al., 2008.  
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the following question: “How big do you think the problem of corruption in 
Hungary?” 87% of the respondents said that corruption was a serious problem 
in Hungary. Thus, only 9% of the respondents in Hungary had (recent) 
experience with corruption, but 87% thought that corruption was a serious 
problem.  
In order to resolve this kind of contradiction, more empirical studies are needed 
to find out the experiences of corruption, which also help to reveal the real 
volume of corruption. That was one of my reasons to carry out this empirical 
research.  
The aim of the research  
Finnish society is recognized in surveys as one of the most corruption-free 
societies in the world. According to the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 (see Transparency International, 2010) Finland was 
ranked in the fourth place on the list, i.e., among the least corruption-infected 
countries. Every year Finland was to be found within the first five places. In 
2010 Hungary was ranked in the fiftieth place. The question arouse in my mind 
regarding how Finnish investors behave in a foreign trade relation. Do they 
play according to the local rules, or do they have to play according to the local 
rules?4 We could say that in Finland as well as in the Nordic countries in 
general the level of corruption is quite low5. However, in international 
commercial relations, especially in the field of arms trade, we could find some 
cases which are related to corruption, such as the Wärtsilä and Partia cases in 
Finland and the case of Gripen in Sweden (see Transparency International, 
OECD Progress Report, 2011).  
Since we can perceive that there is corruption in Hungary, it is important to 
explore the experiences of foreign investors with it. On the one hand, we have 
certain forms of corruption to which people have almost become accustomed, 
and little attention is paid to it. On the other hand, a citizen from a country 
where corrupt behaviour in business and in the public sector is unusual is able 
to explore the ways in which we could mitigate the problem. Thirdly, we 
cannot neglect how our society is viewed from abroad. If a country is seen to 
be corrupt, it is not only a problem of moral worth but it could cause serious 
consequences to the economy in connection with foreign investments. Because 
of this I decided to carry out research focusing on the situation of Finnish 
investors in Hungary. 
                                                 
4 We could find examples of that behaviour, for example Finnish companies situated on the 
Finnish-Russian border. See Aromaa et al. 2009.  
5 For a more detailed analysis of the statistics on corruption in Finland see Joutsen and 
Keränen, 2009 and also Juslén and Muttilainen, 2009, page 95. Since 2000, about ten bribery 
cases have been reported per year. 
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During my research I interviewed representatives of the Finnish companies 
which have investments in Hungary and the representatives of the Hungarian 
subsidiary companies. 
The research covers the following topics: the investment climate, business 
security, experiences of violent crimes, crimes against property, economic 
crimes and corruption in Hungary. In this article I will discuss only the 
investment climate and the experiences of corruption as part of the research.6  
The aim of the research is to obtain information about problems caused by 
crime to Finnish companies in Hungary, in order to assist businesses in 
preventing crime and corruption. 
Data and methodology  
The list of the companies was collected from the databases of the Embassy of 
the Republic of Hungary in Finland, Finnagora, Finpro and ITD Hungary 
homepage information. I received a list of 117 companies from the Embassy of 
the Republic of Hungary in Finland which was made by the Finnagora in 2008. 
First, I had to select the companies still active in 2010. I disregarded the 
reseller and retailer companies which are not solely the representatives of given 
Finnish products, but which also deal with a lot of products of other foreign 
companies. Obviously, they are not real investors in Hungary. Some of the 
companies have become 100% (for example) Swedish, Italian or Dutch owned, 
and I eliminated these companies, as well. Following this selection, the final 
list contained 46 companies. During the research two companies terminated 
their activities in Hungary. The sample of active and available companies 
remained 44.  
The companies were approached as follows. First, I sent by e-mail a one-page 
introduction letter which contained my personal data and a short description as 
well as the aim of the research. If there was no response to this letter within a 
week, I phoned the potential interviewees.  
In Finland six companies rejected my request to participate in the study. (One 
rejection was quite nice: “To my best knowledge we have never had any 
problems with crime in Hungary. Your beautiful country in the business where 
we are present.”) Seven companies delegated the task to the local managing 
director (usually on the grounds that in Finland they did not have enough 
knowledge of the topic). Twenty-one companies did not answer my e-mails 
and phone calls. Eventually, ten companies were willing to participate in the 
study. I conducted the ten interviews in Finland between 1 January and 15 
March 2011. The ten interviews were completed with eleven persons (four 
chief executive officers and seven senior or middle managers) representing ten 
companies.  
                                                 
6 The full research report will be published at the end of 2011. 
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In Hungary one company rejected my request. The managing director of two 
companies was the same person whom I had interviewed in Finland. Twenty-
three companies did not answer my e-mails and phone calls. A total of eighteen 
companies were willing to participate in the study. I conducted the 18 
interviews in Hungary between 1 May and 31 August 2011.  
The 18 interviews were completed with 19 persons (three chief executive 
officers, 15 managing directors and one middle manager) representing 18 
companies. 
Thus, in the two countries I have conducted a total of 28 interviews involving 
21 different companies / Finnish investors.  
The business sectors of the companies were the following: durable goods 
sales/product sales, construction, trade/commercial, telecommunications, 
freight forwarding and transportation, packing, labour hire and recruiting 
services, consulting and training services, printing services, and electronics 
manufacturing.  
14 out of the 21 companies were small-sized businesses (with less than 100 
employees in the Hungarian subsidiary), five were medium-sized businesses 
(between 100 and 1000 employees in the Hungarian subsidiary), and two were 
large-scale companies (more than 1000 employees in the Hungarian 
subsidiary).  
The interviews were qualitative, semi-structured, thematic, in-depth and face-
to-face. The semi-structured thematic interview outline was developed by the 
author. The interview outline was divided into four main parts. The first part is 
the personal data of the interviewee (what kind of profession he or she has, his 
or her working experiences, how long has he or she been working in this 
company, what is his or her position in the company at the moment, etc.). The 
second part is devoted to the company unit with questions related to facts and 
figures of the company (e.g. the business sector and the forms of the 
company’s activity in Finland and in Hungary, when has the company’s 
activity started in Finland and in Hungary, what is the ownership of the 
Hungarian daughter company, how much was the annual turnover of the 
company’s outlets in Hungary in 2010, how many employees they have in 
Hungary, etc.) This part contains the questions on the opinion of the investment 
climate in Hungary. The third part is ‘Crime experiences in Hungary’ which 
contains the experiences with violent crimes, crimes against property and 
economic crimes. The last part of the interview is the definition, the perception 
and experiences of corruption. All of the interviews started with the 
interviewer’s introduction and a short description and the aim of the research.  
The length of the interviews in Finland varied between 1 and 1.5 hours. The 
interviews in Hungary lasted on the average between 1.5 and 2 hours. The 
longest in Hungary took 4 hours and 19 minutes. Six interviews in Hungary 
lasted more than 2 hours. I received the impression that all of the 
representatives of the companies on the investor side knew the major cases, 
events and crimes related to the company. They could inform me concerning 
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the most important events in the subsidiary’s activities concerning everyday 
administrative problems, crimes and corrupt behaviours.  
At most of the companies, the Finnish representatives were quite familiar with 
the Hungarian political and economic situation. They knew the result of the 
election in the spring of 2010, the two-third majority of the new government 
and so on.  
Out of the 28 interviews 25 interviews were recorded and transcribed. Three of 
the interviewees refused to allow recording of the interview because of the 
company’s security policy.  
Business climate in Hungary  
Many of the companies had business relationships with Hungary before the 
political-economic transition7 in Hungary. Some of the companies set up their 
subsidiary immediately after the change of regime.8 Typically, the first few 
years after the establishment the managing director was a Finnish national. 
Nowadays, most of the local managing directors are Hungarians.  
Half of the companies have relied on the assistance of the Finnish Embassy in 
Hungary when they established the company.  
From the responses it appeared that the reasons behind setting up a company in 
Hungary were the good geographical location which is favourable for 
transportation and helps opening the market towards Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as more capacity in respect of Russia. Furthermore, the high 
labour skills, good mathematics and IT education in Hungary, and low labour 
costs were also taken into account. It was also likely that Hungary would be a 
member of the European Union, and with the EU membership the legal and 
business environment would be more understandable and transparent, i.e., 
similar to the usual conditions.  
In general, the companies found what they had expected, although they also 
had difficulties. The typical problems which all of the companies faced were 
the frequent changes in legislation (especially the regulations related to taxes), 
the bureaucratic legal system, the slow procedure in court, the complicated 
reclaiming of VAT, the different interpretation of the law – sometimes the EU 
directions – and the inflexible, ineffective and inappropriate regulations 
concerning company bankruptcy. This point regarding bankruptcies is 
interesting, since section 5 of the Finnish Limited Liability Companies 
                                                 
7 The political changes in Hungary started in 1989. After the first free elections in 1990 the 
one-party, Soviet-type system was replaced by a multiparty democratic system. At the same 
time it was declared that the former planned economic system should be transformed into a 
market-oriented, capitalist one.  
8 More detailed description of the relationship between the transition and the economic and 
white-collar crime see Inzelt, 2011, p. 352-379.  
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provides that ’The purpose of a company is to generate profits for the 
shareholders, unless otherwise provided in the Articles of Association.” In 
Hungarian civil law there is no corresponding provision. Because of this fact, 
in Finland a company is responsible if it has not done everything to ensure a 
profit or if it has acted in bad faith. In Hungary only a special type of 
bankruptcy is punishable according to Hungarian Criminal Code Section 290.  
An example of when a company is concerned about taxation:  
“The past six months were unpredictable. Exposed a lot. So many tax 
issues. Uncertain. Exposed tax after the benefit for a foreign company. 
The taxation system has to be more predictable and certain.”  
Another example of the opinion about the general business climate in Hungary:  
“Some competitors use the law as a weapon. Competitors abuse the law.”  
A piece of advice from a respondent:  
“Is the political system totally separated from the legal system? You 
always have a little bit of doubt in your mind. In Finland you don’t have it 
at all. The political system should be separated from the legal system.” 
Defining corruption  
Corruption was mainly understood by the interviewees both in Finland and in 
Hungary as any money or gift which is given to another person in order to 
influence their decision. Most of them emphasised the illegal personal benefit 
caused by corruption. Some of them mentioned the problem of the grey 
economy and its impact on corrupt behaviour.  
Only a few respondents mentioned the difference between large-scale and 
small-scale corruption.  
Many Finnish respondents referred to the company’s code of conduct when 
defined corruption.  
Many of the representatives of the companies both in Hungary and in Finland 
had faced difficulties in distinguishing between a bribe and a gift. The practice 
in respect of gifts and business travel was not uniform in the companies. Most 
of them referred to the provisions of their company’s code of conduct 
regarding the value of gifts, both when accepting them and giving them. This 
value varied between 25 and 100 euros. Usually hospitality, for example a 
business lunch or dinner, is allowed by these codes of conduct.  
Some of the Finnish respondents told me that the most typical form of 
corruption in Finland is to go skiing in Lapland and invite your clients. Some 
of them think that this is already corruption, because the value of the trip is 
high.  
Three different views and practices could be found according to the answers. 
Five companies still have the practice of inviting the customers and paying all 
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the travel and other costs to the partners. The approach of some companies in 
the case of a skiing trip to Lapland is that the customers pay the cost of the 
flight and the rest (the accommodation) is paid by the inviting company. The 
rest of the companies invite the customers to a factory visit, but the customer 
has to pay the travel cost and the accommodation. This is a most common and 
acceptable way to do it for both sides. Some of the interviewees said that the 
Finnish attitudes to corruption are too strict, because in their view a business 
dinner is not corruption, but the attitudes of the Finnish public think that it is.  
One respondent commented on who could issue an invitation to a trip without 
there being a sense of corruption: 
“We have been invited only by those clients who had already been our 
clients for a number of years. This is a clear distinction. If you already do 
a lot of business together than you can accept a little bit more, e.g. a dinner 
or a trip.” 
Some interviewees told me that the personal relationship is important and it 
could not be built by cash: 
“In most of the other countries in which we operate the understanding of 
what is corruption is a lot higher up than in Finland.”  
Business gifts at Christmas are allowed in every company. A new approach to 
this is where a company donates the money to charitable purposes and just 
sends a postcard to the partners, in which they note that the money that they 
could spend for Christmas business gifts has been transferred to support a 
certain organization.  
The following example is evidence of the effectiveness of the social control 
theories (see for example Reiss, 1951 and Reckless, 1962) in Finland. Social 
control seems to be effective in Finland. Unfortunately, this is not working in 
Hungary as widely as in Finland: 
“Since we are a company based in Finland we can not afford a case like 
this. If I bribe somebody in Hungary and that becomes news in [the 
newspaper] Helsingin Sanomat, I might lose all my business in Finland 
and on top of that nobody would want to work with me in Finland. 
Because this is the Finnish atmosphere, I have a business reason not to do 
that.” 
In Hungary I heard also two remarkable statements which are worth citing: 
“Corruption is a mechanism of social consensus” and “Insider information is 
a form of corruption.” 
Experiences with corruption  
In accordance with the Hungarian Criminal Code and on the basis of the 
present research two categories can be distinguished regarding the relationships 
in corruption activity, i.e., between the business and the state or official sectors 
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and between the business or economic partners. First, the characteristic features 
based on the statements of the representative of Finnish industrial and 
commercial companies according to the above-mentioned categories will be 
surveyed.  
In the interviews, primarily small-scale corruption was mentioned. When local 
authorities, mayors etc. or senior politicians would be / were involved the 
interviewee – with a few exceptions – either interrupted or refused to speak. 
Some of the interviewees think that they had not received as many offers to pay 
bribes as happens between Hungarian partners, because they are Finnish or 
representatives of a Finnish-owned multinational company.  
Many of the representatives declared that bribery cases which involve money 
were a special feature of Hungarian-owned small or medium-sized companies 
because the multinational company – as they are – rarely use cash money in 
business transactions.  
Some of the respondents told me that they have been learning during the 
establishment of companies in other countries – they especially think about 
Russia and the Baltic countries – that if the local way of doing business 
includes bribes and if one would like to do business in that climate, you have to 
just accept it and trust your local people to know the situation better than you 
do. They said: “For us it is strange to go to the customs officer and give a nice 
and big present. In Finland they would not take it.”  
The respondents mentioned that when somebody was asking money for his or 
her services it was not direct approach, usually just a hint.  
Corruption between the business and the state or 
official sectors 
The interviewees had the following experiences with cases which can be 
considered to be typical ones. 
Maladministration by a customs officer 
A customs officer offered a decrease in the amount of customs duty in return 
for a favour. This was declined by the Finnish company, and they reported it to 
the police. The case is ongoing in court.  
Licences 
In many cases, obtaining a licence (for example for construction) can be 
facilitated by a payment. The Finnish companies prefer to wait until the official 
deadline. The Hungarian representative of a Finnish company said that it 
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happened once, when the licence was very urgent, that they accepted the offer, 
paid a small sum of money to the clerk, and the licence was obtained at once.  
Many of the respondents gave a small amount of money (around 10,000 forints 
= ca. 35 euros) in order to obtain a licence within one week, instead of the 
usual six weeks. They mentioned that this is typical behaviour in Hungary and 
everybody does it.  
Tenders 
This is a very serious point. According to one of the respondents, even though 
bribery of experts is specifically prohibited by the code of conduct, in Hungary 
it is often impossible to win a tender without bribery. Therefore, Finnish 
companies prefer not to participate in state tenders.  
Tax and Customs Authorities 
A curious practice can be found in Hungary. The tax controller has a yearly 
plan in advance decided by his or her boss concerning the amount of money to 
be collected as fines. The inspector’s bonus depends on meeting this 
requirement. (A similar plan exists e.g., at the Police and at the Council of 
Public Procurement. At the latter, 20% of its budget comes from this source.) It 
is worth citing one of the respondents word by word: “The Tax Authority has 
an office at our company because they visit us so often. Last time the controller 
told us – before inspecting any documents – that they want 35 million forints 9 
penalty to be paid. After bargaining we paid 5 million forints 10 eventually.” 
This is certainly not an isolated experience, since several respondents told me 
that the controllers arrive at the company with a concrete amount of fine 
decided in advance. It also happened that an employee of the company was 
asked to show any item which is thought to be ‘uncertain’, because this would 
help the inspector to impose some kind of ‘symbolic’ fine. In another case after 
imposing a fine – that was appealed by the company – the inspector said the 
following words: “some million forints won’t floor you”. Several CEOs said 
that the controllers visit those companies more frequently, which are easily 
available. Another general complaint was the constant changes in the tax 
regulations, which are practically impossible to follow. Furthermore, due to the 
different interpretations of the regulations, in Hungary anybody can be fined at 
any time. In one case the company filled in the old questionnaire and not the 
new one. Even though the declared and paid tax was the same, the company 
was fined. A positive sign is that, because of the contradictory legal 
environment, the companies frequently ask the Tax Authority (formerly APEH, 
                                                 
9 This is approximately 130,000 euros.  
10 This is c.a. 18,510 euros.  
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presently the Tax and Customs Authority, NAV) concerning their standpoint 
on different issues, and they usually receive adequate answers. 
In another case, the Hungarian bookkeeper suggested to the CEO of a Finnish 
company to give some money to the inspector to get back the money from the 
Tax Authority that the company was entitled according to the law. Of course, 
the CEO followed the suggestion because he/she did not know the local habits.  
“In Hungary the thinking of the inspectors is that you are guilty if you 
cannot yourself prove that you are not. In Finland if something is not clear 
in taxation tax, you are not punishable.” 
Public procurement 11 
One aspect of public procurement has already been mentioned above. 80 % of 
the responding Finnish companies do not participate in public procurement 
procedures on purpose because they consider these to be unfair and burdened 
with corruption. It was said that they want to live under market relations.  
A special situation emerged with one interviewed company in a public 
procurement process. The Finnish company’s product and service were the best 
and the state-owned company would have liked to buy this product and service, 
but nevertheless the Finnish company did not win the process as a prime 
contractor. It continued according to the usual scenario, which is as follows. 
The state-owned company creates a private or public company – the owner and 
the CEO of such companies are usually friends of the director of the state-
owned company – in order to participate in the procurement process. This 
company wins the procurement process and becomes the prime contractor. The 
purpose of the establishment of this company to take away some money from 
the procurement project. Meanwhile the state-owned company still needs the 
Finnish company product, and so the Finnish company becomes a 
subcontractor in the process. The prime contractor is just a company through 
which money flows.  
Another feature was experienced in procurement, namely that the 
announcement specifies the product or the service in such detail that only one 
company can meet the requirements.  
The case of the company cars  
Another typical case in Hungary is when a company buys a new car which has 
to be registered as a company car. The process usually should take a minimum 
                                                 
11 Transparency International Hungary estimates that corruption is systemic in government 
procurement, the cost could amount to an increase of 20-25%, and the result is often poor 
quality or useless goods and services to purchase. 
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of 60 days. However, for only 5000 forints or so (ca. 18 euros) one can get the 
document within one day.  
Maintain a good relationship with civil servants  
Some of the interviewees told me that they like to maintain good relationships 
with custom officials, municipal clerks or other civil servants. To achieve this 
they usually give some gifts not just during Christmas time, but also for 
example on the occasion of the public official’s birthday. The value of the gift 
is usually not more than 25 euros. The gift could be a box of chocolate or a 
bottle of alcohol.  
The interesting point here is that in Finland it is quite unusual to behave like 
this. The Finnish representatives think that this is a cultural distinction between 
the two countries. And of course it is not regarded as corruption in Hungary, 
while it is corruption in Finland in their point of view.  
“The attitude is getting stricter towards corruption in Scandinavian 
countries. The civil sphere is isolated from the rest of the society.” 
Cases related to the building industry  
In the building industry the respondents divided the corrupt behaviours in three 
different categories. The first one is the cases related to building permits 
(mentioned above in subsection 2.). The second category usually occurs in big 
projects where there is a so-called “middleman” that sometimes the companies 
have to hire, because if they did not do so, they would not get the business. In 
99.9 % of the cases the companies do not use this “middleman” construction. 
The third category involves structural engineering companies which stipulate 
what kind of products are good for a building. According to the interviewees 
most bribe requests typically come from these engineering companies whose 
employees state that their salaries are poor. They select the products of a given 
company as suitable ones, provided that the company gives a certain percent of 
the value of the products.  
Corruption between business partners 
It is worth summarizing the experiences of Finnish companies also in this 
respect. 
Promoting the sale of the products 
The directors of the customers responsible for purchases indicate that they 
would accept the price offered, however, they ask that a lower price be noted in 
the documents, and they want ca. 5 % of the original price to be transferred to 
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them or to the company. Such a deal is never accepted by the Finnish 
companies. The problem is, however, that there are companies on the market 
which accept this deal, and consequently the Finnish companies will suffer a 
disadvantage in the competition, and they lose business. 
Prearranged tenders  
Several interviewees told me that if there was a tender – which seemed to be 
clear – the company or the employee of the company has already arranged 
matters so that a certain one of the participants would win the tender. It is 
usually known that there is a hidden agreement between the parties.  
Abuse by using inside information 
Official persons involved in a tender convey the quotation of a given company 
to the competitors. Then the rival can easily offer a somewhat lower price, and 
win. This was mentioned by 70 % of the interviewees. 
Customer asking for some support  
One company mentioned a case in which a customer was asking for some 
support in renovating a meeting room of the company. The reaction of the 
company was that they were not able to pay extra money which is not linked to 
the direct business.  
Nepotism  
Some of the interviewees told of cases of nepotism. The owner of the winning 
company in a tender is a relative or friend of the customer. Everything seems to 
be legal because they win the tender with the lowest price. After the signing of 
the contract, there will be new accounts mentioned as unexpected costs. 
Evidently the final cost of the project will be substantially higher than that 
offered by any other participants in the original tender. Eventually the customer 
signs these accounts, and usually personally gets some of this extra money in 
cash.  
Corrupt behaviour on the part of an employee 
Some cases have arisen in the interviews in which the Hungarian employee of 
a company acted illegally – receiving personal benefit from the situation– 
without the knowledge and the will of the company, thus causing damage to 
the company.  
One case was in connection with the amount of the rent of a company’s 
warehouse, which was over the market level. After the company noticed the 
case – there were suspicions that a certain employee was obtaining personal 
88 
benefit in this way – they managed to have the amount of the rent decreased. 
The suspected person was fired.  
Other cases were linked to the fact that employees had inside information of 
the company and they misused this.  
Bonus after trade 
Bonuses after the signing of a contract are legally allowed both in Finland and 
Hungary. However, the actual attitude is different in the two countries, which 
is due to the different social and economic environment. While in Hungary this 
bonus is generally accepted, in Finland it is seldom used. 
The anti-corruption policy of Finnish companies 
A code of conduct, which is used by 70 % of the Finnish companies, is a very 
important part of an anti-corruption policy. It should be emphasized that the 
code of conduct is made known to all employees, and their knowledge of it is 
tested each year. Every employee is responsible for the code of сonduct 
personally. 
The atmosphere at the working place also supports the prevention of 
corruption. The spirit of the code of conduct is considered even more important 
than its content. The code of conduct provides for zero tolerance for corruption 
in all companies, and an employee should be dismissed immediately if he or 
she commits such a criminal act.  
Two representatives of a Finnish parent company said that they conveyed the 
solution to the local corruption-related problems to the local management, even 
they did not want to know about it. An example of this is the following: 
“If you need to bribe somebody, I don’t need to know it. Yes, I know it is 
going on but I don’t want to know the amount, to whom, etc. You take 
care of your culture and you understand what needs to be done. We want 
the business to be run, we need profits from the business itself and if the 
price for obtaining that profit is that some of the profits go to somebody 
else, it is worth it.”  
In some cases in which the partner’s company employee behaved in a corrupt 
way (see above for example the sections ‘Promoting the sale of the products’ 
or ‘Prearranged tenders’), and it seems to be that it is just his or her attitude to 
doing business, the local managing directors talked with the owner of the 
company and explained the situation. Usually in the near future it was proven 
that it was not an isolated case and finally the company fires that person.  
 
  89  
Preventing corruption  
All of the companies answered – happily – ‘no’ to the following question: “Has 
the corruption situation in Hungary influenced your investment decisions in the 
country in any way?”  
However, most of the representatives of the companies stated that because of 
the corruption situation in Hungary they were losing business, since they were 
not giving bribes. They emphasised that the corruption situation reduces 
competition and prejudices fair competition.  
The Finnish respondents recommended the following steps in order to curb 
corruption in Hungary: clear rules, transparency, effective law enforcement, 
investigations, a stable business environment, a good and predictable market, 
the fixing of the economy, a stable political structure and development, proper 
and honest ways of receiving gifts, improvement of the open market and free 
competition, paying attention to the company culture, investing time in the 
code of conduct, earning enough money in a legal way so they can avoid 
corrupt behaviours, the establishment by the government of good control 
mechanisms, more transparency in everyday life and business life, and the 
international business life and ethics would be a good sample. Preventing 
corruption must start from the top and go down to everyday life. Rethink the 
tax system: if the taxes decreased, the state could get more tax money and the 
black market becomes smaller. Tax authorities should make more inspections 
in order to prevent crimes. The pyramid structure has to be eliminated and 
responsibility has to be delegated to a lower level.  
The money has to flow through accounts which are more visible to the 
authorities. Reduce the use of cash. The free press is a key element. 
Investigating journalism is a good way to prevent or fight against corruption.  
Preventing corruption requires the raising of public awareness, which must 
start in school. It is a question of attitudes and education.  
The Hungarian interviewees recommending making adequate regulations, 
starting ethic education in schools, the state should review its own activity in 
connection with the prevention of corruption, the structure of macro-economy 
should be reconsidered, the grey economy should be decreased, and civil 
pressure should be increased. 
Some of the respondent mentioned that preventing corruption will be a slow 
process, because corruption is inherited, and is a part of the Hungarian culture. 
First of all Hungary needs an economic recovery, after which salaries can be 
raised and stricter regulation and control can be introduced.  
In the following part I will discuss the attempts of the Hungarian governments 
over the last ten years to prevent corruption.  
The various government-initiated anti-corruption programmes in Hungary are 
partially the result of international pressure. The most influential source of 
pressure has been the European Union (EU). While seeking EU membership, 
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successive Hungarian governments have participated in several anti-corruption 
actions initiated by the EU. 
The Government decision on regulation No. 1023 of 2001 introduced the 
Governmental Strategy against Corruption. This contained a wide range of 
proposals concerned with conflicts of interest, property declarations, preparing 
more effective control of the sources of the assets of political parties and 
campaign donations, lobbying, increased publicity of data and reduction of the 
scope of business, bank or securities secrets, the length of immunity, restraint 
of profession in the case of committing bribery or trafficking in influence, the 
introduction of criminal sanctions applicable against legal persons, money-
laundering, terrorism, and public procurement.  
The strategy, however, took the ‘traditional approach’ to fighting 
administrative corruption by focusing primarily on punitive measures instead 
of prevention. Several other attempts have been made over the last two 
decades. 
According to the strategy adopted in 2004 (No.1011/2004 Government 
decision) the Advisory Board for Corruption-free Public Life (hereinafter the 
Board) was established. The Board consisted of representatives from the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister's Office, the Governmental 
Supervisory Office, the National Security Office, the National Headquarters of 
the Police, the General Directorate of the Customs and Finance Guard, the 
Chief of the Coordination Office of OLAF, the State Audit Office and the 
Prosecutor General’s Office. Additionally, representatives from civil society 
(i.e. university researchers, members of the Academy of Sciences) were invited 
to participate in the Board meetings. The main tasks of the Board were to carry 
out research relating to corruption, continuous evaluation of the results of anti-
corruption activities, the providing of advice on anti-corruption measures and 
liaison with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the 
Council of Europe Group of States against corruption (GRECO).  
Anti-corruption activities continued in 2007 with No. 1037 of 2007 
government decision “The tasks related to the fight against corruption”. This 
decision repealed No. 1011 of 2004 Government decision and No. 1023 of 
2001 Government decision.  
According to government decision No. 1037 of 2007 the government requested 
the Minister of Justice to draw up a long-term ‘strategic document’ and a short-
term ‘programme of action’ to fight against corruption. These documents were 
to be formulated in detail by the Anti-corruption Co-ordination Body 
(hereinafter ACB) established in August of 2007. The members of the ACB 
were the representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Economy and Transport, the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development, Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of the Prime 
Minister's Office. Permanent observers were the representatives of the State 
Audit Office, the Hungarian Competition Authority, the Council of Public 
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Procurement, the National Council of Justice, the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information and the Prosecutor General’s 
Office. On a temporary or permanent basis, the Ministry of Justice designated 
non-governmental public organisations and representatives of civil society, in 
proportion to the number of government bodies (six persons). In January 2008 
the ACB had prepared an anti-corruption strategy and action plan. In view of 
the involvement of non-governmental public organisations and representatives 
of civil society in the work of the body (including Transparency International 
Hungary), the new anti-corruption programme was expected to be an important 
step towards a widely accepted national strategy against corruption. The Anti-
corruption Co-ordination Body was scheduled to produce an Anti-corruption 
Strategy by the end of 2007, and the government planned to make a decision 
based on its strategy by February 2008. On the basis of our experience so far, 
we reserve judgement on the effectiveness of the work of this organization. We 
must also mention the crucial role of non-government organisations in the fight 
against corruption. 
In February 2009 the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement published an 
Anti-corruption Action Plan which contained 5 main areas: a) the protection of 
whistle-blowers (draft Act), b) establishment of the so-called “Authority for 
Protection of Public Interest” (draft Act), c) Ethical guidelines for civil servants 
(draft Parliament Decision), d) Stricter regulations in the field of lobbying 
(draft amendment of the Lobby Act), e) transparency in party financing (draft 
amendment of the Operation and Financial Management of Political Parties 
Act). I think this was a great step ahead in combating corruption. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of these new measures have been blocked, at 
least partially. The act on the protection of whistleblowers was adopted by 
Parliament on 14 December 2009, but the act on the Establishment of the 
Authority for Protection of Public Interest, which would have provided 
guarantees of the process and institutional features of the whistle-blowing 
system, was not signed by the President. The amendment of the Lobby Act was 
not initiated in Parliament. The initiative to make party incomes and expenses 
more transparent was not accepted by Parliament in November 2009.  
The new government – which was formed in May 2010 – introduced the 
following steps to fight against corruption. 
 In September 2010 Hungary joined the International Anti-Corruption 
Academy (IACA). The aim of IACA is to overcome current 
shortcomings in knowledge and practice in the field of anti-corruption.  
 From 2011 the government increased the support of the Office of the 
Central Prosecution Service in order to establish the Public Prosecutor’s 
Department of Anti-Corruption. The Department deals with corruption 
cases where the value of the crime and/or the public outrage is high.  
 To reduce police corruption the new government created a regulation to 
control the activities of persons belong to the staff of the police and 
other organizations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not just in their 
working hours but also in their private life. According to this regulation 
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a reliability testing system was introduced where the controller could 
use all sort of intelligence means to test police officers, prison guards, 
customs officers and firemen. There were several constitutional and 
human rights concerns.  
 The whistle-blowing protection is on the agenda again, but up to now 
no legislation has been introduced on this topic.  
 The government appointed a Government Commissioner whose task is 
to review the action of the former ruling party. This step can be 
considered a settling of old scores, and not as an effective measure 
against corruption. 
 The corporate tax was decreased by the government from 19% to 10% 
in order to increase the payment of taxes.12  
The main problem is that there is no long-term strategy in respect of the 
corruption situation in Hungary. The legislature still lacks a systematic 
approach to solving this problem.  
Conclusions 
The aim of the research was to obtain information about the experiences of 
corruption of Finnish companies in Hungary and to gain a deeper 
understanding of typical corruption situations. Corruption is an inevitable part 
of society, not solely in Hungary. It can not be entirely eliminated, although its 
volume and structure can be reduced to an optimal level. The results of this 
research clearly indicate that there are different levels of and situations in 
corruption (see above the section ‘Experiences with corruption’) and that there 
are different reasons and factors (e.g. social, political, economic, etc.) behind 
the diverse types of this criminal behaviour. To fight corruption effectively we 
have to examine the reasons and the factors. After that measures that 
specifically address these reasons and factors have to be introduced. It is quite 
well known that investigations in corruption cases are difficult because of the 
common interests of the partners. It follows from this that the introduction of 
measures focused on prevention would be more welcome.  
Hungary is still a young democracy, only 22 years old with a period of ‘wild 
capitalism’ in the beginning, involving so-called spontaneous privatization. It 
takes time to face and improve the situation. Finland has been showing the way 
and an attitude against corruption for more than 90 years.  
We may state that the multinational companies active in Hungary are exposed 
to an attempt to corrupt them. Their attitude is of outmost importance in respect 
                                                 
12 This involves a special feature in Hungary. Hungarian small and middle-sized companies 
usually do not pay corporate tax because the corporate tax is calculated on the basis of the 
profit. Owing to inventive accounting, company accounts generally do not show any profit, and 
so they do not have to pay corporate tax.  
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of supporting the introduction of a different and better Northern-Western 
culture, and their anti-corrupt behaviour serves as a good example that is worth 
following, adapting and eventually putting into wider practice. Beside the 
moral impact, this will also strengthen the competitiveness of the Hungarian 
economy. The economy can develop if the business decisions are rational and 
do not contain corrupted elements.  
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Abstract: This article points out that the core essential element of the offence 
of corruption in Chinese criminal law is the abuse of office/power. After 
reviewing efforts made by the Chinese government in recent years to 
investigate and prosecute the offence of corruption, including a review of 
statistics, the article concludes that the political meaning of the death penalty is 
an important, if not the most important, reason that the Chinese government 
insists on punishing the offence of corruption with the death penalty. 
Meanwhile, it notes that the prevention of the offence of corruption is a matter 
beyond criminal law in China, and profound political reforms might be more 
effective. 
Key words: Corruption offence; capital punishment; prevention policy; 
Chinese criminal law 
On 19 July, 2011, XU Maiyong, the former deputy mayor of Hangzhou and 
Jiang Renjie, the former deputy mayor of Suzhou, were executed on the same 
day for taking bribes.1 The executions might be seen as a signal showing “the 
firm stance of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese 
government to combat corruption and built a clean government” proclaimed by 
the State Council in the White Paper on China's Efforts to Combat Corruption 
and Build a Clean Government (hereafter, the White Paper) issued in 
December 2010. Traditionally, criminal law is taken as a tool to respond to 
crimes and maintain social order, and punishment is a weapon to protect the 
state and people in China, just as is provided by article 1 of the 1997 Criminal 
Law: “The aim of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China is to use 
criminal punishments to fight against all criminal acts.” Therefore, it is not 
surprising to see that the Chinese legislature has placed certain corruption 
offences such as the taking of bribes on the list of capital offences.  
What, then, exactly is the offence of corruption in China? Why does the 
Chinese government insist on punishing corrupt officials with capital 
punishment, while at the same time facilitating reforms to reduce the use of 
capital punishment? How many corruption cases are investigated and 
prosecuted in China every year? What is the Chinese government doing in 
                                                 
1 See ZHOU Bin and LU Jie, “XU Maiyong and JIANG Renjie Executed”, Legal Daily, 20 
July 2011. 
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order to combat corruption, and is it doing it right? This article aims to answer 
these questions. At the outset, this article tries to define the offence of 
corruption according to the criminal law amended in 1997 (hereafter, the 1997 
Criminal Law). Then, it introduces the efforts that the Chinese government has 
made in recent years in order to deal with the problem of corruption. Thirdly, it 
discusses why the Chinese government continues to punish the offence of 
corruption with the death penalty while taking active measures to restrict its 
use. Finally, this article suggests that more profound and constructive system 
reforms beyond criminal law are necessary in order to enhance progress in 
coping with the problem of corruption in China.  
The offence of corruption in criminal law 
Although frequently used in academic papers and even official documents, 
“corruption” is actually a vague expression. A Japanese researcher has 
suggested that corruption in China usually means “an official’s pursuit of 
personal financial gain by abusing their public power or position. This 
definition specifically includes four kinds of crimes: embezzlement of public 
property, bribe-taking, illegally using public money, and other financial crimes 
committed by officials (for example, smuggling)”.2 This definition itself is 
obviously too vague to help us to understand what corruption is in China. 
Moreover, it improperly limits the offence of corruption within the narrow 
scope of “financial crimes”, because corruption crime is usually called 
“贪腐犯罪”（Tanfu crime) in Chinese, where “贪” (Tan) means to take 
advantage of one’s office to pursue individual financial interests, and “腐” (Fu) 
means to abuse one’s office. The purpose of obtaining monetary advantage is 
irrelevant in the latter case.  
Briefly, the essential elements of the offence of corruption in China could be 
summarized as following:  
1) the actor must be a “State functionary”. According to article 93, 1997 
Criminal Law, “State functionaries” refers to persons who perform 
public service in State-owned companies or enterprises, institutions or 
people's organizations, persons who are assigned by State organs, State-
owned companies, enterprises or institutions to companies, enterprises 
or institutions that are not owned by the State or people's organizations 
to perform public service and other persons who perform public service 
according to law shall all be regarded as State functionaries;  
                                                 
2 Wang Yunhai, “Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Today’s China”, Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Law and Politics 33 (2005), p. 1. 
98 
2) the core essential element is the abuse of office. Therefore, a criminal act 
committed by an official shouldn’t be punished as a “corruption offence” as 
long as the actor didn’t take advantage of this office;  
3) the purpose of obtaining financial advantage can often be seen, but not 
always. For example, according to the crime of abuse of power in article 
397 of 1997 Criminal Law, a typical corruption crime, any functionary of a 
State organ who abuses his power shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment, if only heavy losses to public money or property or the 
interests of the State and the people was caused. The article does not 
mention any purpose at all.  
It should be noted that the scope of the actor in the taking of bribes has been 
extended, by Suggestions on How to Apply Law in Dealing With Bribery 
Criminal Case jointly issued by the SPC and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (SPP) in July 2007, from State functionaries to include also those 
who are in a special relationship with State functionaries and are able to make 
use of their post and influence (such as a mistress). 
In the 1997 Criminal Law, typical corruption offences are those in Chapter 
XIII, including embezzlement (article 382), misappropriation of public funds 
(article 384), taking or extorting money or property from another person 
(article 385), introducing a bribe to a State functionary (article 392), holding a 
large amount of property that cannot be proved legal (article 395) and dividing 
up State-owned assets illegally (article 396) and Chapter IX, the crime of 
dereliction of duty (such as abusing one’s power or neglecting one’s duty; 
article 397) and intentionally or negligently divulging State secrets (article 
398).  
In addition to the crimes mentioned above, a few corruption crimes are 
provided in other chapters of the 1997 Criminal Law for the purpose of making 
the application and enforcement of the law more convenient, because these 
crimes are usually closely related to the criminal acts in question. For instance, 
Article 294, 1997 Criminal Law specially deals with organized crime. Clause 1 
of the article provides the crime of leading or taking an active part in 
organizations in the nature of a criminal syndicate, clause 2 provides the crime 
of recruiting members within the territory of PRC by members of Mafia 
abroad, and clause 3 provides that any functionary of a State organ who 
harbours an organization in the nature of a criminal syndicate or connives at 
such organization to conduct illegal or criminal acts shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment.  
Corruption crime in judicial practice 
“The CPC and the the Chinese government have been resolutely combating 
corruption and building a clean government since the founding of the People's 
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Republic of China on October 1, 1949.”3 And as early as in 1982, Deng 
Xiaoping advocated in a speech against economic crime that “the ‘struggle will 
have to be waged daily for 18 years’ to be won before the end of the 
millennium”.4 It would be fair to say that the Chinese government has been 
tough on corruption crime, as expressed again and again in documents and 
statements, and is devoting more and more resources to investigate and 
prosecute corruption cases and carry out transnational cooperation.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, criminal cases of bribery, embezzlement and 
dereliction of duty tried by people’s court at all levels have been on the 
increase since 2003. Meanwhile, according to the SPP, which is responsible for 
dealing with embezzlement, bribery, dereliction of duty and infringements 
cases, “from 2003 to 2009, the people's procuratorates at all levels filed for 
investigation more than 240,000 cases of embezzlement, bribery, dereliction of 
duty and infringements on rights. Battling the crime of taking bribes, China has 
improved a database on criminal records of bribery, and intensified efforts in 
punishing and preventing crime of bribery. In 2009, some 3,194 people were 
punished for their criminal liability in offering bribes”.5 
Figure 1: Total Number of Criminal Cases of Bribery, Embezzlement and 
Dereliction of Duty (2003-2009). Source: China Annual Statistics (2004-2010) 
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Moreover, in 2005 China launched a campaign to combat bribery in business in 
six major areas, namely, engineering, construction, the granting of land-use 
rights and mineral resources exploration and mining rights, trade of property 
rights, purchasing and marketing of drugs, government procurement, and 
development of and deals in resources, as well as those related to bank credit, 
securities and futures, commercial insurance, publishing and distribution, 
sports, telecommunications, electric power, quality control and environmental 
protection. According to the White Paper, more than 69,200 cases of 
                                                 
3 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, White Paper on 
China's Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government (December 2010, 
Beijing), p. 1. 
4 Borge Bakken, “China, a Punitive Society”, Asian Criminology 6 (2011), p. 46. 
5 Supra note 3, p. 18. 
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commercial bribery had been investigated and dealt with, involving 16.59 
billion yuan in total from 2005 to 2009.6 It is especially worth noting that a 
large number of high-ranking officials have been prosecuted. Some of them 
were punished with severe punishments and even sentenced to death. For 
example, it was reported that in 2010 eleven officials at the provincial and 
ministerial level were held criminally liable, and among them, seven were 
sentenced to death with 2-year suspension and four were sentenced to life 
imprisonment.7  
Finally, as “corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational 
phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making international 
cooperation to prevent and control it is essential,”8 China attaches great 
importance to international cooperation and exchanges in combating 
corruption. In 2003, China acceded to the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, the first such global convention. In 2005, 
China joined the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts Task Force of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, and the ADB/OECD Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, and acceded to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. In 2006, the SPP initiated the International 
Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA).  
So far, China has signed 106 judicial assistance treaties with 68 countries and 
regions. It has established the China-US Joint Liaison Group on Law 
Enforcement Cooperation and an anti-corruption panel with the United States. 
It has also set up a bilateral Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation 
Consultations with Canada. The CPC Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision of China has engaged in friendly 
exchanges with anti-corruption institutions in more than 80 countries and 
regions.9 
Corruption crime, public opinion and the death 
penalty 
Public support for the death penalty for corruption crime 
“China's enthusiasm for capital punishment has long been a target for 
international criticism of its human rights record.”10 In order to realize its 
promise in the Constitution to protect and respect human rights and improve its 
                                                 
6 Supra note 3, p. 19. 
7 Legal Daily, 21 December 2010. 
8 Para.4, Preamble, United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
9 Supra note 3, pp. 21-22. 
10 Susan Jakes, “China's Message on Executions”, at http://www.time.com/time/world/ article/ 
0,8599,1554379,00.html (retrieved on 16 July 2011). 
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international image, the Chinese government has carried out several 
constructive reforms on the death penalty system since 2005. The SPC made 
reform of use of the death penalty a key part of its third Five-year Plan as 
outlined in March 2009 and this has seen important work taking place on 
sentencing guidelines and review procedures. Moreover, this approach was 
endorsed by the first National Human Rights Action Plan issued by the State 
Council in April 2009. And as early as March 2007, Mr. LA Yifan, China’s 
representative in the UN Human Rights Council, made a firm commitment that 
“the death penalty’s scope of application was to be reviewed shortly, and it was 
expected that this scope would reduced, with the final aim to abolish it.”11 The 
latest reform is the abolition of the death penalty for 13 crimes12 in 
Amendment VIII to the Criminal Law of PRC adopted in February 2011, 
which is therefore thought of as the start point of China’s long march toward 
total abolition of the death penalty.13 
Whether the death penalty for crimes of corruption should be abolished or not 
was also debated when the Amendment was drafted. A few researchers 
suggested the death penalty for crimes of corruption be abolished in that crimes 
of corruption are non-violent and incapable of resulting in fatal consequences, 
and application of the death penalty for such crimes goes against the 
requirement in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that in 
countries which have not abolished the death penalty, the sentence of death 
may be imposed only for “the most serious crimes”, which refers to intentional 
crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences according to the provisions 
of the ECOSOC Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those 
facing the death penalty, and it has been proven that the death penalty has no 
deterrent effect in preventing crimes of corruption.14 However, a high-rank 
official at the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress directly 
stated that the Standing Committee had never considered the question whether 
to abolish the death penalty for crimes such as embezzlement and the taking of 
bribes.15 
                                                 
11 See Roger Hood, “Developments on the Road to Abolition: a Worldwide Perspective”, in 
ZHAO Bingzhi (eds.), Overseas Experience of Death Penalty Reform (2011), Beijing: China 
Legal Publishing House, p. 2. 
12 The 13 crimes are: smuggling of cultural relics; smuggling of precious metals; smuggling of 
precious animals or their products; smuggling of ordinary freight and goods; fraud connected 
with negotiable instruments; fraud connected with financial instruments; fraud connected with 
letters of credit; false invoicing for tax purposes; forging and selling value-added tax invoices; 
larceny; instructing in criminal methods; excavating and robbing ancient cultural sites or 
ancient tombs, and excavating and robbing fossil hominids and fossil vertebrate animals. 
13 GAO Mingxuan and CHEN Lu, Reading and Rethinking Amendment VIII to Criminal Law 
(2011), Beijing: Press of Remin University of China, p. 3 
14 Youth Weekend, 2 September 2010.  
15 Nanfang Weekend, 29 September 2010. 
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It is universally recognized that the death penalty for crimes of corruption 
should not be abolished now in China. On one hand, although crimes of 
corruption are also non-violent and economic crimes, just as the 13 crimes for 
which the death penalty was abolished in the Amendment VIII, the legal 
interest it impairs is a complicated one, including public property and the 
State’s system of building a clean government, which is the basis of national 
security and social stability. Therefore, crimes of corruption are much more 
dangerous to society than other economic crimes. On the other hand, abolition 
of the death penalty for crimes of corruption hasn’t obtained sufficient public 
support. And even academic researchers have brought forward the idea that 
China shouldn’t abolish the death penalty for crimes of corruption for least 30 
years.16 In a word, “abolition of the death penalty would be no more than a 
dream if the problem of public opinion couldn’t be overcome.”17 
Nature of public support for the death penalty 
It cannot be denied that public support for the death penalty is exceedingly 
strong in China. For example, the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science (CASS) and the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
conducted a population survey in 1995 in three Chinese provinces in 1995. 
They found that over 95% of the respondents supported the death penalty.18 In 
another survey of 2000 persons in 2005, the respondents were asked if they 
supported the death penalty or if they wanted it to be abolished: 82.1% 
supported it, while 13.7% said they wanted it abolished. Even when the 
question was changed, and rephrased on the assumption that the death penalty 
had already been abolished by the state, 60.6% still wanted to retain the death 
penalty, although the number of abolitionists increased to 33%.19 
The latest survey was the one conducted in Beijing, Hubei and Guangdong 
provinces by the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking 
University in 2007-2008. The survey was administered as face-to-face 
interviews. Among the sample of 4472 persons that were eligible and 
responded, when confronted with the standard general question, without any 
qualifications as to the type and circumstances of the crime or the 
characteristics of the offender, 57.8% support the death penalty, 14% oppose it 
and 28% are undecided. 
                                                 
16 People’s Procuratorate Daily, 9 September 2010. 
17 MO Hongxian, “Analysis on the Interaction between Public Opinions and Judicature on 
Death Penalty: Paths of Judicial Control over Death Penalty”, in ZHAO Bingzhi (eds.), 
Chinese Practice of Death Penalty Reform (2011), Beijing: China Legal Publishing House, p. 
71. 
18 HU Yunteng, Retention and Abolition: studies on basic theories of death penalty (2000), 
Beijing: Chinese Procuratorate Press, pp. 341-346. 
19 See supra note 4, p. 42. 
  103  
However, it would be different when it comes to the death penalty for the 
problem of corruption. In the first place, although public anger at corruption is 
fiery hot, few high-rank officials have in fact been executed over the most 
recent 10 years, even those who took greater amounts of bribes and caused 
more serious social loss than did the two executed deputy mayors. From the 
perspective of the traditional theory that the deterrence of criminal punishment 
depends not only on its severity, but also on its promptness and stability, then 
retaining the death penalty for the purpose of deterring crimes of corruption 
crime seems a suspect argument. Secondly, the public has no access to data on 
the number of executions. Consequently, all average Chinese, and nearly all 
high-rank officials, don’t know the number of criminals who have been 
sentenced to death and executed, their professions, ages, names and the crimes 
that they had committed. Then, how can they be sure that the death penalty 
could deter corrupt officials? In other words, public support for the death 
penalty in China is blind in nature.  
Briefly, public opinion may be an element preventing China from abolishing 
the death penalty, but it can never be the dominant one.  
The political meaning of the use of capital punishment for 
crimes of corruption 
The more important reason might be at the political level. The death penalty, as 
a legal system, was created by political organ, and its fate is also up to political 
decision. Therefore, it can be used to achieve political ends, such as to gain 
public support or restore public confidence. For example, in the federal 
election in Canada held in November 2000, in order to win out, the right-wing 
party adopted the phrase “putting the justice back into the justice system,’ and 
“all opposition parties, even the left-wing New Democratic Party promised to 
make sentencing tougher and to champion changes that respect victims’ rights. 
And this trend, it should be recalled, occurred in the country that has 
experienced the most protracted period of declining crime rates”.20 This might 
be true also in China.  
It has long been pointed out that corruption in China is a kind of “system 
corruption”,21 which means that because the overall political environment are 
corrupt, persons within it naturally become corrupt. Moreover, “along with 
gradual development of market economy, its conflict with present political 
system is becoming more and more obvious.”22 Therefore, more constructive 
                                                 
20 Julian V. Robert, Loretta J. Stalans, David Indermaur and Mike Hough, Penal populism and 
public opinion: Lessons from five countries, New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2003), p. 13. 
21 YU Jindong, “System corruption is the most fearful corruption”, China Youth Daily, 7 
September 2004 
22 FENG Qiusu, “Political System Reform is fundamental to Present China”, available at 
suhttp://www.zaobao.com/forum/pages2/forum_lx100924d.shtml. 
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political reform is believed to be a better way to overcome the problem of 
corruption. However, as the following statement in People’s Daily shows, it 
might be impossible to see positive and effective political reform, at least in the 
near future, in China: “the historic changes in China after the foundation of 
new China, especially after 30 years since the opening up policy, sufficiently 
proves that the political system we are implementing is in accordance with 
Chinese reality and full of vitality.”23 Then, how to respond to public anger at 
the problem of corruption? 
The Chinese government chose to avert public anger from the overall political 
system by guiding it towards individual corrupt officials and has been trying to 
calm citizens down by applying severe punishment in cases where the amount 
involved was extremely large or the consequences caused were exceptionally 
serious. The executions of XU Maiyong and Jiang Renjie have offered us 
examples.24 This is a choice based on penal populism, a political response that 
favours popularity over other policy considerations, and as has been shown in 
Western countries, it can be politically useful, but has nothing to do with penal 
effectiveness, because populist penal policies in some cases “can be a 
consequence of an intentional attempt to exploit public anxiety about crime and 
public resentment toward offenders. In other contexts they have emerged out of 
a desire by policy makers to respond to public opinion without having 
undertaken an adequate examination of the true value of public views. Public 
expressions of punitiveness are taken at face value.”25 
To prevent corruption crime: Beyond criminal law 
As noted above, the Chinese government has been tough on crimes of 
corruption and has been devoting itself to investigating and prosecuting corrupt 
officials. Unfortunately, the problem of corruption continues to become more 
and more serious and looms over the future of China. “Although we are 
working with insecure data, there is no doubt that economic crime has become 
far more serious since Deng started his ‘daily struggle’ in 1982, with its 
repeated campaigns of harsh sentencing.” And “the international global 
corruption reports have all indicated that corruption has become more serious 
in China over the last decade. Professor Angang Hu at Qinghua University has 
put the present cost of corruption as high as 13–16% of GDP. He further 
estimated that 15–20% of public project funds “leak” into private hands”.26 
Where is the problem? Criminal law shouldn’t be blamed because the present 
                                                 
23 ZHENG Qingyuan, “Push Forward Political System Reform positively and steadily along 
the Right Direction”, People’s Daily, 27 October 2010. 
24 See ZHOU Bin and LU Jie, “XU Maiyong and JIANG Renjie Executed”, Legal Daily, 20 
July 2011. 
25 Supra note 20, p. 3. 
26 Supra note 4, p. 46. 
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scope of criminalization is wide and punishment is severe enough. As far as 
criminal field is concerned, the problem lies in the application and enforcement 
of the law.  
For example, although the number of corruption cases investigated and 
prosecuted is gradually increasing, the sentences given by courts at all levels 
are excessively light. According to the SPP, more than 69.7% of defendants 
held criminally responsible between May 2009 and January 2010 in duty-
related cases were either put on probation or exempted from real punishment.27 
This phenomena has resulted in considerable suspicion and opposition to courts 
and judges, more specifically, abuse of discretion, in all social circles and has 
become a touchstone whether the principle in article 4 of 1997 Criminal Law 
“the law shall be equally applied to anyone who commits a crime” and justice 
and fairness could be turned into reality.  
Another problem that has been attracting great public attention and causing 
universal anger at government departments is protection for witnesses and 
reporters for public interest. The SPP stated in a reported in 2006 that more 
than 70% bribery cases were successfully investigated thanks to reports from 
citizens,28 and again in 2007, it admitted that it is reports from citizens that 
helped judicial organs to disclose and investigate more than 50% of the 
economic criminal cases.29 However, it is regrettable to see that the Chinese 
government isn’t offering enough protection to witnesses and reporters. 
According to incomplete statistics, the number of criminal case in which 
reporters for public interest were wounded and even murdered had increased 
sharply from less than 50 annually in 1990s to 1200 in 2008.30 Although 
provision concerning the protection of witnesses and reporters could be found 
in both the 1997 Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law,31 witnesses 
and reporters have no way to get help and remedy from governments when 
judicial organs neglect their duty to offer appropriate protection.  
Both regulating the exercise of the discretion of judges and making it a 
compulsory responsibility to offer proper protection to witnesses and reporters 
                                                 
27 Jinghua Times, 19 November 2010. 
28 People’s Daily, 28 March 2006. 
29 Legal Daily, 5 August 2007. 
30 21st Century Economic Report, 28 June 2008.  
31 For example, article 308, 1997 Criminal Law provides that whoever retaliates against a 
witness shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal 
detention; if the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 
not less than three years but not more than seven years, and article 49, Criminal Procedure Law 
provides that the people's courts, the people's procuratorates and the public security organs 
shall insure the safety of witnesses and their near relatives. Anyone who intimidates, 
humiliates, beats or retaliates against a witness or his near relatives, if his act constitutes a 
crime, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility according to law; if the case is not 
serious enough for criminal punishment, he shall be punished for violation of public security in 
accordance with law. 
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are more a political than a legal issue in China, because they both involve the 
question of power distribution and supervision. However, we should consider 
that Chinese judicial organs seem to be losing the trust of citizens. For 
example, even a vice president of the SPC has admitted that “presently, some 
citizens’ distrust in justice system has gradually evolved into a kind of 
universal social psychology. This is an extremely terrifying phenomenon.”32 
This might have made political leaders aware that it is time to make a decision. 
In a word, since the real cause of crimes of corruption is to take advantage of 
or abuse office / power, the most effective way to prevent it might be to 
properly regulate and supervise the exercise of power. Criminal law is 
undoubtedly an important part of prevention policy, but never the decisive one, 
because it is the power that dominates criminal law, and criminal law is 
basically considered as a tool to ensure the smooth exercise of power in China. 
After all, although now on the way toward “rule of law”, China is still being 
under rule by law.  
Conclusion 
“Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on 
societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of 
human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized 
crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish. This evil 
phenomenon is found in all countries—big and small, rich and poor—but it is 
in the developing world that its effects are most destructive.”33 China, as a 
developing country under the threat of corruption, has been taking active 
criminal measures, such as extending the scope of punishment and allocating 
judicial organs more resources, expecting to achieve deterrence. It cannot be 
denied that a large number of corrupt officials have been held criminally 
responsible, and even put into prison or executed. However, it is also true that 
crimes of corruption are on the increase and the present prevention mechanism 
isn’t working as effectively as expected.  
Corruption might be a socio-historical phenomenon, and its causes 
complicated. However, the fact that its nature is to take advantage or abuse 
power implies that the effective way to prevent corruption crime is to strictly 
regulate and control the exercise of power. Therefore, in addition to criminal 
punishment, China needs to strengthen its mechanism for protection of civil 
rights, and make the process of the exercise of power more transparent and 
democratic in order to realize the goal to “build a clean government” stated in 
the White Paper.  
                                                 
32 WU Ke, “SHEN Deyong: Some Citizens’ Distrust in Justice System now a Universal 
Psychology”, People’s Daily, 19 August 2009. 
33 Kofi A. Annan, Foreword to United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
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Introduction  
Globalisation did not begin in the late 20th century, nor did transnational crime 
begin then. However it seems sensible to cluster a set of transnational crimes – 
looking from crime production to delivery and laundering – within that ‘crimes 
of globalisation’ category.  
Any set of statistics that relates to crime categories contains an element of 
social construction. Unless one is to define ‘crime’ as coterminous with (far 
from objective) ‘social harm’, the decision by any polity to treat a harm as a 
‘crime’ rather than, for example, a matter for ‘regulation’ or administrative law 
or even social disapproval represents a moral as well as political decision 
(whether intended or not). The traditional legal distinction between mala in se 
(wrongs in themselves) and mala prohibita (wrongs that are forbidden) reflects 
not just process differences in terms of whether evil intent has to be proven but 
conscious or unselfconscious ideological valuations of relative harm. 
Sometimes this is combined with a judgement about how economic interests 
might be affected by taking these wrongs seriously. A good example would be 
the length of time it has taken the US to get the rest of the world to criminalize 
transnational bribery of public officials overseas (via the 1997 OECD 
Convention and the UNCAC 2005) since they first passed the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977.  
The question of whether criminal sanctions actually have to have been applied 
for the conduct to be included in an empirical review of crime applies to all 
areas of crime, but has been a particular issue for white-collar crimes because 
of their contested and relatively under-policed nature. Given the tiny number of 
transnational bribery prosecutions, even in the US (and none in the UK), this 
would have a huge impact on the analysis of costs, incidence and prevalence. 
Thus, if we are to include unprosecuted cases, this inevitably involves making 
assumptions about levels of intention and recklessness that would be highly 
contentious in criminal cases. Some critical criminologists would contend that 
one should go beyond this and include social harms that have been ‘politicked 
out’ of the criminal law and the criminal process: in this paper, I will draw the 
line at recasting the criminal law but if one were to take no account of 
unprosecuted cases, then the notion of the ‘dark figure of crime’ would make 
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no sense. It is important to take account of the growing significance of the 
private sector and ‘its’ actions in policing fraud and acting as gatekeepers of 
the criminal process.  
There are a number of questions we might ask of such crimes. 
1. What do we want data for, and how serious are we? 
2. What do we count, whom do we count and where do we count them? 
 The expansion of transnational/human rights crimes; 
 Counting victimisations (e.g. fraud, extortion, kidnapping/people 
trafficking); and counting consensual illicit acts such as illegal drug-
taking, (in some jurisdictions) gambling and prostitution. 
3. What are the mechanisms of transnational crime delivery and how do 
these affect the counting challenge? 
 Separation of place of offending from offender residence in different 
jurisdictions; 
 Most serious offenders in the supply chain may never set foot in the 
jurisdiction where the victimisation or where the consensual purchase 
takes place. 
There are a number of vices to which such data are prone (see Andreas and 
Greenhill, 2011 for a wider range of questionable counting practices): 
1. Generate a number for prevalence, harm or effectiveness that suits the 
bureaucratic and/or moral imperative 
2. This then becomes a ‘fact by repetition’ 
3. But the larger the figure, the less likely it is that any law enforcement or 
preventative measures will impact significantly on it 
4. So why do people/journalists almost never match crime costs – global, 
national or local - with control measures in place? 
5. Can we resist the media and political demands? 
6. If not, what are the consequences? 
In the zemiological tradition, there is enthusiasm for counting harms rather 
than crimes, since crimes are an artefact of the capitalist law-making and 
enforcement processes, and the ‘harms’ approach transcends this enforcement 
process (or purports to do so) (Dorling et al, 2008). I will set aside the 
problems of how victims can know the intent of offenders (an issue largely 
ignored by national and international crime surveys) and note that we 
sometimes also count ‘organised crime groups’ – nationally plus references to 
foreign countries or ‘hubs’. However, quite apart from the epistemological 
problem of knowing (and justifying) when crime networks begin and end, there 
remain some practical questions: 
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1. Do we multiply count trafficking crimes in every country the drugs or 
people pass through? 
2. Do we multiply count proceeds of crime in every country the funds pass 
through? 
3. How do we evaluate the harmfulness of crimes or harms arising in a 
third party country? 
Although offences connected with trade might be the earliest forms of 
globalisation-connected offences – the transfer of people and products, whether 
per se licit or illicit – I will focus primarily on financial crimes. Let us take an 
example. From UK cases examined, boiler room frauds are commonly based 
abroad (e.g. in Spain, where police interest is low), have never sought 
authorisation by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) – which is a legal 
requirement to sell securities - and use high pressure sales and telemarketing 
(author interviews with UK officials and police). If the fraudsters have 
sufficient nerve, they can seek to become regulated in one EU country and 
obtain a ‘passport’ to operate in another under EU single market regulations, 
using that as a base for fraud and making it difficult for regulators to intervene 
to close them down. In all of these cases, what the boiler room is really selling 
is deceptive and worthless expectations.  
The growth in cross-border frauds can be illustrated by data from the US (FTC, 
2011). The US multi-agency Consumer Sentinel received over 100,000 cross-
border fraud complaints during calendar year 2010. Cross-border fraud 
complaints comprised 14% of all fraud complaints received during calendar 
year 2010, and 13% during both CY-2008 and CY-2009. 
Prizes/Sweepstakes/Gifts was the leading product/service category in U.S. 
consumers’ cross-border complaints (12%), followed by Lotteries/Lottery 
Ticket Buying Clubs (11%), Internet Auction (9%), Foreign Money Offers 
(8%) and Advance-Fee Loans/Credit Arrangers (8%). Of all cross-border fraud 
complaints (104,402) in calendar year 2010, almost two thirds were from U.S. 
consumers complaining about other foreign companies and 14% were from 
U.S. consumers complaining about Canadian companies. U.S. consumers 
reported fraud losses of over $31 million against companies located in Canada, 
and losses of over $184 million against companies located in other foreign 
countries in calendar year 2010. A fraud complaint is “cross-border” if: (1) a 
U.S. consumer complained about a company located in Canada or another 
foreign country; (2) a Canadian consumer complained about a company located 
in the U.S. or another foreign country; or (3) a consumer from a foreign 
country (e.g. the UK or Australia) complained about a company located in the 
U.S. or Canada. Company location is based on addresses reported by the 
complaining consumers and, thus, likely understates the number of cross-
border complaints. In some instances the company address provided by the 
consumer actually may be a mail drop in the consumer’s country rather than 
the physical location of the company in a foreign country, and in other cases, 
the consumer does not know whether the location is in the U.S. or abroad. 
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From a crime-recording viewpoint, it might be sensible to develop an 
international protocol about where the crime should be recorded in such a case. 
This is even more important where cybercrimes are committed against 
individuals globally from a jurisdiction – if identified at all – that is hard to 
reach by mutual legal assistance. If the scams are recorded separately where 
the victims live, this might inhibit the collation of collective data identifying 
the origins of the scam and thus reduce prevention possibilities, including 
cross-border enforcement interventions. 
Furthermore, we are used to working out metrics for measuring harm. 
Traditionally we have merely counted crimes. But the burgeoning interest in 
the impact of crime has led to work on the cost of crime (Cohen, 2005). To 
date, only applied to substance misuse, household crimes, street crimes & those 
illicitly sexually exploited women who have escaped – from which highly 
questionable extrapolations are made about harm to trafficked/smuggled 
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women generally. Hitherto, this has been calculated only in a national context, 
in terms of: 
 Productivity losses  
 Medical and mental health care  
 Direct property losses  
 Indirect costs of victimization  
There are some paradoxes. Using court settlements or negotiated ones in the 
shadow of the court, injuries to wealthy may be valued higher if not 
‘normalised’ against income or wealth. Can it be applied to fraud and to e-
crimes? 
 In UK, 2005, the estimated cost of fraud identified was a minimum of 
£12.9 billion, plus income tax fraud + share of EU fraud (Levi et al., 
2007; Levi and Burrows, 2008)  
 By 2011, the cost of frauds identified rose to £38 bn. (National Fraud 
Authority, 2011)  
There has been a rise in the number of corporate victimisation surveys 
conducted by international accounting and consulting firms. However although 
(for sound marketing reasons), they break up their global totals on a country 
basis, presumably based on where the company is headquartered, this does not 
resolve the question of where the crimes occurred, since any of these 
companies can operate in a number of jurisdictions and occur losses there. 
Partly because individuals are not targets for expensive consultancy services, 
there are very few studies of fraud/e-crime against individuals, except for those 
based around the international victimisation surveys, that ask only about 
consumer fraud and local corruption (van Dijk, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; van Dijk 
et al., 2008). 
One can express data about the risks and impact of fraud on business activities 
in a number of different ways: 
1. Absolute numbers of incidents, e.g. stolen credit and debit cards (not 
always reliably differentiated from lost ones by victims or in issuer or 
police records – the fewer defined as stolen rather than lost, the lower 
the recorded crime rate);  
2. Absolute fraud loss figures (with a grey area of bad debt that may in 
fact be fraud by debtors such as cardholders but is seldom given out 
when ‘fraud statistics’ are presented);  
3. Fraud to turnover (in some respects a better measure because it takes 
into account rising expenditure patterns) or fraud per financial 
instrument, e.g. per credit, charge or debit card; per internet transaction 
by number and/or value;  
112 
4. Fraud to profit (this replenishability factor – if better data were 
available - would measure how much business has to be done to make 
up for the losses); and 
5. Fear of fraud (e.g. as experienced by cardholders, potential cardholders, 
retailers and bankers), which can have a chilling effect on commercial 
activity such as e-commerce or, conversely, can lead to inappropriate 
decisions by those who have insufficient awareness of the true risks 
they are taking or creating. 
Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages, and organisations 
may wish to deploy them tactically to suit their interests. In media terms (as 
with crime statistics generally), the preference may be for bald data that can be 
used for simple headlines. The ratio per transaction or per turnover may be as 
unattractive to the tabloid press or television as would be the number of 
offences per male or female juvenile in vandalism, or homicides per released 
violent offender in other criminological spheres. For individual victims, on the 
other hand, there is less variation, though one could still analyse the different 
impact in terms of whether the funds were compensated by some government 
or private scheme - normally restricted to financial services investments up to a 
moderate limit, though even these do not exist in many parts of Central or 
Eastern Europe, or Third World countries; how much work it would take to 
make up the losses (expressed, say, in days); or indeed, in the case of 
retired/involuntarily unemployed persons, whether they could recover the 
losses at all; the emotional and health impact on victims; or indeed the general 
effects on consumer/investor confidence. 
There are broader questions about international statistics. How do we compare 
financial crime harms with harms from other crimes and from ‘natural 
disasters’ and from the global financial crisis, in connection with which almost 
no senior banker and certainly no regulator has been prosecuted anywhere in 
the world? This is despite the transnational impact of US mortgage origination 
fraud.  
The Future: Harm, risk and counting crimes 
There are three dimensions of harm and risk: 
1.  Economic costs (present/future) & impact upon victims and upon 
third parties who fear being defrauded 
What difference does it make to us if victims are non-citizens? 
2.  What the media represent the risks to be – this is a key driver of 
political reactions to crime. 
3.  Continuing risks arising from the kind of people who are committing 
financial crimes. These consist of  
 ‘Organised criminals’ with no stake in social respectability to 
constrain them and growing access to corruptible / pressurisable 
staff, especially in recession 
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 what they spend their money on (terrorism, political corruption, 
business) - though mostly on party-going 
So in order to develop better measures for transnational crimes, we need to 
combine victim surveys with offender location studies, and how do we do that 
for offences with a low rate of clear-ups? We need ‘sentinel’ trend data, not 
precise numbers, which anyway are bound to be imprecise: the more precise 
that numbers are, the more suspicious we should be of them. 
Gradually, via the impact of routine activities theory, criminologists have 
begun to see ‘the causes of crime’ as including an analysis of how crime is 
organized socially and technically. This fuses the neglected traditions of 
gang/subculture theory with situational opportunity theory, especially in its 
improved recent formulations in showing how the forms of crime are shaped 
by the motivational and cultural environments in which they occur, which 
facilitate and/or inhibit the development of transnational financial crime, 
whether or not accompanied by offender versatility. To understand how this is 
possible, we need to examine crime as a business process, requiring funding, 
technical skills, distribution mechanisms, and money-handling facilities. The 
larger the criminal business, the more likely all these elements will be required. 
On the other hand, those persons who commit acts defined as ‘not really 
criminal’ by their reference groups and by policing agencies, and where 
technological means of detection are not very powerful, are enabled thereby to 
commit offences with relative impunity. One method of improving one’s 
chances of remaining unprosecuted and with assets available is to use the 
‘offshore secrecy’ paraphernalia of modern commerce, though anti-money 
laundering legislation and evaluation has made the world shrink in terms of 
opportunities for concealment once a well-resourced investigation happens. 
Even the attempt to combat ‘harmful tax competition’ and control the more 
abusive aspects of offshore finance centers/tax havens has had some successes, 
and in 2012, the Financial Action Task Force has included tax evasion as a 
predicate offence in its new set of guidance. This could be characterized as 
risk-managing financial globalization, but by the nature of many frauds, they 
will not be picked up by the system until they become substantial: the logical 
result may be that there may be the same number of frauds, but the larger ones 
will be smaller than they would otherwise be. It is the systemic protection that 
is the principal objective.  
There are barriers of distrust, of language and culture, and of modesty of 
ambitions and skills, that inhibit the transnationalization of all forms of crime, 
including fraud and corruption, and one must question any assumption that 
transnational crime will somehow replace ordinary, local crime. But when one 
can set up an Internet site from the privacy of one’s home, get registered to 
process credit card transactions for one’s pornography site, and then send 
modest extra invoices for non-existent transactions to thousands of people who 
have purchased from one’s site, the possibilities for transnational fraud are 
readily visible and fairly open to all except the financial lumpenproletariat. 
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(Even they can obtain coerced assistance from those fraudsters unlucky enough 
to be sent to jail.) 
Transnational functions are an inherent part of many financial fraud schemes, 
to lend plausibility and evade authorization mechanisms, and to frustrate civil 
and criminal investigations and asset recovery. However, in the financing and 
laundering aspects – as well as the physical transportation of legal and illegal 
goods and services – the transnational component applies to many other crimes 
as well. In the final analysis, the globalization offered to the international 
corporate world creates possibilities for illegal financial entrepreneurs that are 
both technically and economically difficult to police, even absent corruption on 
the part of political elites and law enforcement agencies. We are only at the 
beginning of how to measure these issues transnationally, or even nationally. 
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The significant geopolitical, economic and social changes that have taken place 
in Russia at the end of the twentieth century have brought about change in 
respect of combating crime. Reforming the system of government, which 
directly touched the bodies of internal affairs, had a significant impact on the 
quality of their judicial functions. 
The Federal Law "On Police" has been prepared in accordance with the 
Presidential Decree dated 18 February 2010 № 208, "On some measures to 
reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation." On the 1 
March 2011, a new Federal Law "On Police" was introduced. 
The Law has brought together the most important proposals for the reform of 
the Russian Ministry of Interior, which were received from professional 
lawyers, expert and scientific communities, political parties, public 
associations and citizens. 
The provisions of the Law takes into account the principles, norms and 
standards of international legal acts on the police. 
The law enforcement functions are assigned to the police. The existing major 
activities of the militia, which are similar to the police activities carried out in 
most other countries, are retained. However, some activities which are 
implemented by the militia have been changed in order to reflect current 
conditions. The Law defines the following professional key areas of policing: 
1) Prevention of crimes and administrative offences; 
2) Identification, suppression and detection of crime and the inquiry in 
criminal cases; 
3) Search for persons and stolen property; 
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4) Elimination of administrative violations and the investigation of 
administrative cases; 
5) Protection of the public order; 
6) Traffic safety; 
7) Control of trafficking in arms; 
8) Control of private detective and private security activity; 
9) Protection of property and facilities under contracts; 
10) State protection of participants in criminal proceedings, judges, law 
enforcement officials and regulatory agencies; 
11) Assistance to citizens and officials in the protection of their legitimate 
rights and interests. 
The Law specifies that the main principles of policing are: 
 respect of human rights and freedoms; 
 the rule of law; 
 impartiality, openness and publicity; 
 insurance of public confidence and support of citizens; 
 police cooperation and collaboration with government agencies, 
local governments, associations, organizations and individuals; 
 use of science, modern technology and information systems. 
The openness and transparency of the police will help to restore confidence 
among citizens. In accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, citizens 
and organizations are eligible to receive from the police information that 
directly affects their rights. 
The police should inform the media about their activities. At the request of 
editors, they are to provide the necessary information, conduct press 
conferences, disseminate information and statistical data, and interact in other 
ways. 
Public opinion should play the determining role in assessing the effectiveness 
of the police activities. In this regard, the responsibility of the Russian Ministry 
of Interior is the constant examination of public opinion and the monitoring of 
interaction between the police and civil society. 
The chapter in the Law on "Principles of Policing" contains the obligation for 
the police officer, when implementing measures towards the person that restrict 
his or her the rights and freedoms, to explain the reason and grounds for the 
application of such measures, as well as the accompanying rights and 
obligations of a citizen. This includes clarification for the detainee of his or her 
right to legal assistance, the right to an interpreter, the right to notify relatives 
about the detention, and the right to refuse to give explanations. A substantial 
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procedural novelty is the right of the detained person to one phone call in order 
to notify close relatives or friends about his or her detention and the location. 
The chapter on "The Use of Some Measures of State Enforcement by the 
Police" contains rules governing the exercise by the police of such measures of 
state coercion as the detention of citizens; entry or penetration into residential 
and other premises on land; the cordoning off or blocking of terrain, residents, 
buildings and other objects; and the formation and maintenance of data banks 
on citizens. 
In accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the Police, adopted in 
1979 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the 
recommendations of the European Court of Human Rights the Law, the chapter 
incorporates the rule that detainees should be kept in designated areas and they 
should be protected in conditions that preclude any threat to their lives and 
health. 
To enhance the security of human rights and freedoms and in accordance with 
the European Code of Police Ethics, the Law contains provisions on the 
maintenance of a register of persons who are subject to detention. 
The provisions on the use of physical force, special means and firearms by 
the police contained in the Law are based on the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials adopted by the UN General Assembly. 
The Law defines the limits, conditions and procedures for the use of physical 
force, special means and firearms, as well as features of their applications, 
especially the use of special weapons and tactics by a police unit and in 
crowded conditions, and the grounds and conditions for the use of limited 
damage weapons. In addition, the Law guarantees the personal security of the 
armed police officer. 
Within the framework of the fight against corruption, the demands on the 
personal and professional skills of police officers have increased. Every 
Russian citizen entering the police service must undergo psycho-physiological 
examination, testing for alcohol, drug and other toxic addiction, as well as a 
test to check his or her moral and psychological qualities. 
Corruption is an anti-social phenomenon, immoral by nature, where the 
promotion of the personal interests of some (those who take and those who 
give bribes) infringes against the material, economic, financial and social 
interests of the majority of the population. Corruption erodes public morality, 
devalues the content of labour, and fosters greed, avidity, ignorance of the law 
and violence. 
The President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, has quite 
accurately stated that corruption as one of the most significant barriers to 
economic growth and development. This is, of course, an international 
problem, a problem that exists in every country. There are no states in the 
world where this phenomenon is absent. 
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Speaking on the issue of anti-corruption, The Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin said: "In the fight against acquisitive crimes, we 
should not get involved in quantitative indicators at the expense of minor 
criminal cases. It is important to focus efforts on a thorough and 
comprehensive investigation of crimes that represent a direct threat to Russian 
security. I want to emphasize that in solving such problems, the police should 
not allow themselves to be drawn into corporate conflicts, disputes in 
businesses, and certainly should not introduce itself as one of the party in these 
conflicts. In addition, the firm principle should be the policy of purification 
against bribe-takers, people who have turned the service into a variety of 
profitable business." 
During the reform of the Ministry of Interior, we observed the active cleansing 
of the police ranks from the former militia officers who were prone to corrupt 
practices. As a result of the reform the total number of employees of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs was reduced to 22%, in counterbalance to which 
wages in 2012 should double. 
It seems that this is not the end of the reform. The assumption is the 
continuation of reforms with further improvements in police performance. The 
main objective is not only to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement, but 
also to restore the confidence of the society. 
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SESSION 3: INFORMATION GATHERING 
DATA COLLECTION ON [NEW] FORMS AND 
MANIFESTATIONS OF CRIME 
Steven Malby1 
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The terms “emerging crimes”, “new forms and manifestations” of crime and 
“complex crimes” are increasingly found in criminological literature and 
discourse on organized crime. In a high-level debate during the 2010 session of 
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), speakers underlined the importance 
of developing adequate legislative and operational responses in order to 
prevent and combat emerging and re-emerging forms of crime. Illicit activities 
mentioned during the debate included cybercrime, trafficking in cultural 
property, piracy, trafficking in natural resources, trafficking in counterfeit 
medicines and trafficking in organs.2 Whilst there may be broad agreement on 
some specific crime types that fall into this rather diffuse crime category, the 
identification of a clear definition of an emerging, new or complex crime 
remains a challenging undertaking. Such crimes may perhaps be defined (under 
the “complex” label) as crimes that are “composed of more than one single 
action”. However, even certain common crimes often have multiple elements, 
such as the crime of burglary that typically requires unauthorized entry 
(whether forced or unforced) into a structure with intent to commit another 
offence. A further distinction may rely on the fact that many new forms and 
manifestations of crime require a certain degree of logistics and organization 
and hence may often be committed by groups of persons meeting the definition 
of an organized criminal group contained in UNTOC. However, some crimes 
typically included in the “emerging crimes” category, in particular cybercrime, 
may be committed by individuals acting alone or by loose associations of 
persons that do not meet the “durability” requirements of the Convention. Still 
further definitions highlight the “transnational” element of such crimes and, 
whilst this can be a common attribute of such crimes, it is by no means 
definitive. As recognized by the Conference of the Parties, even the label 
                                                 
1 Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views or policies of the United Nations or UNODC.  
2 United Nations. Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime at its fifth session, held in Vienna from 18 
to 22 October 2010. 2 December 2010. UN Doc. CTOC/COP/2010/17 
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“new” may not be so applicable in the case of re-emerging crimes, such as 
ocean piracy.  
As a result, even before turning to the challenges of data collection on non-
traditional crimes, one is faced with a significant definitional problem. For the 
purposes of this paper, it may be sufficient to speak of data collection on “non-
volume crimes”, that is, data collection on the types of crime that are not 
commonly encountered by the public at large and reported to the police as 
such. This therefore excludes crimes such as assault, burglary, robbery, theft, 
and rape. Nonetheless, even an appeal to the negative can encounter 
difficulties, since the public at large may still be direct victims, and in large 
numbers, of “new” crimes such as cybercrime, for example in the case of 
online credit card fraud. This leaves a rather unsatisfactory definition of the 
scope of this paper, but hopefully the above discussion at least traces some 
broad outlines of the type of events to which the following methodological 
discussion applies. Distinctions between the terms “emerging”, ”complex” and 
“‘new” crimes are not attributed with particular significance in this paper and 
may all be taken as broad terms for the approximate phenomenon at hand. 
At the international and regional level, the new crime types identified by the 
UNTOC Conference of the Parties do benefit from some definitional work. 
Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, for example, are defined by 
their relevant protocols to UNTOC, a number of specific acts that constitute 
corruption are defined by the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), acts constituting cybercrime are defined in a number of cross-
national instruments, including the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is defined by the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, and European Union legislation defines a number of complex, 
organized or cross-border crime types, including money laundering, illicit 
trafficking in cultural property, and a number of environmental crimes. As 
such, even if the group of crimes falling into the category under discussion is 
not precisely known, the basic factual and legal elements of at least some 
crimes in this group do show common core agreement. 
The next challenge is the identification of exactly what we want to know about 
these crimes. Some ten years ago, the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) released a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal 
groups in sixteen countries.3 The survey asked key informants who had studied 
these particular groups about the structure, size, activities, transborder 
operations, identity, use of violence, corruption, political influence, penetration 
into the legitimate economy, and co-operation with other organized criminal 
groups. The idea behind the study was to take steps towards a comprehensive 
system of classification for transnational organized criminal groups and the 
level of harm that they cause. The report noted that a layered approach of 
                                                 
3 UNODC. Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen 
countries. September 2002. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/ 
Pilot_survey.pdf 
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“groups”, “clusters”, and “markets” was important to provide a comprehensive 
framework in which to collect information and assess trends. The report 
recommended starting with the lowest “building blocks” of the system – 
criminal groups. Eight years later, in 2010, the UNODC Transnational 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment concluded that “Today, organized crime 
seems to be less a matter of a group of individuals who are involved in a range 
of illicit activities, and more a matter of a group of illicit activities in which 
some individuals and groups are presently involved.”4 The different focus of 
these two reports – “groups” and “markets” – well highlights the range of 
possible approaches to the measurement of organized crime. Whilst the 
identification and characterisation of the individuals and groups behind 
organized and emerging crime types is important, it does appear true that 
organized crime today can have a very fluid structure. Drug trafficking 
organizations in Mexico, for example, frequently show shifting alliances, 
splinters, and engagement in a range of different illicit activities as individuals 
are arrested and incarcerated, as power grows and wanes, and as illicit markets, 
incentives, and risks develop and subside. Overall, however, it may be fair to 
assume that we would like to know who (and how many) are involved in what 
(and how much). When crime generates proceeds in small amounts, as is 
usually the case in common crimes, the offender will typically spend a 
significant proportion of this income on living costs and minor luxuries. In 
contrast, offenders whose proceeds of crime accrue in large amounts need to 
“launder” a large proportion of their income in order to disguise its illicit 
origin. Such is the case with many new and emerging types of crime, including 
piracy that may generate payment of ransom sums of the order of millions of 
dollars, or large-scale organized cybercrime that benefits from thousands or 
hundreds of thousands of fraud or scam victims. Understanding the size, nature 
and direction of illicit financial flows can represent important information 
concerning the nature and extent of the underlying illicit acts. Finally, we may 
wish to measure and understand the harm caused by new forms and 
manifestations of crimes. Such harms may fall into three categories: direct 
victims of violence associated with crimes, direct loss to victims from crimes, 
and indirect loss to victims. Indicators capturing (non-conflict) violent death or 
injury to individuals are able to provide information on the first of these, 
although of course the challenge is to distinguish the sub-category of deaths or 
injuries that are attributable to the crime types of interest. Indirect harm is 
frequently even less straightforward to identify and quantify, including harms 
such as the socio-economic costs of crime prevention, governance loss, drug 
abuse and illegal migration. One of the main dangers of substantial financial 
flows related to transnational organized crime, for example, is the ability to 
foster the economic viability of the underlying criminal activity, thereby 
contributing to its spread and expansion. Illicit financial flows also have 
                                                 
4 UNODC. The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. 
2010. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report 
_2010_low_res.pdf 
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negative socio-economic implications in their own right. Criminal funds 
prioritise concealment over rates of return, resulting in negative impacts on 
economic growth by diverting resources to less productive activities. 
Distortions in prices, consumption patterns and imports have negative effects 
on economic and consumers and resultant corruption drives out legitimate 
business, introducing a parasitic, anti-competitive market approach.5  
Having identified the broad landscape of crimes to be “measured”, and outlined 
what may need to be known about such crimes, it is next necessary to examine 
what information sources may be used in practice. Four broad areas are 
identified: i) police statistics, ii) proxies or market analysis, iii) survey-based 
information, and iv) information “exhaust”. These are depicted in figure 1.  
Figure 1: What could be measured? 
 
 
As many forms of new, emerging, or organized forms of crime do not 
frequently come to the attention of the police, this traditional source of crime 
statistics is often considered of limited use for the category of crimes under 
consideration. In addition to the challenge of underreporting or under-
identification and a large “dark figure” of such crimes, it may often be difficult 
in police statistics to link acts that come to the attention of the police with the 
phenomenon of new and emerging crimes. Whilst some complex crime may be 
                                                 
5 UNODC. Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other 
transnational organized crimes. Research Report. October 2011. Available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_ 
web.pdf 
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explicitly identified as such in police statistics – such as instances of human 
trafficking or smuggling of migrants - these cases are often numerically small 
compared to “volume” crime acts, such as murder which nonetheless may be 
closely associated with the activity of, for example, organized criminal groups. 
In this respect, the possibility of a “marker” for organized crime involvement 
for use in police records is commonly considered. The European law 
enforcement agency (EUROPOL), for example, specifies that for any crime or 
criminal group to be classified as “organized crime” at least six of the 
following characteristics must be present, four of which must be those 
numbered (1), (3), (5) and (11): (1) collaboration of more than two people; (2) 
each with his or her own appointed tasks; (3) for a prolonged or indefinite 
period of time; (4) using some form of discipline and control; (5) suspected of 
the commission of serious criminal offences; (6) operating on an international 
level; (7) using violence or other means suitable for intimidation; (8) using 
commercial or businesslike structures; (9) engaged in money laundering; (10) 
exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial 
authorities or the economy; and (11) determined by the pursuit of profit and/or 
power.6 Nonetheless, indicators such as the rate of homicide offences 
considered linked to organized crime is generally not considered a strong 
indicator of underlying organized crime levels due to differences in the 
stability, instability, and degree of competition between organized criminal 
groups and markets, as well as their differing propensities to use violence. 
Following a “market” based approach to the measurement of organized and 
complex crime, the use of information based on seizure or identification of 
illicit goods and movements allows inferences to be made about market size 
and direction. Whilst methodologies for extrapolating total market size from 
seizures (which represent a (non-statistical) “sample” from the market) may 
contain a greater or lesser degree of precision depending upon other known 
market information, trends in markets may perhaps be more reliably estimated 
from such information. Although seizure information (such as seizures of illicit 
drugs in transit) represents a combined effect of law enforcement activity and 
the underlying market, if law enforcement activity is reasonably constant, it is 
possible that market changes over time can be detected. As demonstrated later 
in this paper, seizure information clearly shows, for example, shifts in cocaine 
transit routes between the Caribbean and Central America in the last ten years. 
Using a sample-based methodology, statistical surveys may further allow 
inferences to be made about phenomena as a whole. Interviews with key 
informants or general population-based interviews can be used, for instance, to 
obtain estimates of the size of drug consumption markets, or, as discussed 
earlier, of the structure and modus operandi of a sample of organized criminal 
groups. 
Finally, the concept of information “exhaust” represents a novel idea 
concerning the extraction of “patterns” in information that is routinely 
                                                 
6 Criteria specified by EUROPOL Doc. 6204/2/97 ENFOPOL 35 Rev 2. 
  125  
generated but may change in response to changes in crime events. In the area 
of cybercrime, for example, a large proportion of potential victims of 
cybercrime have security devices, such as firewalls or antivirus software, 
installed on their computers. The aggregate automated response data generated 
by all such installed software can be considered analogous in the area of 
“volume” crime to, for example, the aggregate data from all house security 
systems, such as burglar alarms. Information generated by geographic 
information systems, such as satellite imagery, may only cover a proportion of 
the potential population of victims, but can represent a significant sample from 
which inferences may be made. 
One key to measuring new forms and manifestations of crime is likely to be 
found in the effective combination of these various data sources – police 
statistics, proxies/market analysis, surveys, and information exhaust. A number 
of precedents exist in this respect. At the international level, the UNODC threat 
assessment approach includes use of a range of data sources to identify and 
define illicit market flows in terms of routes (source, destination, vector), 
dimensions (annual market volume and value), perpetrators (groups involved), 
and threat (trend and effects). Other UNODC work, including the “Global 
Afghan Opium Trade Threat Assessment” (2011), a research report on 
“Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other 
Transnational Organized Crimes” (2011), the “Global Study on Homicide” 
(2011), as well as the “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons” (2009) make 
use of a range of information include market-based approaches based on 
seizure and consumption statistics, modelling based on estimates of market 
size, profit and the proportion of profit laundered, in addition to law 
enforcement, criminal justice and public health data.7 At the regional level, 
research such as the European Union-financed “Improving Knowledge on 
Organized Crime” project combined a number of measures to develop an 
approach aimed at estimating the probability that an organized crime event 
may occur, based on inter alia indicators related to characteristics of known 
criminal groups and law enforcement risks to such groups.8 Such work 
demonstrates that whilst methodologies for combining data sources are still 
under development, a number of first steps have been taken towards the 
quantification of the nature and extent of new and complex crimes.  
The remainder of this article presents a number of brief examples of work at 
the international level that well illustrate recent attempts to collect and interpret 
data from sources such as those depicted in Figure 1. All are drawn from 
completed or ongoing work by UNODC. The first example concerns the 
                                                 
7 Reports available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/TOC-threat-
assessments.html and http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/publications. 
html 
8 See for example, Savona, E.U., 2006. Measuring organized crime: an international 
perspective, A methodology for measuring the probability that a given organized crime event 
will occur and a methodology for measuring the harm caused by organized crime. Forum on 
Crime and Society, 5(1), 21-88. 
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investigation of links between intentional homicide, the use of firearms in 
homicide, and the proportion of homicides linked to gangs or organized 
criminal groups. Data presented in the 2011 UNODC Global Study on 
Homicide9 suggest a greater involvement of gangs and organized crime in 
homicides in the Americas than in other regions of the world. As shown in 
Figure 2 below, the match between a high proportion of homicides by firearm 
in the Americas and a high proportion of gang/organized crime-related 
homicides suggests that in those countries where there is a higher homicide 
rate, the percentage of firearm homicides is also higher and is often associated 
with higher shares of homicides committed by organized crime or gangs, as 
reported by police data 
Figure 2: Homicide rate, percentage of homicides by firearm and percentage 
of gang/organized crime-related homicides, selected countries (2010 or latest 
available year)  
 
 
As elsewhere, homicide trends in the Americas are influenced by numerous 
factors. A 2007 UNODC study pointed out that many countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean, for example, were vulnerable to crime and 
violence for a number of reasons, including their legacy of armed conflicts and 
violence, the easy availability of guns, chaotic urbanization, high income 
inequality, a high proportion of youth, local gang structures, as well as 
                                                 
9 Figures 2, 3 and 4 and the accompanying narrative are based on UNODC, 2011, Global Study 
on Homicide. Ch.3. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/ 
statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf 
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organized crime and drug trafficking. Nonetheless, in light of the role played 
by gangs and organized criminal groups in homicides in selected areas of the 
Americas, comparison of homicide patterns with other indicators, such as those 
related to changes in the levels of organized crime, drug trafficking or gang 
activity may prove instructive. Figure 3 shows that countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean have seen significant changes in homicide rates in 
recent years. In Central America, homicide rates have increased in five out of 
eight countries in the last five years, with Honduras in particular seeing 
homicide rates more than double between 2005 and 2010, while Mexico saw 
an increase of 65 per cent in the same period.  
Figure 3: Homicide rates at the subnational level, Central America (2005 and 
2010)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A major cause of violent crime in Central America is the region’s strategic 
location between the lucrative cocaine consumer market in Northern America 
(although the European market is increasingly important) and the main areas of 
coca cultivation in Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.10 
While all Central American and Caribbean countries have been affected by 
drug trafficking at varying points at different points in time, the effects of this 
trade on violent crime have been far from uniform or linear. Organized 
criminal groups involved in drug trafficking do not necessarily make 
themselves visible through violent and lethal crime. Rather, violence often 
escalates when an existing status quo is broken, as a result, for example, of 
changes in the structure of the drug market, the emergence of new protagonists 
or the “threat” posed by police repression. Comparison of national homicide 
rates in this region with cocaine seizure trends suggests that at least part of the 
pattern of homicide trends is attributable to changes in cocaine trafficking 
flows and increased competition and conflict relating to drug markets. Figure 4 
                                                 
10 UNODC, 2011. World Drug Report. 
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shows, for example, that higher levels of violence and homicide are not only 
associated with increases in drug trafficking flows, but also with decreases in 
drug trafficking flows that lead to turbulence in established markets, more 
competition between criminal groups and more killings. As such, it is likely 
that changes in drug markets may drive lethal violence, not overall levels of 
trafficking flows per se. In Central America, for example, cocaine seizures by 
law enforcement authorities rose almost constantly until 2007 in Mexico before 
dropping abruptly, while they increased and remained at an elevated level in 
other countries of the region, such as Panama and Costa Rica, indicating the 
importance of Central America over the Caribbean as a preferred drug-
trafficking route from South to North America. At the same time, homicide 
rates in these countries doubled from 1997 levels. In the Caribbean, whilst drug 
seizures decreased by 71 per cent between 1997 and 2009, diminishing drug 
trafficking flows may be traced to increases in lethal violence, caused in part as 
increased competition between drug trafficking organizations led to fighting 
for established shares of a diminished market.  
Figure 4: Cocaine seizures and homicide rates, selected countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean (1997-2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the use of homicide and drug seizures as relevant indicators for 
drug trafficking flows and changes in markets, modelling of the illicit financial 
flows associated with the drug trade can provide further insights into the nature 
and extent of this crime type.11 Such an approach uses a market-based analysis 
                                                 
11 Figures 5 and 6 and the accompanying narrative are based on UNODC, 2011. Estimating 
illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes. 
Research Report. October 2011. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf 
Central America Caribbean 
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which recognizes that the supply of illicit drugs proceeds in stages. 
Wholesalers import drugs in bulk and sell in smaller quantities to their network 
of retailers for resale, in even smaller quantities, to consumers. As shown in 
Figure 5, with respect to the cocaine market, this market structure results in a 
characteristic “V”-shaped graph, linking the transaction quantity of pure 
cocaine (in kg) with the price of pure cocaine (per g). Price and concentration 
increase to the level of a major drug trafficking organization, followed by 
further price increase but concentration decrease, as bulk cocaine is diluted and 
further distributed. As a result, in order to answer questions such as “how much 
crime is there?”, “how much profit is there in crime?”, “what proportion of the 
profit is laundered?” and “where does it go for laundering?”, it is necessary to 
generate a model that breaks the sequence of events into a number of basic 
steps, including estimating the number of traffickers involved at the retail and 
wholesale levels in key countries, analysing the market structure, and applying 
the resultant market structure to the estimated number of traffickers at the retail 
and wholesale levels with a “cut-off” rate for reasonable “living expenses”, 
above which traffickers are able to launder money. The modelling of the 
geographic attractiveness of destination countries for money launderers is then 
based on factors such as the geographic distance from the source country, 
whether the countries share a common border or are linked by a key transport 
route, whether the countries share a principal language, and the overall 
proportion of exports that pass from one country to the other.  
Figure 5: Price quantity relationship of the cocaine market in the 
late 1990s 
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With respect to the global cocaine market, analysis of this type suggests that 
the gross profits out of cocaine sales (totalling 85 billion USD) were around 84 
billion USD for the year 2009 (about 1 billion USD were production costs, 
mainly going to farmers in the Andean region). Most of the profits (retail and 
wholesale) were generated in North America (35 billion USD) and in West and 
Central Europe (26 billion USD). Whilst the local cocaine market in South 
America (including Central America and the Caribbean) are still rather small in 
dollar terms (around 3.5 billion USD), the gross profits of organized crime 
groups operating in South America, selling the drugs to the local markets as 
well as to overseas markets rises to some 18 billion USD. The calculations, 
derived from the estimates of the size of the market, the number of traffickers 
and the market structure (derived from individual drug seizures) suggests that, 
at the wholesale level, some 92% of global cocaine gross profits were available 
for laundering in 2009. The proportion fell to 46% at the retail level. In terms 
of destination countries for laundering, the “gravity” model for destination 
countries, suggests that out of more than 84 billion USD in gross profits and 
some 53 billion USD available for laundering, around 26 billion USD left the 
jurisdictions where the profits were generated.  
The approach of combining data from multiple sources – including police 
statistics, seizure reports, market surveys, and quantitative modelling – in the 
case of illicit drug trafficking shows that a reasonable picture of the nature and 
extent of the market and its consequences, both in terms of human suffering 
and capacity to distort licit business activities and investments can be 
constructed from a macro perspective. In conjunction with local, intelligence-
led information, such data is key to the inclusion of a cross-national 
understanding of the nature and extent of the phenomenon, and in turn, to the 
development of effective policy responses. The same need for a systematic 
approach, based on clearly defined data sources is no less pressing in other new 
and emerging crime areas. With respect to cybercrime, for example, data 
collection faces a number of significant challenges, including defining the 
extent of the term “cybercrime” in the first instance, as well as in 
understanding the nature and limitations of potential information sources, 
including police statistics and data generated by private sector organizations. In 
this respect, the United Nations General Assembly has recently mandated a 
“comprehensive study” on the problem of and response to cybercrime.12 In 
discussing the scope of the study, Member states decided that it would be 
important for the study to include research on: the phenomenon of cybercrime; 
statistical information on cybercrime; the challenges of cybercrime; common 
approaches to cybercrime legislation; criminalization; procedural powers; 
international cooperation; electronic evidence; the roles and responsibilities of 
service providers and the private sector; crime prevention and criminal justice 
capabilities and other responses to cybercrime; the role of international 
                                                 
12 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65/230. Para 9. 
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organizations; and technical assistance needs of Member states for the effective 
prevention and combating of cybercrime.13 
Information gathering for the study recognizes that relevant data will be found 
in all of the governmental, intergovernmental, private sector and academic 
domains. Indeed, preventing and responding to cybercrime requires partnership 
between the private sector and national governments to a greater extent than 
probably almost any other crime type. Cybercrime acts involve the same 
mobile devices, computers, wireless or wired internet connections, cloud 
computing power, software and global connectivity as the vast majority of 
legal computer use, all of which are provided by private sector organizations. 
The private sector has also developed advanced technical solutions to prevent 
and respond to cybercrime, including computer firewalls, anti-virus software 
and identity-protection packages. At the same time, many national 
governments have created legislative approaches to cybercrime, criminalizing 
acts such as illegal access to a computer system or illegal interference with 
computer data. Both the effective prevention of cybercrime and the bringing of 
cybercrime perpetrators to justice require close cooperation between the private 
sector and government institutions. Computer service providers, for example, 
may receive requests from law enforcement for information on computer users 
or customers, such as IP address records. Such requests often raise issues 
including rights to privacy and also to freedom of expression and can involve 
law enforcement authorities from multiple countries. In light of this 
complexity, questionnaires for information gathering for the study have been 
developed that cover many of these areas, including a questionnaire for 
Member states that requests police, prosecution and court statistics on 
cybercrime acts and a questionnaire for private sector organizations that asks 
about cyber-trends and threats encountered. In order to address definitional 
challenges, the questionnaires do not “define” cybercrime as such, but rather 
include a list of “act descriptions” which provide common acts that may be 
considered cybercrime: a definitional approach not dissimilar to that of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption. The act descriptions include 
inter alia acts such as illegal access to a computer system, illegal data 
interference or system interference, the production, distribution, or possession 
of computer misuse tools, breach of privacy or data protection measures, 
computer-related fraud or forgery, computer-related identity offences, 
computer, computer-related acts causing personal harm, computer-related 
production, distribution or possession of child pornography, and computer-
related acts in support of terrorism offences. As depicted in Figure 6, it is the 
combination of results from questionnaires distributed to Member states, 
intergovernmental organizations, private sector organizations and academia 
that will be used in the preparation of the final study. 
                                                 
13 See United Nations. Expert Group on Cybercrime. Draft topics for consideration in a 
comprehensive study on the impact of and response to cybercrime. 20 December 2011. UN 
Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2011/2.  
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Figure 6: Methodology for a comprehensive study on cybercrime 
 
 
This paper commenced with discussion on those crimes that may fall within the 
broad group often referred to as “new forms and manifestations” of crime. It 
continued with consideration of possible data sources and methodologies for 
measurement, illustrated by examples including the illicit drug market in the 
Americas and the phenomenon of cybercrime. From a descriptive perspective, 
such new forms and manifestations of crime frequently involve the illicit 
movement of persons, goods, or other commodities, such as computer data, 
usually for monetary gain. The complexity and logistical challenges of these 
modi operandi mean that new forms and manifestations of crime may often be 
perpetrated by groups that meet the UNTOC definition of an “organized 
criminal group”.14 As such, information is commonly sought on groups, 
markets, and financial flows with a view to characterising who (and how 
many) are involved in what (and how much). Information of this type will 
usually need to be of a cross-national nature and it has been proposed that the 
combination of data sources offers a strong approach to measurement of the 
nature and extent of new and complex crimes. An understanding of all of 
groups, markets, and financial flows has implications for the response to new 
forms and manifestations of crime. An understanding, for example, of routes 
where migrant smugglers operate can result in targeted prevention measures, 
including those aimed at potential employers in identified destination countries. 
An understanding of organized criminal group structure, supply, demand, and 
financial flows associated with drug markets can direct demand and supply 
reduction efforts and law enforcement interventions. Similarly, an 
understanding of the extent of different acts constituting cybercrime can inform 
awareness-raising and prevention amongst potential victims. Overall, whilst 
                                                 
14 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Art 2. 
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both definitions and measurement methodologies in this area are challenging, a 
systematic yet innovative approach that recognizes the comparative strengths 
of a range of data sources can begin to provide insights into the most hidden 
and yet, often, pervasive and destructive, forms of crime.  
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HOW TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARABILITY OF CRIME STATISTICS* 
Jörg-Martin Jehle 
University of Göttingen 
Federal Republic of Germany 
* This is the written version of my short oral statement given at the Helsinki 
International Seminar in honour of Kauko Aromaa. It is based on literature referred to 
in the footnote. 
Problems of international comparisons 
Since the beginnings of criminal statistics in the early 19th century, their use as 
instruments for measuring the amount of crime has been controversial. 
Nevertheless, they continue to be important up to the present day. These data 
are used to justify policies, to decide on measures of crime prevention and 
control and to make statements about the performance of the criminal justice 
system. Despite all the methodological doubts, these figures are still referred to 
in criminology, since there are no real alternatives to them. Even crime or 
victim surveys originally intended to replace recorded crime statistics can only 
complement them. Therefore it is important to face and attempt to solve all the 
methodological problems identified since the days of Quetelet and other 
pioneers in the field of criminal statistics.1  
If these observations are already true for the respective national situation to 
which criminal statistics are normally related, they are all the more valid when 
one tries to compare statistical figures of different countries. Criticisms that 
comparisons across jurisdictions are virtually impossible or at least misleading 
given the many differences in legal definitions, reporting and recording 
practices are as old as the earliest writings of Quetelet in comparative 
criminology. The difficulties in overcoming these problems may have lead to 
the fact that international comparative data in criminal justice are relatively 
rare compared to other fields of public interest. But meanwhile signs are 
increasing that an upturn of international research in criminology is taking 
place. In view of an increasingly interlinked world and a Europe growing 
closer and closer together, not only economic and social comparisons are 
                                                 
1 See Martin Killias, The European Criminal Justice Sourcebook Project, in: Jehle/Lewis: 
Improving Criminal Justice Statistics, Wiesbaden 1995, p. 203 ff.  
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needed, but it is also necessary to compare developments of crime figures as 
well as criminal policies and criminal justice systems.2  
There are only a few international collections and evaluations of crime and 
justice statistics:3 those associated with international bodies, such as the 
worldwide UN Crime Trends Survey (by UNODC and HEUNI), EuroStat Data 
Collection (European Union), CEPEJ and SPACE of the Council of Europe on 
criminal justice and prison systems, and other collections based on the 
contribution of a small number of experts, especially the European 
Sourcebook. 
How to overcome the pitfalls of international 
comparisons – The example of the ESB 
The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics4 (ESB) is a 
prominent example of such efforts to collect and evaluate national data on all 
levels of the criminal justice chain and to bring them together in a European 
comparison. In contrast to other data collections, it has established a common 
understanding of concepts, furthered comparability by using standard 
definitions for crime types and penal measures or at least improved the 
evaluation by demonstrating the deviations across jurisdictions.5 Evaluations 
have been made which focus on the question of how the given data can be used 
for criminological analyses especially of trends in crime and criminal justice, at 
the same time taking into account the methodological difficulties and the 
problems of lacking data.6 
A crucial matter in internationally comparing crime and criminal justice data is 
the different legal concepts of offences defined by the national legislator. The 
European Sourcebook has tried to find a solution for improving the 
comparability of offence data by establishing standard definitions and breaking 
down the offence types in special items to be included or excluded. Thus for 
every offence type and for each country one can identify to which extent the 
                                                 
2 Jörg-Martin Jehle, Improving Criminal Justice Statistics – Needs and Prospects, in: 
Jehle/Lewis 1995, p. 11 ff. 
3 See Chris Lewis, Crime and Justice Statistics Collected by International Agencies, the 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Special Issue on European Statistics 
(2012, in print). 
4 see Aebi et al, European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, Den Haag 
2010 
5 see Jehle/Harrendorf, Defining and Registering Criminal Offences and Measures, Göttingen 
2010 
6 See the respective articles in the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Special 
issue 2012 (in print) 
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national data could follow the standard definition. This can be demonstrated by 
the example of rape7 (see graph below): 
RAPE: sexual intercourse with a person against her/his will (per vaginam or 
other)  
 Include the following: Deviations:  
 penetration other than vaginal (e.g. 
buggery)  
ARM, CH, RUS, UA, SK, Scotland  
 violent intra-marital sexual 
intercourse  
MD, RUS, SK  
 sexual intercourse without force with 
a helpless person  
A, CH, GR, NL, SK, SLO, England & 
Wales, N. Ireland, Scotland  
 sexual intercourse with force with a 
minor  
CH, GR, SK, SLO  
 attempts  P, SK 
 
Exclude the following: 
 sexual intercourse with a minor 
without force  
AL, B, F, LV, SW  
 other forms of sexual assault  AL, I, LV, PL  
 
The standard definition for rape was slightly modified after the first edition of 
the questionnaire, and then remained identical in the second and third editions 
of the European Sourcebook. For the fourth edition, the definition was updated 
after being evaluated and optimized by the AGIS project. It is specified as 
“sexual intercourse with a person against her/his will” and backed up with a list 
of items to include in or to exclude from the data. 
Overall half of the countries reporting data to the ESB questionnaire could 
meet the ESB standard definition of rape at the police level. Nineteen countries 
followed the standard definition of rape proposed by the questionnaire. 
                                                 
7 See Jehle/Harrendorf 2010, p. 70 
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For the other countries, some items could not be included in or excluded from 
the data. Mainly, some countries could not include sexual intercourse without 
force with a helpless person in their rape data, and others had to exclude 
penetration other than vaginal. Only three countries excluded violent intra-
marital sexual intercourse, but four countries could not exclude sexual 
intercourse with force with a minor from their data. 
Generally, there are fewer deviations from standard definitions for conviction 
statistics than for police statistics.8 
Of course, this definitional approach can only lead to a description of how far 
the national concepts of criminal offences can be compared. A further step in 
order to overcome the pitfalls of international comparisons should refer to the 
level of statistical recording. Firstly, on the police level not only is the violation 
of a legal provision recorded, but also additional criminological data e.g. 
concerning the object and the victim of the offence, are registered. If the 
additional data can be used, one can create identical or at least more similar 
statistical units despite differing national crime definitions. 
To give an example: The ESB collects data on domestic burglary. The standard 
definition reads as follows: “Gaining access to private premises by use of force 
with the intent to steal goods”. This standard definition cannot be easily met by 
continental countries: Burglary is one special form within a broad concept of 
aggravated theft. Therefore the figures for aggravated theft can only be reduced 
to burglary if additional information on the target and the modus operandi is 
available. This is the case for police-recorded crime statistics in many 
European countries. But on the court level only the violation of a legal 
provision is recorded, and therefore no specific burglary data are found in 
continental countries. 
Change of recording methods in an international 
uniform way 
The ideal way of overcoming the pitfalls of international comparisons is the 
event-based approach suggested by Kauko Aromaa.9 This means that the 
legally defined crime is no longer taken as the statistical unit, but is replaced by 
a criminologically reasonable event particularly described by its elements and 
attributes. This approach has been adopted by the UNODC/UNECE Task 
Force, which has developed a comprehensive concept for the international 
                                                 
8 For details, see Jehle, Attrition and Conviction Rates of Sexual Offences in Europe, in: 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Special issue 2012 (in print) 
9 For details, see Kauko Aromaa in this volume 
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classification of crimes and reported this to the Conference of European 
Statisticians.10  
The starting point is an act/event-based classification. Each action/event is 
broken down into its constituents/elements/attributes: 
Act: target (e.g. person/object), seriousness (e.g. damage), modus operandi 
(e.g. use of force), degree of completion (e.g. attempt) 
Perpetrator: age, sex, intent (e.g. negligence), co-responsibility (e.g. 
accessory, accomplice) 
Victim: age, sex 
Such a breakdown by elements and attributes is promising, as is clearly shown 
by the examples of assault leading to death and burglary.  
But of course the implementation of such an approach will mean hard work. 
The evaluation of the Task Force indicates that the development of an 
international crime classification system is challenging in light of significant 
differences between existing national crime classification systems. The 
eventual development of a full international crime classification should be 
carefully piloted using a limited number of crimes in the first instance. 
Substantial work would be required to either ‘parallel-code’ recorded crime 
events using an international classification, or to ‘cross-code’ from existing 
national classifications to an international classification. In order to ensure that 
lessons-learned are integrated into this process, any international crime 
classification should be developed in a consultative manner and implemented 
progressively both within and across countries. 
Concluding remarks 
 As long as we don’t have event-based crime statistics we have to try to 
find comparable elements between the existing national data on the 
police level or at least to document the differences.  
 As long as a uniform European criminal code doesn’t exist we have to 
live with different crime definitions which determine the recording on 
court level. 
 If we do not want to wait for an international uniform recording system 
we should continue internationally collecting and evaluating crime 
statistics data taking into account their pitfalls and weaknesses. 
 This means: The figures can not easily be used by policy-makers and 
the public, but have to be thoroughly interpreted. At the same time this 
is a comfort for criminologists: Their expertise will not become 
superfluous, they still have work to do 
                                                 
10 Report of the UNODC/UNECE Task Force on Crime Classification, prepared by experts, 
among them Kauko Aromaa, Steven Malby and the author 
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PREPARED STATEMENT 
Geoffrey Thomas 
Eurostat 
Eurostat’s mandate to produce crime statistics goes back to the Hague 
Programme (2005) of the European Union. The 2006-10 Action Plan to 
implement the Hague Programme includes a number of activities in the area of 
so-called ‘complex crimes’, including trafficking in human beings, money-
laundering, cybercrime and corruption. The Stockholm Programme (2010) 
reiterated many of the policy objectives outlined in the Hague Programme and 
this is reflected in the 2010-2014 Action Plan, which in turn reiterated many of 
the priorities of its predecessor. 
In the specific area of money-laundering statistics, Eurostat has followed up the 
requirements of the third money-laundering Directive (2005/60/EC) which 
specified the information to be gathered by EU Member States and forwarded 
to the Commission. Eurostat’s first point of departure was the network of 
contact points which had already been built up in the Member States for the 
purpose of collecting administrative data on crime such as police reports. Such 
data have been collected by Eurostat on an annual basis since 2007 and are 
published on the Eurostat website as well as in analytical factsheets in the 
series Statistics in Focus. 
However, the collection of data on money-laundering proved more 
problematical due to communications difficulties within the Member States. 
These included in the first instance a lack of awareness at the national level of 
the work of the FIUs (Financial Intelligence Units) set up by the Directive. In 
some cases it required Eurostat’s intervention to establish contact between the 
statistical contact points and the FIUs. In addition, the Directive was 
insufficiently clear on the information to be collected, requiring considerable 
work to define appropriate indicators and associated guidelines to enable the 
national authorities to provide the data. 
The publication Money laundering in Europe covering the years 2003-2008 
was finally issued by Eurostat in November 2010 and was generally well 
received as representing the first initiative of this kind. Eurostat is currently 
engaged in producing a second edition updating the situation to reference year 
2010, which is scheduled to appear in late 2011. 
The next area which Eurostat will cover concerns trafficking in human beings. 
A similar procedure is being followed and some of the experiences acquired in 
collecting money-laundering data will be put to use, including a process of 
informing the Member States of the initiative, providing detailed indicators and 
guidelines, and establishing a list of appropriate points of contact. In this case 
the important network consists of the network of ‘national rapporteurs’ set up 
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under the European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 
2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. The role of the 
national rapporteurs as defined in Article 19 of this Directive includes 
collecting statistics, and in Article 20 a biennial report on trafficking is set up. 
Although the compulsory transposition of the Directive into national law is not 
due until 5 April 2013, the signs are hopeful that data will be forthcoming from 
a large number of Member States. A request to all countries was issued by 
Eurostat in September 2011 and publication of the results is planned in early 
2012. 
This brief overview of activities in the field of crime statistics indicates 
Eurostat’s commitment to international progress in monitoring the types of 
crime which have been the focus of this seminar. 
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COLLECTION OF DATA ON HATE CRIME 
Sami Nevala 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and its 
predecessor the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
(EUMC), has reported on an annual basis on racist crime and harassment – in 
dedicated reports1, in its Annual Reports2, and in annual antisemitism 
overview reports3. The FRA will expand the scope of its analysis with a report 
on the collection of data on hate crime in the 27 Member States of the 
European Union, covering a wide range of grounds, including immigrant or 
ethnic minority background, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and other 
grounds. 
While the FRA continues to follow the situation on hate crime in the Member 
States based on administrative data (for example, data collected by the police 
when recording incidents), only limited conclusions can be drawn based on 
existing official data collection. In many European Union (EU) Member States, 
the existing data collection can provide only limited tools for designing and 
improving measures for the prevention of hate crimes. This is reflected in the 
large discrepancies between Member States in the number of recorded hate 
crimes, from tens of thousands of cases each year in some countries, to a 
handful of cases in others. 
To complement the picture provided by police statistics, and in order to move 
towards a more comprehensive approach to data collection and analysis, the 
FRA has initiated a number of projects to explore the experiences of hate crime 
among persons at risk in the EU Member States. 
The forerunner of these projects has been the European Union Minorities and 
Discrimination survey (EU-MIDIS). This survey, which interviewed a total of 
over 23,000 immigrants and ethnic minority persons in the EU-27, has 
provided a wealth of data that can inform us not only about how widespread 
the problems are, but also about the situations where hate-motivated crime 
takes place, who are the perpetrators, and to what extent these incidents are 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States (2005): 
http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/previous_publicati
ons/pub_cr_racistviolence01-04_en.htm 
2 See http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/annual_report_on_fundamental_ 
rights/annual_report_on_fundamental_rights_en.htm 
3 See e.g. Antisemitism – summary overview of the situation in the EU 2001-2010 (2011): 
http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/publications/publications_per_year/2011/pub-
antisemitism-update-2011_en.htm 
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reported to the police. The survey also collected data on the experiences of 
immigrants and ethnic minorities with discrimination, their awareness of their 
rights, and their experiences of being stopped by the police. 
Indeed, the results of the survey – as documented in a series of reports4 – show 
that most incidents are never reported to the police, and in many cases people 
are to a large extent unaware of the rights they have, and are therefore unlikely 
to pursue those rights. In 2012 the FRA will complete its set of Data in Focus 
reports based on the survey with the sixth report in the series, dealing with the 
experiences of criminal victimisation among immigrants and ethnic minorities. 
The FRA has also launched an EU-wide survey on violence against women, 
which will interview a random sample of 40,000 women across the EU’s 27 
Member States and Croatia. The survey will collect data, through face-to-face 
interviews, about women’s lifetime and more recent experiences of physical, 
sexual and psychological violence in different settings and by different 
perpetrators. Although not framed as a survey on ’hate crime’, the findings on 
gender-based violence can also be looked at through the broad lens of ’bias-
motivated crime’.  
In addition, in 2011-2012 the FRA initiated further population-based survey 
research to measure the extent and nature of hate crime against lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender people across the EU, as well as a separate survey on 
discrimination and hate crime against Jewish people in selected EU Member 
States.  
The results of the FRA’s new surveys – as outlined above – will be available 
from 2013 onwards. Each survey presents comparable results between Member 
States, which can allow for informed targeting of resources to areas that have 
been identified as problematic – be it through new legislation or development 
of programmes aimed at preventing these crimes. 
In turn, the research carried out by the FRA should also encourage countries to 
consider developing new methods of data collection at the national level, as a 
part of a comprehensive system for evidence-based policy making in the field 
of hate crime. 
                                                 
4 The results of the EU-MIDIS are available at http://fra.europa.eu/eu-midis 
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POLICY RELEVANCE AND CRIME DATA 
Kauko Aromaa 
HEUNI 
What are crime data? 
The data sources most commonly used for situation assessments, for trend 
assessments, and for comparisons across regimes and jurisdictions refer to 
 police-recorded crime, and 
 survey-based crime victimisation. 
There are many other potential and existing data sources on crime-related 
issues. However, these two types of data are those that are currently used most 
widely. 
For this reason the following discussion is primarily about these two, even 
though it is worth considering the implications also in respect of other 
frequently scrutinised data types, such as prosecutor, court and prison data, as 
well as sanctions-related data more generally. 
In regards to administrative crime data, a number of other options do exist. 
Such data are being produced under many umbrellas, and by many 
organisations, from state to municipal to non-governmental organisations. 
Consequently, much of the following does – more or less – apply to all of these 
various data sources. 
There are three main justifications for doing comparative crime data analysis. 
One is comparison of crime rates; a second one is comparison of crime trends; 
and a third one is a combination of these two. Currently, all of these objectives 
are severely hampered by a fundamental lack of comparability of these data. 
The fundamental problem 
Crime statistics are not highly valued or used in decision-making related to 
crime policy. When they are used, the conclusions are likely to be incorrect 
This is due to one well-known fundamental problem, and three lower-level 
flaws. 
The fundamental problem is that administrative crime-related data only reflect 
the work of crime control agencies, and not “crime”. Unrecorded crime 
notoriously hampers the usefulness of this data source, if the expectation is that 
it should inform us about “crime” as this occurs in everyday reality. Survey-
based data, on the other hand, are not readily comparable with administrative 
data and therefore also problematic. 
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Since this problem has been recognised, many policy-makers and experts alike 
have lost faith and failed to try to make the best out of what we have. 
This is a mistake: administrative data are the only ones that are readily 
available on a regular basis. Therefore, much effort should be invested into 
making them more useful, rather than complaining about their shortcomings. 
One way to do this is to look at the lower-level flaws of crime-related 
administrative data. 
The three lower-level flaws 
Compared to the fundamental problem of administrative crime data being 
about the work of the relevant authorities, not about crime, the three lower-
level flaws are in a way of more interest because they can be remedied. 
The first flaw: administrative and survey data are not sufficiently useful for 
policy purposes because they do not adequately address policy relevant issues. 
This is to a large extent due to administrative crime data being outdated – they 
were designed in a different historical situation. They do indeed come from 
archaic societies that had quite different interests in knowledge than current 
democratic societies. Often, the way in which administrative crime data are 
compiled has not been significantly amended over time to correspond to a 
modern policy-making environment, in which statistics/crime data, in addition 
to their governance function, serve quite a different function, where they are 
used and needed for social and political debate. Also, the important 
requirement of continuity slows down changes that would be needed to 
improve the “timeliness” of the data. 
Also survey-based data are outdated, albeit in terms of a shorter time 
perspective: they were initially designed with the idea of wanting to learn about 
unrecorded crime, and since then they have not been properly developed to 
their full (unrecognised) potential. 
Re: ”Policy relevant issues”: What is crime policy? 
In order to discuss policy, we are well advised to go back to Patrik Törnudd 
(1969, 1971) who coined a working definition of crime policy through its 
objectives. According to Törnudd,  
”Decision-making related to crime and crime control – criminal policy or crime 
control policy – has two basic objectives: 
1. To regulate/minimise the sum total of the social costs (including 
human suffering) caused by crime and by society’s response to 
crime (i.e. crime control), and 
2. To distribute these costs fairly among the parties involved, i.e. 
offenders, crime victims, tax payers, and so on.” 
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The objectives of crime policy 
To emphasise the core issues: the objectives of crime policy are fourfold:  
 minimising the social costs of crime 
 minimising the costs of crime control 
 distributing the costs 
 doing this in a “fair” manner. 
A knowledge-based response to all of this requires improvements to crime-
related data. It also requires much research of a kind that is not being done too 
often 
The second flaw: Administrative crime data and survey-based data are not 
addressing sufficiently well the strategic logical elements of crime. Because of 
this, those wishing to use them for knowledge-based decisions will be at a loss. 
The logical basic elements of crime 
Crime takes place in a specific temporal, geographical, social and legal 
framework that determines what people and legal persons are able to do, and 
which actions are defined as crimes in that particular framework. 
Reform work and debate concerning the criminal justice system has often been 
about changing the legal framework: diversion, decriminalisation, 
decarceration, alternative sanctions, restorative justice, etc. 
Within this framework, crime is a simple thing, composed of three logical 
elements that are required for a crime to take place: the perpetrator, the 
target/victim, and insufficient control (Marcus Felson) 
The first element is the offender 
Graph 1: The first element: the offender. 
Motivated and
able offender
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The requirement of a motivated and able offender has several consequences. 
First, no crime can take place if there is no criminal will and capacity, i.e. there 
is no motivated and able offender. Societal change influences how many such 
offenders are around and what they are like. Crime data, research and policy 
have been mostly looking at this factor. Our criminal law and criminal justice 
systems are focused on the offender.  
Furthermore, a large part of existing theory concerns this element of crime: 
crime causation theories (biological, psychological, social) are the prime 
example of this. This is not wrong as such. It is indeed relevant to study 
offenders and offending behaviour. Criminal law is about wrongdoing, and the 
criminal justice system deals with the known wrongdoers, and tries to deter the 
potential ones. 
The second element is the target/victim. 
Graph 2: The second element: the target/victim 
Motivated and
able offender
Suitable
target/
victim
 
However motivated, skilful and able the potential offenders may be, a crime 
cannot be committed if a suitable victim or target is not available. Societal 
change influences how many and what kinds of targets/victims are available. It 
also influences the intersection of these two elements, i.e. how much and in 
what respects they overlap. 
Awareness – and data – regarding targets and victims, and research to this end 
are essential for improved interventions. 
Similarly, data and research that illuminate the intersection of offender and 
target are essential for a better understanding of the situation. 
An improved understanding of the relevant mechanisms also provides tools for 
the legal and administrative systems designed for interventions. 
The third element is control. 
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Graph 3: The third element: control 
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Even when offender and target coincide in time and space, nothing will happen 
if the situation/opportunity is adequately controlled. Also the size and profile of 
this element is influenced by societal change, and so are its intersections with 
the first two elements. 
Control is both formal and informal. It is external control. Self-control and 
internalisation of norms are another matter that would rather belong to the 
problem area “motivated and able offender”. 
External control has not been studied too much, nor is there much work on the 
interplay of the three basic logical elements. 
The third flaw: Currently, administrative crime data and survey-based data are 
incompatible. They speak two different languages. 
Administrative data speak the language of the criminal code (what was the 
name of the offence, etc.). 
Survey-based data speak an everyday existential-phenomenological language 
(what happened, who was involved, how did you feel, etc.). 
There is indeed even a fourth flaw that causes much trouble as well: the 
counting rules and units are often not identical. However, I choose to neglect 
this particular flaw for the time being. Basically, in order to be comparable, 
counting should be event-based, as is mostly the case in respect of data on 
police-recorded crime as well as of data from victimisation surveys (albeit that 
the latter are often used to estimate victim prevalences rather than event 
incidences). 
Remedies 
Regarding the first flaw (missing policy relevant issues): administrative crime 
data, even though they are working statistics, could nevertheless offer more 
information about the target/victim, the costs issue, and the control element. In 
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particular, simple victim characteristics such as age, sex, relationship to 
perpetrator, etc. should be collected on a routine basis. 
Regarding the second flaw (neglecting the logical elements of crime): similar 
remedies would, to a degree, take care of this flaw as well. 
Regarding the third flaw (administrative crime data and survey-based data 
speak two different languages): the comparability of these two types of data 
can be improved by relatively simple measures. These would also provide a 
partial answer to what could be done about the first two flaws. I'll explain. 
More about the third flaw 
Administrative crime data are currently not comparable with survey data, and 
not comparable across jurisdictions (and perhaps not strictly comparable over 
time either). 
This is because they are working statistics, and thus prisoners of their 
respective criminal codes that define what is being described. 
This flaw can be influenced in a simple manner: Introduce a reasonably small 
number of new descriptive variables to standard crime data at the police level. 
For example for crimes against persons, it would be useful to know who were 
involved, what was their relationship, what were the damages, what was the 
modus operandi, what were the circumstances ... 
Some of this has actually already been done in many countries for some 
selected crime categories. 
For instance, “aggravated theft” may be specified by using subcategories that 
indicate whether breaking and entering is involved, and that describe the target 
of the burglary/offence (home, business premises, warehouse, ...) 
Similarly, some countries have recently joined a European project that attempts 
to introduce a joint standard for data collection on police-recorded homicides. 
This project recommends that identical case characteristics should be collected 
regarding each homicide, describing a multiplicity of perpetrator, victim, and 
event characteristics. 
Because the currently used additional variables are unique for each country, 
these additional descriptive elements are not uniform and not similar, and thus 
their usefulness is limited. 
Systematically add some new variables to police crime data 
These variables should not be too many, and they would, to a degree, depend 
on the type of crime. 
Not all crimes need to be dealt with simultaneously, at once; it might be 
tactically better to start with a few crimes that are not too numerous and that 
are politically interesting. 
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It would then be possible to proceed to other crime types when the time is ripe, 
i.e. when the usefulness of the innovation has become obvious. 
The result 
It this is done systematically, the information value of the crime data becomes 
much higher. 
Comparability over time and across jurisdictions is considerably improved 
since the new variables are not criminal code related but practical, and 
therefore comparable. 
What is an additional bonus is that this solution creates a “bridge” between 
police data and survey data, bringing them eventually to speak a few words of 
a common language. 
The time is ripe 
Consequently, the new variables should be of a kind that correspond to some 
international victimisation survey standard. Today, in Europe, for some crimes, 
such a standard is currently being developed: Eurostat is about to launch a 
European Union wide general victimisation survey, and the Fundamental 
Rights Agency is about to launch a European Union wide dedicated survey on 
violence against women. The core event characteristics of the relevant crimes 
could be simply taken over from these surveys and added to police-recorded 
crime data. 
The time is ripe to take this cheap and small, yet radical step that will finally 
allow existing crime data to be understood and applied for better policy 
decisions. 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
Fredrik Wersäll 
President, Svea Court of Appeal, Sweden 
Chairperson, HEUNI Advisory Board 
I shall not attempt to summarise the discussions that we have had. However, 
the contributions show that the work of HEUNI moves within the core area of 
research and policy-making.  
Just a few words about the future. The topics discussed today have currently 
been highly acute at the European level and also at the global level, since 
issues of this kind are obviously not just of European relevance. However, as 
major topics for HEUNI, they are not likely to survive forever – although it is 
probably true that they will never disappear or be elaborated sufficiently. 
Nonetheless, once a critical amount of basic work has been done on such 
topics, the work is likely to proceed to the level of new routines that are no 
longer something for small think-tanks to take forward, but instead become 
part of standard administrative routines. If this will take place, innovative path-
breaking work on such topics will no longer be of the highest priority. 
Even so, some work on these topics should be continued also in the future, not 
least because some unique expertise around these topics has been developed in 
HEUNI in recent times.  
It is likely that new acute problem areas and corresponding new areas of 
excellence are going to be developed, and need to be developed, in the years to 
come. We should be prepared for this – a classic dilemma of an organisation 
that wants to survive in a turbulent environment (and today, it is indeed 
turbulent in several respects) is that it continues to do the “right” things for too 
long, and will eventually end up in a crisis. What was initially “right” may 
eventually not continue to be so, and an organisation interested in survival 
must try to be sensitive to this.  
I am not trying to look into the future too closely. To forecast such things is not 
too simple.  
But it is likely that if HEUNI maintains its knowledge about and familiarity 
with current and emerging international concerns in the area of crime and 
crime policy, the institute is also going to be able to maintain its position. New 
topics in this sense are not likely to emerge overnight, but are bred for years 
and years in preparatory organs before they will gain broader recognition. 
Thus, being there and being active and awake when this happens is the answer. 
See, for instance how forced labour issues have come to the surface – this took 
years and years of ILO input before becoming better recognised and accepted – 
and this work is by far not finished yet. The life span of a topic of this kind is 
not very short. 
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In any case, the longevity of topics may vary. Topics that have once been 
forgotten also tend to be revitalised, although when this happens it is likely that 
they become flavoured with new perspectives. A good example of this is the 
ever-topical issue of crime data. It reappears in new disguises over and over 
again, but old expertise on them will not suffice when this happens – it is 
essential to have the old knowledge to build on, but it is totally insufficient to 
apply the old knowledge “as is”. 
To summarise: In my opinion, the way forward for HEUNI is to participate in 
international development work and debate, cooperating with the big players in 
the area, while at the same time taking advantage of the flexibility of a small 
organisation. With that in mind, I can foresee another 30 successful years for 
the institute. 
Last but not least a few words to Kauko.  
We came to know one another about 20 years ago and have had contact ever 
since. You are a recognised researcher, who combines the skill of going in 
depth with a problem and at the same time presenting the finding in a way that 
is understandable for amateurs as me. 
You are colourful and outspoken and not a bit afraid of being controversial, 
something that is not very common in this part of the world. 
We on the Advisory Board have had little to add to the skilful leadership that 
you have presented. We are constantly trying to come up with new ideas, but 
they have normally already been thought of. 
I know that I speak for the entire Advisory Board when I say that it has been a 
pleasure to work with you as the Director for HEUNI. We wish you all the best 
in the future. 
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